

As part of its original request NASA included a new section 5 in the bill which would grant the Administrator relief from the 6-percent limitation on architect-engineer fees imposed by the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 2306(d). NASA's proposal had been to amend the basic Space Act of 1958, thereby enacting permanent legislation which would permit waivers of the 6-percent limitation by the Administrator. The House disagreed with NASA's request in this regard and included a substitute provision which would grant relief to NASA for a period of 1 year only. The provision of temporary relief was based on the House position that all Federal agencies involved in the construction of facilities, particularly in support of research and development programs are faced with the same problem regarding the limitations on architect-engineer fees. The House report accompanying H.R. 14324 instructed the Comptroller General to conduct a Government-wide

study with regard to this matter and to submit its recommendations for possible legislative change by January 1, 1967.

The Senate disagreed with the House position in this matter and deleted section 5 from the bill on the basis that NASA should abide by the same procurement practices in effect within the Department of Defense. The Senate agreed with the House that a Government-wide study should be made, however, their position was that the Bureau of the Budget should conduct this study in lieu of the Comptroller General as proposed by the House.

In conference the managers on the part of the House agreed with the Senate that the provision should be struck from the bill and that NASA should be enjoined to abide by the procurement regulations in effect within the Department of Defense pending possible revision to the statutes. The Senate, on the other hand, receded to the House position and agreed that

the Government-wide study should be made by the Comptroller General.

Mr. Speaker, the foregoing account of the actions taken in conference has been somewhat in detail as, in my opinion, it should be, in view of the fact that it involves authorization amounting to more than \$5 billion. As in all conferences of this nature some compromise is necessary. However, in my opinion, the items in dispute have been settled in conference more in favor of the original House position than the position assumed by the Senate.

I feel that our conferees have adequately defended the House position and prevailed in most major issues involving the national space effort. The bill as finally agreed to in conference is the best possible that we could achieve under the circumstances. It is a bill which, in my opinion, is in the best interests of NASA and the furtherance of the Nation's space program.

## SENATE

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1966

(Legislative day of Friday, July 22, 1966)

The Senate met at 10 o'clock a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by Hon. THOMAS H. KUCHEL, a Senator from the State of California.

Rev. Edward B. Lewis, pastor, Capitol Hill Methodist Church, Washington, D.C., offered the following prayer:

Dear Lord and Father of mankind, we recognize a basic essential of life for prayer at the beginning of this session of the U.S. Senate.

This moment of prayer is for the sincere purpose of invoking divine blessing and guidance upon one of the highest of government assemblies.

Prayer is offered today, O God, because of the sense of personal need. We are grateful for leaders who have a consciousness of heavy responsibility. We know that Thou art with them; even through this prayer and their personal meditations, deliberations, and decisions. Be Thou their guide and strength.

Be with our President and the world leaders. Give men of the governments of the world sincere desire and insight to the way of peace, we pray sincerely in the name of the Prince of Peace. Amen.

### DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,  
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,  
Washington, D.C., July 26, 1966.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. THOMAS H. KUCHEL, a Senator from the State of California, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

CARL HAYDEN,  
President pro tempore.

Mr. KUCHEL thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

## THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, July, 25, 1966, was dispensed with.

### FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, 1966

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3584) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is the amendment offered by Senator MORSE now the order of business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). The amendment offered by Senator MORSE is now the order of business.

### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, pending the arrival of the distinguished Senator from Oregon, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] may speak for 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### REFERRAL OF BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for giving me this opportunity. I shall be very brief.

Mr. President, I submit, for appropriate reference, a resolution to provide that all original bills or resolutions proposed to be reported shall be introduced and referred to the appropriate Senate committee before being placed on the Calendar of Business. I do so in light of the situation which recently developed on the floor when the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee reported an origi-

nal resolution from that committee and asked for its consideration, without its having been referred to the Armed Services Committee, which has jurisdiction over the subject matter involved.

In response to a question first raised by the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] the Vice President said that had the resolution been introduced in the customary way, it would have been referred to the Armed Services Committee. He emphasized, however, that this was his informal opinion given to a hypothetical question. Later, as a result of a point of order made by the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] when the question arose of whether the resolution as reported from the Foreign Relations Committee had to be referred to the Armed Services Committee, the Vice President ruled that there was no precedent, and left the matter to the Senate to decide.

I think the Senate made the proper decision in that instance, but I do not believe it should be faced with such a question again. As it now stands, the precedent is that the matter should be referred to the Senate for a vote. I think the issue involved in that situation is too important to be left unclear. It should be spelled out in the rules. We know that in instances such as the one recently before us, the House of Representatives has procedures which would prevent the floor action proposed by the supporters of the original resolution. I do not believe this matter should be left open to doubt in this body, either.

I believe that my resolution will be helpful. If a committee is allowed to extend its jurisdiction into areas traditionally within the jurisdiction of other committees, all subjects may be "up for grabs," so to speak. No committee can feel secure that the jurisdiction it possesses today will not have to be shared tomorrow with another committee which asserts its desire to extend its traditional jurisdiction to cover other subjects. This could be done without hearings and without providing an opportunity to consider the views of the committees which

traditionally have had jurisdiction over the subject in question. There would, of course, be an opportunity for discussion on the Senate floor, but such matters should first be given careful consideration with adequate opportunity for all interested parties to be heard.

My resolution would avoid problems by establishing regular—and I believe proper—procedures for considering original resolutions reported by committees as well as resolutions amended by striking out all after the enacting clause and inserting new language, the subject matter of which is predominantly within the jurisdiction of another committee. I hope that the Committee on Rules and Administration will be able to schedule hearings on the proposal this session. It may be that such hearings would reveal ways in which it can be modified and strengthened. I am concerned with the principle involved. I believe there should be a provision in the Senate rules to cover this matter. It should not be necessary for the Senate to vote up or down each original resolution reported by a committee which involves the jurisdiction of another committee. Nor is it the way to conduct the business of the Senate.

Mr. President, I hope the Committee on Rules and Administration will give me and those of us who are interested in this subject an opportunity to be heard.

I thank the majority leader for this opportunity to speak.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It is a pleasure, I say to my distinguished friend, the senior Senator from Massachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, under the rule, will be printed in the RECORD.

The resolution (S. Res. 287) was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

*Resolved*, That Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"3. All original bills or resolutions proposed to be reported shall be introduced and referred to the appropriate standing committee before being placed on the Calendar of Business. A proposed report on a bill or resolution with a committee amendment to strike out all after the enacting or resolving clause and insert in lieu thereof new language, the subject matter of which predominantly is within the jurisdiction of another committee, shall be referred to such other committee and reported therefrom before it shall be printed on the Calendar of Business for Senate consideration."

#### COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly Legislation of the Committee on the Judiciary be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate today.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, objections have been lodged with the minority leadership. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Government Research of the Committee on Government Operations and the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PASTORE subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hearing none, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Gen. Nguyen Kao Ky, provisional premier of South Vietnam, has recently stated to the American people that the requirements of victory in Vietnam compel a ground invasion of North Vietnam. Furthermore, he believes that "we" as "free men" ought to go to war now with China since we will have to do so, in any event, in 5 or 10 years.

General Ky's right to say whatever he pleases is recognized. His right to bind the United States thereby ought to be rejected in equally unmistakable terms.

It so happens that Gen. Nguyen Kao Ky is a northern Vietnamese. It is quite proper for him to desire the reunification of Vietnam, which, as some of us have stated, is basically one culture, north and south, with many shadings. It is quite proper for him to want to go back home to North Vietnam, where he was born and where he grew up and did his initial soldiering with the French colonial forces. It is quite proper for him to believe he must fight the Chinese, if it is necessary for him to get there and stay there.

What is not proper, what is most improper, is for the United States to permit itself to be placed by General Ky in a position which requires us not only to use our strength to protect the provisional Ky government in South Vietnam but to carry General Ky back home to North Vietnam on the shoulders of our marines and infantry. What is not proper is for us to incur tens of thousands of additional U.S. casualties to help General Ky realize his ambitions.

What is not proper is for the United States to have any aim in this war except peace, a peace equitable and restrained, and at the soonest possible moment. That is where the American interest lies, wherever General Ky's interests may extend and whatever they may be.

We have already put upward of 270,000 Americans into Vietnam in order to do most of the frontline fighting there while, in accordance with General Ky's desires, he concentrates on organizing the rear. It would be, and I choose the word most advisedly, an abomination to move this already questionable battle order into North Vietnam in order to accommodate General Ky.

It seems to me that this Government has only one course here and that is, to dissociate itself completely and at once from General Ky's statement, which is his own business, and to reiterate clearly that the commitment of this Nation is to the people of South Vietnam and to the kind of political order which they can and will in time and in freedom choose for themselves. To accept for ourselves a concept of this war, such as that advanced by General Ky, would appear to be at the gravest variance with the interests and the policies of the United States and with the basis on which this war has heretofore been supported.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. I thank the Senator from Montana for yielding to me. I commend the majority leader for what he has said.

When I awoke this morning and found that there had emerged a great new leader for the Western democracies in the person of General Ky I did not know whether to swell with pride or to tremble with apprehension. I decided that it would be better to let Russia and China do the trembling and perhaps we should be rather proud that we have done so much to develop this new leadership.

It is very possible that after he takes care of Russia and China and North Vietnam, perhaps we could ask his advice as to what we should do in the United States where we are having virtually organized insurrection in our cities, where we have strikes in our most critical industries and where there is no home building or home purchasing possible because the banks are putting their money into channels other than mortgages or homes.

Perhaps he could advise us about the financing of our own Government, which I understand today is in a rather precarious situation.

I do not know just what we might give in return for the advice and leadership which is now available to us. Possibly we could contribute more American troops to start with, but as to what the ultimate number should be, I have no knowledge—possibly a contribution of 5 million would suffice since with competent leadership and direction our quota could be held to a minimum.

As I say, let us leave it to Russia and China to do the trembling. They have wanted us to make a bigger effort in Vietnam so that in 2 years we will be more thoroughly bogged down and they will be in a position to undertake a war of any size and kind. Now, let them worry.

As I have said, I thank the majority leader for calling our attention to this



change in leadership, and it is up to each of us to decide whether he will swell with pride or tremble with apprehension for fear of what it might bring about.

Mr. MANSFIELD. May I say to my distinguished friend that if we were to follow General Ky's advice, we would directly presume to be an Asiatic power which is something I do not think we should do under any circumstances. I believe that we should stay with our historic position which goes back beyond the time when we were an Atlantic power, in reality. We should remain, on the other side of the world, a Pacific power, and not try to stretch ourselves into being an Asian power.

Our interests are on the fringes and borders of the Western Pacific Ocean, but not deep in the mainland of Asia. We are not in Vietnam to become and we should not seek to become an Asiatic power.

Mr. AIKEN. There is nothing like a conference in the mid-Pacific to develop the greatest leadership in the world.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to identify myself with the majority leader and the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] in what they have said. I rise to underline the words of the majority leader, which I think are the key words of importance today, and that is to disassociate this Government from the assertions of General Ky.

The origin of the present situation is Honolulu, and the situation has now come full circle with General Ky representing a position into which the United States might be thrown.

I wish to pay my tribute to the majority leader for calling the turn on it. I hope very much that this position is followed by our Government in calling the turn on General Ky.

It is high time that General Ky found that he does not speak for the United States and that he cannot impliedly speak for the United States because he represents, for the time being, the Government of South Vietnam.

Second, as the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] emphasized, our responsibility is to the people of South Vietnam, so long as they demonstrate a hunger for freedom and the will to fight for it. If we find that these factors have changed, I say that we do not belong there.

Third, it demonstrates that we must push with all of the effort that we have and all the influence that we have for a duly elected, legitimate civilian government. As long as there is a military junta running South Vietnam, this kind of irresponsibility becomes possible.

I think that the majority leader has shown time and again his complete probity in these matters of foreign policy by taking positions of this kind.

I honor the majority leader for taking the position that he has today. I hope that it is followed by our Government. I think that it is the only way in which the implications of Honolulu—where, it

has been said, the United States put its arm around General Ky—can be ended.

General Ky has provided us a splendid opportunity and it should be taken advantage of.

I congratulate the majority leader for his great exercise of responsibility today and the leadership which he has demonstrated.

UNITED STATES MUST DISAVOW PREMIER KY'S EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. President, in recent weeks leaders of the military junta in Saigon, and in particular Premier Ky, have made statements and stated objectives that are both dangerous and contrary to the aims of U.S. policy in Asia. If the United States is to maintain and strengthen the credibility of its peace position, we must disavow those dangerous objectives as expressed by the Saigon leaders.

The latest of these statements is reported in today's New York Times. Quoting from an interview with Premier Ky from U.S. News & World Report, the article indicates that Premier Ky wants the United States to face the Communist Chinese now. "Sooner or later we, as freemen, have to face the Chinese Communists. I think it is better to face them right now than in 5 or 10 years."

Last week, Premier Ky called for an Allied invasion of North Vietnam.

In previous weeks Ky has repeatedly stated that his government, or indeed any South Vietnamese government over which he has any control, would never under any circumstances, negotiate with the National Liberation Party.

All three of these aims are dangerously out of line with U.S. policy. It is not enough for the United States simply to ignore these remarks. Silence is not sufficient disavowal. If Premier Ky's remarks are ignored by us, other nations cannot help but believe that he is expressing objectives which we ourselves hold but choose not to state publicly.

There is no reason for us to fear the consequences of challenging Premier Ky in these matters. The United States should not allow the military junta to maneuver us into a position where we are made to feel that any public disagreement between our Government and the one in Saigon will result in the toppling of the present Saigon government.

If we act only by silence now, then we will increasingly lose control over events that happen to us in Vietnam. We may soon find that no reasonable negotiating position and no peace offensive are acceptable to the military junta. U.S. interests are at stake in Vietnam and American troops are fighting there, but those interests and those men should never be a party to a war without an end or to a massive Asian land war.

I urge the Government of the United States to restate our negotiating position, to reaffirm U.S. desire for peace, and to disavow any objectives stated by the Saigon government which run counter to our own.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I wish to add my comments to the discussion to which I have just listened.

The other day the majority leader and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations engaged in a colloquy as to our responsibilities in Asia, and as to whether we were an Asian power, and all that that implied.

At that time I rose and spoke briefly and said that I believed our position there was one of a military character to make it possible for us to have greater safety for our own citizens and more security in our own country.

We are doing that with the idea that if we help South Vietnam to establish a government of their own, then we will have more security and safety here for our own citizens.

If we are to extend our responsibility, as suggested by General Ky, into other areas of Asia, we only decrease our opportunities for security and safety of our own citizens and increase our military responsibilities. In substance we spread our efforts too widely to be effective.

I certainly join with my colleagues who have spoken this morning on that subject, and I commend the majority leader for having emphasized the need for keeping our responsibilities to the original purpose of making it possible for the South Vietnamese to establish their own government which, I understand, is what we are trying to do and what we hope we will succeed in doing in our efforts there.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, what has been said in this Chamber this morning should have been said.

The majority leader, and those who have followed, spoke for the American people and for this Government.

General Ky does not speak for the people of the United States, nor for the Government of the United States.

On this occasion, I think that members of the executive branch should join responsible Members of Congress in speaking out and saying so.

I very much doubt that the world misunderstands. My judgment is that the position of the American people has been made clear over the past months and years. I think that Communist China clearly understands the goal of the Government of the United States and what it seeks in southeast Asia.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Young] may be recognized for 7 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### CLEVELAND RAKES COALS OF RACIAL VIOLENCE

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, in recent days, on the East Side of the city of Cleveland where I have lived in

the past, there have been acts of violence and killing of innocent people. In the Hough Avenue area, where some years ago I made my home with my wife and little children, Negroes, frustrated no doubt by neglect, have resorted to acts of violence. Stores have been looted and burned, abandoned, and neglected. Apartments and old dwellings have been destroyed by fire, stores looted of merchandise, and four or more citizens have been killed. Hundreds have been wounded by gunfire or brutally beaten. This is not at all the result of any conspiracy, Communist inspired or otherwise.

Obviously one of the causes of the rioting in Cleveland is the terribly inadequate and long-neglected housing condition throughout the Hough Avenue area. The indignities of ghetto life are distressing and the routine rat-filled houses of the slums appalling. The neglect of this entire area is inexcusable. Church and community leaders in Cleveland should accelerate efforts on a non-profit housing program not only for the Hough area but for other East Side areas of Cleveland. Then, we in the Congress have a duty to enact into law more effective programs to back up and aid efforts of communities to provide adequate housing.

Violence that has occurred in my home city is also taking place in many other cities throughout the Nation, particularly in northern cities which have tolerated what could be termed "Negro ghettos." We are witnessing explosions in various cities in various sections of our country, both north and south of the Mason-Dixon line. This is an explosion of pent-up frustrations, unemployment, and hopelessness of those living in neglected neighborhoods.

Mayor Ralph Locher of Cleveland, when our police force was unable to cope with the rioting, requested that National Guard units be sent in to restore law and order. Governor Rhodes complied. Elements of the Ohio National Guard, to the extent of approximately 2,000 men, are in this East Side Hough Avenue area establishing road blockades and barricades and enforcing a curfew seeking to end rioting and the killing and injuring of men, women, and children. In most part, objects of destruction by Negro youth in the Hough Avenue area have been stores and property largely owned and operated by absentee owners. Store windows have been smashed, stores looted, apartment buildings burned.

In Cleveland many of the young men, members of the National Guard suddenly called in, frightened of the terror and violence, seemed unable to quell the rioting and to prevent women, children, and men from being injured. In fact, in some instances the guardsmen, unaccustomed to handling weapons in combat, appeared trigger happy.

Mr. President, nearly one-third of the large population of the city of Cleveland consists of Negroes. We have always taken pride in the fact that our city is truly a melting pot. We have believed that our population of various and diverse ethnic origin, Slovenian, Hungarian, Polish, Italian, German, and na-

tionals of other countries of the Old World who came here themselves or whose fathers and mothers settled in Cleveland away from the prejudices and oppressions of the Old World, came in search of political and religious liberty and found it in Cleveland. Perhaps we were wrong in our high hopes.

In this administration of Mayor Ralph Locher there are considerably more than 2,000 men on the Cleveland police force. Yet, of this large number only 137 are Negroes. This in a city where 33 percent of the population is Negro. Furthermore, it has seemed evident that some members, a minority but a substantial minority, of our police force conducted themselves with brutality and a lack of intelligence in trying to cope with unruly crowds who were rioting. In Cleveland, where the 31 members of our city council are elected and not appointed, as are members of the police force, 10 are Negroes. The majority leader of the city council is a respected Negro leader, Charles V. Carr, who has been elected as councilman from his ward for many years.

In the cabinet of the mayor of Cleveland two of the nine directors are Negroes. There are 13 municipal court judges. Of these 13, 2 Negroes have been repeatedly elected to the court. There are 23 Cuyahoga County common pleas court judges, and only 1 is a Negro. Governor Rhodes of Ohio has within the past 2 or 3 years made a number of appointments to the common pleas court of Cuyahoga County. He has made good appointments, but not one has been a Negro. Ohio courts afford a citizen the right of one trial and one review. The court of appeals of the Cleveland area has six judges, one of whom is a Negro. It is deeply saddening that in a great industrial and beautiful city such as Cleveland respect for the laws of our land which American citizens should defend and respect have been flouted and disregarded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 7 minutes have expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. However, it is difficult to convince a Negro living with eight or nine others in a one-room flat amid rats and disease in Cleveland's Hough area that abstract constitutional ideals have any meaning to him. His immediate needs are food, a roof over his head, and employment.

I deplore the violence which is exploding throughout Cleveland. However, I am thoroughly convinced that much more of the same is to come unless strong corrective measures are taken. It is no solution to beat back rioters with clubs or tear gas. Such action, merely generates more violence and destruction in a spiral which ends in ruin and more bitter memories, which, given a spark, will explode out all over again.

It was hoped that the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 would provide some answers. Unfortunately, that act has failed to fulfill the high hopes held out

for it at its enactment. The programs sound good but the targets have been set far too low. Yet the Economic Opportunity Act has given rise to some very beneficial programs directed toward our urban poor. Only Federal action on a large scale can strike to the heart of this urban dilemma. I am hopeful that meaningful changes will be made this session to rid the war on poverty of its deadwood. For example, Federal funds for the elimination of poverty must be taken from the hands of the politicians in some of our cities who have been appointed to high-salaried positions and who have done very little for the poor and unemployed.

The housing program is too small. The poverty program is too small. The program for slum schools is too small. It is not the riots in the slums but these lame and inadequate programs that are the real disgrace of the richest nation on earth.

It is clear that the elimination of slum misery will require new programs and much money. We as legislators must act with determination in providing the wherewithal to rub out conditions in slum neighborhoods which give rise to the ugly rioting which has racked our cities over this summer. We must be determined in this task. The handwriting is clearly written on the battered walls of Cleveland, Chicago, and other great cities of our Nation.

Cleveland is my home city. It is a matter of pride with me that from 1911 when I moved to Cleveland from the small city of Norwalk, Ohio, right up to the time I was elected to the Senate in 1958, I practiced law in Cleveland and lived in the Cleveland area. My neighbors there, including many thousands of Negro citizens, have been good and generous to me every time I sought elective political office.

Years ago my wife, children, and I lived in the Hough Avenue area close to where the worst of this terrible rioting occurred.

We in the Congress and very definitely the city officials of Cleveland, from Mayor Locher down, have neglected people living in this area and have permitted it to deteriorate into a miserable slum where many thousands live in the midst of filth, stench of overcrowding and lack of toilet facilities and where children are crowded into dark and filthy tenements and compelled to play in streets and where young men and young girls, even to have a breath of fresh air, are compelled to walk outside to escape the heat and fetid air of the tenements. In this hopeless situation and in the continuing heat of some July nights, hindsight tells us that the explosion, was inevitable.

Four deaths resulted and hundreds of men, women, and children were badly injured. The damage to buildings and property will reach a million dollars. This was the worst rioting in the entire history of Cleveland. It was replete with looting, gunfire, and sniping. Even some narrowminded white men who considered themselves self-appointed vigilantes now stand accused of the murder of a young Negro husband and father who had not participated one iota in any rioting.



George Barmann, an outstanding news reporter on the staff of the Plain Dealer—a man who is noted in Ohio as an objective and talented news reporter—wrote a fine news column which was published in the Christian Science Monitor under the caption, "Cleveland Rakes Coals of Racial Violence." Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this special news column by George Barmann, as published in the Christian Science Monitor, be placed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**CLEVELAND RAKES COALS OF RACIAL VIOLENCE**  
(By George Barmann)

CLEVELAND.—In the race riots in this city, there are two vital questions which still have no official answers: What has caused this turbulence, with fatalities, injuries to police, firemen, and civilians, and property damage that will reach \$1 million? And was it all organized or was it spontaneous?

Few public officials care to make public statements or to give answers to either of these questions.

Cleveland's worst rioting in its history broke out in what is known as the Hough area, on the city's east side, the night of July 18. It carried over into the morning hours of July 19.

It left a Negro woman killed, felled by a bullet from someone's gun. Twenty-one persons were hurt, including 12 policemen and one fireman. They were victims of gunshot wounds and of showers of bricks and rocks. Property damage, authorities said, would reach \$1 million—from fires, mostly.

The next day Mayor Ralph S. Locher said "this is a tragic day in the life of our city." Observing the damage and the smoldering fires in stores and homes, he asked Gov. James A. Rhodes for a unit of the Ohio National Guard to be alerted for duty—if necessary.

The trouble area is an urban-renewal area, where renewal has been extremely slow and, by many measures, mostly a failure. It is an area of frustrations—in housing, in jobs, in education. The area has deteriorated badly. That's the big problem: deterioration.

**GATHERINGS BROKEN UP**

And so the summer's lightning of racial discontent has struck the Hough area again in Cleveland. The summer's first violence, a pattern of vandalism and of looting, began June 22, with roving gangs of teen-agers and young men on the loose with rocks and bricks and fire bombs.

A Negro boy was shot at that time. He was wounded when he stood near a gang of rock throwers. The trouble went on for 10 days, with police squads breaking up gatherings here and there in the area. As quickly as the incidents began, they gave way to an uneasy lull.

Then came the furious troubles of the night of July 18.

Young mobs ran wild again. Only this time the shooting was widespread. Snipers went after policemen. Chief of Police Richard R. Wagner took his own personal hunting rifle with him as he tried to track down snipers on roof tops. Mobs cut fire hoses to keep firemen from putting out blazes.

"Burn, baby, burn!" was the cry heard. Said the Cleveland daily newspapers, in editorials: "This violence must stop."

Putting down the violence hardly ends the difficulties. Ironically, the trouble broke out hours before Mayor Locher was to visit the racially concentrated area. That visit was prompted by repeated complaints of uncollected and rat-infested garbage, abandoned

and vandalized houses, unswept streets, and other marks of the area. All of this—and hot and crowded Hough in July.

Another cause, some persons insist, is sinister leadership. Still, there is plenty of frustration and suffering for the instigation to feed on. Said a social worker in the area: "Nothing has been done about police enforcement or building enforcement. We can reach these people, but we can't get results without more help from City Hall."

**MAYOR ORDERS STUDY**

Bertram E. Gardner, director, Community Relations Board, said: "It's a combination of frustrations." Ezra Shapiro, cochairman of the board, said: "Not enough is being done to solve the basic problems." Mayor Locher has ordered a study of the area's problems. He has asked for recommendations.

For weeks, police have been collecting information on the activities of several persons—information relating to gun clubs, target-practice ranges in an adjoining county, youth clubs where teen-agers are taught to "mug" and loot, in addition to military drills and crowd-dispersal tactics. Veteran newsmen get the picture. Some persons spoke of the summer riots of 1966 while the snow was still on the ground earlier this year.

The seething element in the Hough community spins out of a youth movement identified with the JFK House, a store-front recreational center. It is directed by Lewis G. Robinson, a Negro, who formerly was a city housing inspector and one-time law student. He believes Negroes are "terribly abused by whites." Youths associated with the house have been involved in fights and street hoodlums.

Observers have noted that among the teen-agers in the latest riots were persons in their 20's.

"There is a classic pattern emerging all over the country," says Chief of Police Wagner. "Juveniles are supposed to get the riot off the ground. If they do, extremists come out and get on the roof tops with their rifles to shoot at policemen. The extremists are a small, loose organization with a lot of opportunists."

Again, with no one willing publicly to pinpoint the trouble, some Negro councilmen and welfare workers blame the riot squarely on the boldness of the youth gangs who are not arrested or punished and who continue to grow in daring.

**MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED**

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

S. 2822. An act to amend various provisions of the laws administered by the Farm Credit Administration to improve operations thereunder, and for other purposes;

H.R. 139. An act to provide for the striking of medals to commemorate the 1,000th anniversary of the founding of Poland; and

H.R. 14324. An act to authorize appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research and development, construction of facilities, and administrative operations, and for other purposes.

**FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, 1966**

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3584) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Oregon.

**AMENDMENT NO. 667**

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, my amendment No. 667 is pending. It is an amendment which provides that none of the funds authorized by this act shall be used to provide assistance to any country in Latin America in any fiscal year, if the total estimated expenditures of such country for defense purposes for such year are expected to exceed an amount equal to 3.5 percent of the estimated gross national product, as determined by the President, of such country for such year.

Mr. President, this amendment is designed to restrict financial assistance to countries of Latin America that devote a disproportionate share of their already meager national wealth to military establishments.

At the present time, it would not cause suspension of any assistance in Latin America, for no country exceeds the limitation set forth in my amendment, judging from the figures available.

In the hearings on the pending bill, I questioned Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon on the extent of militarization of nations of the hemisphere. We all know they are not threatened with attack, say, from the Soviet Union, or China. If world war III comes, it will not come because of Latin America nor will it directly involve Latin America. Defense problems between themselves tend to be more a matter of rivalry in prestige rather than the likelihood of full-scale warfare.

It is obvious, Mr. President, that in some of the Latin American countries, there have been built up, on a prestige factor, rather powerful military oligarchies which cost the countries involved huge sums of money. If we are to provide economic development aid, the taxpayers ought to have assurance that the recipient country will not use, then, its own resources to build up a nonproductive military oligarchy, for it is not needed for the external protection of the country.

We have to draw a clear line of distinction here, Mr. President, between external security and internal security. The Latin American countries exist under the defense umbrella of the United States. Certain types of military aid are needed for internal security, to protect a country from a Communist coup—although it is rather paradoxical that much of the military establishment in too many Latin American countries is used to bring about military coups.

The type of military aid that I have supported has been military aid of that quantity and kind necessary in order to suppress internal riots and internal coups of a Communist nature. That means small arms. It means helicopters, communications equipment, machineguns, and rifles; it means what we generally refer to as small arms military paraphernalia. But tanks, plans, submarines, and heavy equipment, Mr. President, which characterize too much of the military establishment in too many Latin Ameri-

can countries, are used primarily to build up, for prestige purposes, a powerful military class.

The figures furnished by Mr. Gordon, our Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, appear on page 538 of the printed hearings. They show that in Latin America, Brazil, and Peru currently spend the largest percentage of their national wealth on military establishments. The figure for both is 3.4 percent of their gross national product.

My amendment provides that if any country goes over 3.5 percent of its gross national product, then we cut off the aid until that country returns to a more reasonable figure as far as military expenditures are concerned. Panama spends the least—one-tenth of 1 percent, followed by Costa Rica with four-tenths of 1 percent.

The administration seeks to make much of the small percentage of men under arms in Latin America, relative to the rest of the world. But that hardly has anything to do with the issue. The issue is: What is the real need in Latin America? It is not for military defense, as it may be in West Germany or India, but for economic growth and development.

If the United States is going to be expected to contribute heavily to their economic growth—and we are so expected, and I happen to believe we should make such contributions—then we need to be assured that their own resources are not going to be diverted into unnecessary and wasteful military expenditures.

The Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, sought before our committee to make much of the possibility that if we do not furnish military equipment gratis to Latin America, or at least sell it at cut-rate prices, those countries will take their business to Europe and will spend much more of their resources on military equipment than at present. Of course, that does not follow at all, nor does it follow that the United States should help them do it by continuing the flow of money that enables them to buy military goods elsewhere.

In fact, Mr. President, as I said at the hearing in my colloquy with the Secretary of Defense, I consider his argument the argument of international blackmail. I was very disappointed that the Secretary of Defense would advance it as a serious argument, that we ought to either give or sell military equipment to a given Latin American country in the quantities that they want, on the premise that if we do not, they will turn to Russia and buy it. My answer to them would be, "Go ahead and do it. But we will cut off aid to you, if your military expenditures go over 3.5 percent of your gross national product."

Mr. President, that is only a common-sense proposal. I do not see how we, as Senators, can justify to the American taxpayers our making large sums of money available to a Latin American country for economic development when our contribution has the effect of releasing their own money to buy from us or

others large quantities of military equipment.

Mr. President, the issue is whether or not, if we yield to that kind of coercion on the part of any Latin American country, we are protecting the American taxpayer in the way he is entitled to be protected. I think we are not. I believe that the military establishments they will be able to maintain with up to 3.5 percent of their gross national product would give them more military supplies than they need to protect themselves from the internal disorders that might be created by a threatened Communist coup.

Mr. President, Argentina, for example, puts 15 percent of its budget into arms as against 17.5 percent into capital investment.

The Dominican Republic, before the revolution, spent 17.8 percent on arms and only 15.7 percent on capital investment.

I ask unanimous consent that the figures submitted by Secretary Gordon which appear on page 538 of the printed hearing, be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

*Latin American military expenses, 1964*

	Host government expenditures			U.S. military assistance (millions of dollars)	
	Defense expenditures		Capital budget investment as percent of total expenses		
	As percent of total expenses	As a percent of GNP		Grant assistance deliveries	Credit assistance sales
Argentina.....	15.0	2.3	17.1	1.5	-----
Bolivia.....	6.8	1.1	20.2	3.2	-----
Brazil.....	16.1	3.4	26.7	9.1	-----
Chile.....	8.8	1.8	32.9	7.8	0.1
Colombia.....	12.2	1.3	38.9	6.2	-----
Costa Rica.....	2.0	.4	38.8	.5	-----
Dominican Republic.....	17.8	n.a.	15.7	1.5	-----
Ecuador.....	10.0	2.0	17.6	2.6	-----
El Salvador.....	8.8	1.2	32.4	.9	-----
Guatemala.....	10.5	.9	16.6	1.4	-----
Honduras.....	10.1	1.3	21.3	.4	-----
Mexico.....	8.2	.7	25.5	.3	-----
Nicaragua.....	16.5	1.8	23.2	1.2	-----
Panama.....	.5	.1	16.1	.1	-----
Paraguay.....	30.4	3.1	26.7	1.2	-----
Peru.....	13.1	3.4	26.8	10.0	-----
Uruguay.....	6.2	1.2	4.4	1.8	-----
Venezuela.....	9.9	2.2	39.6	1.5	4.6

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, rather than measure defense expenditures as a portion of total budget expenditures, however, this amendment measures them as a percentage of gross national product.

I think that is the fair measuring rod.

Its nearest impact would be in Brazil and Peru, which devote 3.4 percent of their gross national product to defense expenditures, and Paraguay which devotes 3.1 percent.

The amendment would not affect them immediately, but would serve as a warning that if their expenditures for military purposes go any higher, the United States will no longer subsidize their economic development and, in effect, replace their capital resources with American capital resources.

When I discussed the amendment in committee, where it was rejected, the argument was made that we would be interfering with the sovereign rights of a sovereign state. I understand that argument, Mr. President, but I do not think that a period should be put at the end of that argument, but only a semicolon. There also should be added to it: "so is the United States a sovereign state."

So it is the United States, in carrying out its obligation of sovereignty in relationship to the taxpayers of the United States, that has a duty to lay down conditions on the meeting of which will depend the making available of American taxpayer dollars for aid to any country.

We do not interfere with their sovereign right to place more importance on

their buying of arms from Russia than on getting economic aid from the United States to help them improve the lot of the masses of their people.

The argument of sovereignty, Mr. President, works both ways. The Senate has an obligation to carry out a foreign policy within the sovereign prerogative of the United States that protects the American taxpayer from the kind of holdup to which I think they are being subjected in some Latin American countries when they take all the aid they can get from us—and our AID administration has been exceedingly generous to them—and then, in addition, they start using their own resources to obtain supplies, equipment, and heavy equipment for a large military establishment which, in effect, means that the taxpayers indirectly pay for that military establishment.

I think that is a good example of malfeasance in the administration of our foreign aid program. Our foreign aid administrators need to be told that must stop, that we will give those countries that amount of military establishment that will protect them from internal disorder, but no more.

If the countries of the hemisphere want to spend their resources for arms, they can surely do it. But do we want to spend Alliance for Progress funds to replace the diverted money? In my opinion, that is pure waste. In my opinion it is hurting the Alliance for Progress program, but more of that in a moment.



This amendment would discourage these countries from purchasing arms abroad and should accompany any ceiling on arms aid such as is now in the military assistance portion of the law.

My closing argument deals with our actions to put the deleterious effect of our military program in Latin America upon the true objectives of the Alliance for Progress program.

President Kennedy never envisioned the Alliance for Progress program as being anything other than an economic aid program. Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations are well aware of it because many were on the committee with me at the time that the then Senator from Massachusetts, later President of the United States, was a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations and also a member of my Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs.

He stood shoulder to shoulder with me, may I say, on practically all aspects of the Alliance for Progress program, although we did not call it that then. In fact, I cannot recall one single item, major or minor, involving the Alliance for Progress program, or the preparation of it, in respect to which we did not completely agree.

Mr. President, the then Senator Kennedy, later President Kennedy, emphasized that what is needed is an economic program in Latin America. He emphasized that what is needed is investment of American funds in projects that would help improve the economic lot of the people of a given country, leaving within the sphere of economic influence of each project that our objective should be to try to do something to better the economic lot of the people of Latin America at the mass level.

I have said in the Senate so many times that I know I speak only again for the record this morning: there is no hope in some areas of Latin America for a developing political freedom, and there is no hope of maintaining and strengthening political freedom wherever it exists to some degree in Latin America unless we strengthen economic freedom. Only through exporting or helping to export to Latin America the system of economic freedom is there any chance for Latin America surviving the threat that communism is pressing down upon it in many areas of Latin America.

Communism will never be beaten with military assistance. Communism will never be beaten with bullets. You cannot shoot communism out of Latin America, nor can you shoot communism out of the minds of segments of the people who, because of their deprivation and degradation, have reached the point in many instances of hopelessness and are therefore completely willing to go along with something that promises to be better when, in fact, it is bound to be worse and will mean more misery, more poverty, and more degradation if they surrender to it.

Mr. President, we have got to build up, as President Kennedy envisioned when he announced the Alliance for Progress program, a great economic assistance program in Latin America based upon the project concept.

When the military assistance program, or when the expenditure of a given country for an unneeded, exaggerated military establishment, has the effect of interfering with the economic program of a given country, then we ought to be willing to say, and my amendment proposes to have us say: "We are not going to continue economic aid to you. You must cut back, and you ought to establish a ceiling of not more than 3.5 percent of your gross national production."

Here, in connection with the economic aid program, we have an opportunity this morning to put into the proposed legislation this check on excessive spending for a military program in any Latin American country at the cost of the development of a sound economic program.

Therefore, I believe that my figure of 3.5 percent in relationship to the gross national product figure is a fair checkmate upon any Latin American country that wishes to build up a military establishment at the expense of the economic needs of its people.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this amendment was offered in committee and rejected by a vote of 11 to 4.

According to the latest figures available to the Foreign Relations Committee, Brazil spends the highest percentage of gross national product on defense in Latin America, and that is at the level of 3.5 percent. All other Latin American countries spend a lower percentage.

Thus, the amendment would have no immediate practical application. But it would have the effect of saying to Brazil, "If you increase your defense expenditures, you get no more U.S. aid."

Maybe that ought to be said to Brazil, but it ought to receive more consideration than the Senate can give it during debate on this bill. And it ought also to be related to defense expenditures by other Latin American countries, especially Argentina.

There is a technical defect in the amendment, possibly inadvertent, in that it makes it the responsibility of the President of the Latin American country to determine that country's gross national product.

For these reasons, I oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE].

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE].

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER] and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH] and the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER] would each vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 11, nays 78, as follows:

#### [No. 154 Leg.]

#### YEAS—11

Burdick	Hartke	Pell
Clark	Kennedy, N.Y.	Tydings
Ellender	Morse	Young, Ohio
Gruening	Moss	

#### NAYS—78

Aiken	Hart	Mundt
Anderson	Hickenlooper	Murphy
Bartlett	Hill	Muskie
Bennett	Holland	Nelson
Bible	Hruska	Pastore
Boggs	Inouye	Prouty
Brewster	Jackson	Proxmire
Byrd, Va.	Javits	Randolph
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Ribicoff
Cannon	Jordan, Idaho	Robertson
Case	Kennedy, Mass.	Russell, S.C.
Church	Kuchel	Russell, Ga.
Cooper	Lausche	Saltonstall
Cotton	Long, Mo.	Scott
Curtis	Long, La.	Simpson
Dirksen	Magnuson	Smathers
Dominick	Mansfield	Smith
Douglas	McCarthy	Sparkman
Eastland	McGee	Stennis
Ervin	McGovern	Talmadge
Fannin	McIntyre	Thurmond
Fong	Metcalf	Tower
Fulbright	Miller	Williams, N.J.
Gore	Mondale	Williams, Del.
Griffin	Monroney	Yarborough
Harris	Montoya	Young, N. Dak.

#### NOT VOTING—11

Allott	Dodd	Neuberger
Bass	Hayden	Pearson
Bayh	McClellan	Symington
Carlson	Morton	

So Mr. MORSE's amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND and Mr. BYRD of Virginia addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized. The pending business, however, is amendment No. 696, according to the unanimous consent agreed to yesterday by the Senate.

The Senator from South Carolina has the floor.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, is that the amendment that has been modi-

fied and is now numbered or designated as amendment No. 704?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The amendment has been modified and is pending now as amendment No. 704, proposed by the Senator from New York and the Senator from South Dakota.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Colorado [Mr. DOMINICK].

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy of the distinguished Senator from South Carolina.

I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 minute on a nongermane subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### AIRLINE STRIKE—INTRODUCTION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, it seems to me the airline strike is getting more acute every day. We keep getting more and more letters, telephone calls, people writing in about their problems in connection with the airline strike.

Yesterday I introduced a joint resolution. I ask unanimous consent that I may introduce a revised version of the joint resolution which would give legislative authority to do something about the airline strike. I also ask unanimous consent that it may be printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

My original joint resolution called for the reconvening of the Presidential Emergency Board of April 21. I have talked with the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], who is on the floor, about this proposal. From statements he has made and from statements of other persons, he feels that the Presidential Board has disqualified itself. Consequently, the revised version of my joint resolution would have the President appoint a five man board within 5 days after the adoption of the resolution. The hearings and the recommendations of the Emergency Board would be turned over to the new Board. The Board would have 30 days to hold additional hearings and then it would have authority to issue an order which would be binding on both parties.

We are in an extraordinary parliamentary situation in the Labor and Public Welfare Committee. There is pending before it the minimum wage bill. There is pending before it the lower education and the higher education bills. There is pending before it the airline strike proposals and so many other matters that it seems impossible for the committee to consider all of the matters.

I have alerted the committee that I shall object to the Labor and Public Welfare Committee proceeding on other legislation while the Senate is in session, until the airline dispute has been worked out in a legislative way or the strike is settled. I think that is particularly important. I do not see how we can debate with good reason and justice, the

other bills before the Labor Committee, until the issue of the airline strike is settled.

This airline strike is having such a devastating effect upon our Nation's economy that it is sheer foolishness to ignore it any longer. Not only will I object to the Labor Committee's bypassing this important issue to take up other legislation, but I intend to object to any executive sessions on other legislation that the committee may attempt to hold while the Senate is in session.

It is not my purpose to hold back action on important legislation such as the current proposal dealing with minimum wages, but it is high time for the Senate to come to grips with the enormous problems created by the airline strike, especially in view of the President's refusal to make his own position clear.

I thank the Senator from South Carolina for yielding to me.

I now send to the desk the revised version of the joint resolution to which I referred previously.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the joint resolution will be printed in the RECORD.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 185) to provide for the settlement of the labor dispute between certain airlines and certain of their employees, introduced by Mr. DOMINICK, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### S.J. RES. 185

Whereas the labor dispute between certain airlines and certain of their employees represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers threatens essential transportation services of the Nation; and

Whereas it is essential to the national interest, including the national health and defense, that essential transportation services be maintained; and

Whereas all the procedures for resolving such dispute provided for in the Railway Labor Act have been exhausted and have not resulted in settlement of the dispute; and

Whereas the Congress finds that emergency measures are essential to security and continuity of transportation services by such carriers; and

Whereas it is desirable to achieve the above objectives in a manner which preserves and prefers solutions reached through collective bargaining; and

Whereas the parties have failed to reach a settlement of the dispute, and as a result a work stoppage has occurred which has deprived the nation of necessary transportation services; and

Whereas it is essential that such services be restored at the earliest possible date and that procedures be provided for final and binding settlement of the issues in the dispute: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no carrier or labor organization which is a party to the existing labor dispute (National Mediation Board Case No. 7655) between certain airlines and certain of their employees which has resulted in a stoppage of work by such employees and an interruption of service by such airlines, shall make any change except by agreement, or pursuant to an arbitration award as hereinafter provided, in rates of pay, rules, or

working conditions encompassed by such dispute or engage in any strike or lockout over such dispute. Any action heretofore taken which would be prohibited by the foregoing sentence shall be forthwith rescinded and the status existing immediately prior to such action restored.

Sec. 2. There is hereby established an arbitration board to consist of five members who shall be appointed by the President within five days after the date of enactment of this joint resolution. One of the members shall be designated as chairman at the time of appointment. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the National Mediation Board is authorized and directed (1) to compensate the members of the board at the rate of \$100 per day together with necessary travel and subsistence expenses, and (2) to provide such services and facilities as may be necessary and appropriate in carrying out the purposes of this joint resolution.

Sec. 3. Copies of the record of the proceedings before Emergency Board No. 166, appointed by the President under the Railway Labor Act, shall be made available to the arbitration board appointed under section 2. The arbitration board is authorized to consider and adopt such of the testimony taken by the Emergency Board No. 166, and to take such additional testimony, as it deems appropriate. The arbitration board shall make its decision resolving the issues in dispute. Such decision shall be binding on both the carriers and the labor organization which are parties to the dispute and shall constitute a complete and final disposition of the issues covered by the decision.

Sec. 4. To the extent not inconsistent with this joint resolution the arbitration shall be conducted pursuant to sections 7 and 8 of the Railway Labor Act, the board's award shall be made and filed as provided in said sections and shall be subject to section 9 of said Act. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia is hereby designated as the court in which the award is to be filed, and the board shall report to the National Mediation Board in the same manner as arbitration boards functioning pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. The award shall continue in force for such period as the board shall determine in its award, but not to exceed two years from the date the award takes effect, unless the parties agree otherwise.

Sec. 5. The board shall begin its hearings immediately upon its appointment and shall make and file its award not later than thirty days after the date on which it commences its hearings.

Sec. 6. The obligations imposed by this joint resolution, upon suit by the Attorney General, shall be enforceable through such orders as may be necessary by any court of the United States having jurisdiction of any of the parties.

Sec. 7. This joint resolution shall expire one hundred and eighty days after the date of its enactment, except that it shall remain in effect with respect to the last sentence of section 4 for the period prescribed in that sentence.

Sec. 8. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof is held invalid, the remainder of this joint resolution and the application of such provision to other parties or in other circumstances not held invalid shall not be affected thereby.

#### FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, 1966

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3584) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am going to speak against the Kennedy



amendment which is pending at the desk as No. 704.

I was interested to see in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD this morning that quite a discussion and debate developed last evening on the Senate floor concerning an amendment offered by the junior Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] and cosponsored by the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK].

This amendment is the same amendment which was offered last year to the foreign aid authorization bill and was adopted by the Senate on rollcall vote of 78 to 1. It subsequently was deleted in conference, a circumstance which has precipitated its being offered again this year.

During the discussion which ensued yesterday, numerous references were made to the overwhelming approval of the amendment last year by a vote of 78 to 1. Since I was the only Member of the Senate to vote against the proposal last year, when it was considered in such great haste and certainly without adequate discussion, I am particularly pleased that the amendment is being considered for what it actually is this year.

My understanding of the amendment last year was that it directed a study to determine the appropriate level of future foreign aid commitments on the part of the United States with particular reference as to whether the level of our foreign aid should be tied in, on a percentage basis, with the gross national product of the United States.

I was not opposed then, nor am I opposed now, to a study and rethinking of our foreign aid program. However, even from the brief discussion of the amendment, it appeared obvious to me that the amendment was sadly deficient in several respects.

First, it was predicated on the assumption that foreign economic assistance by the United States was too low and should be increased substantially.

Second, although there was a commission established to study the foreign aid economic program and report both to the President and to the Congress, the amendment virtually tied the hands of the Commission as to what their findings could be.

Third, it appeared to me completely unreasonable to attempt to calculate the level of our foreign economic assistance on the basis of our own gross national product since this avoids the necessary question of the need for future assistance on the part of the developing nations.

Fourth, it was implicit from the amendment that it anticipated a foreign economic assistance program in perpetuity, and did not look to the day when the United States would no longer be called upon to devote its own resources to the benefit of other nations.

Fifth, the amendment did not deal with certain elements of the foreign aid program which I considered most worthy of study. I have particular reference here to the numerous administrative deficiencies which have existed from its inception and which continue today.

These are the reasons why I opposed the amendment when it was offered last

year and are the reasons why I shall oppose the amendment this year unless it is substantially modified. It is particularly gratifying to me to see that numerous other Members of this body share my concern with the implications of this amendment now that the opportunity has provided itself for a more full and open debate on its merits.

#### AMENDMENT NO. 694

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be temporarily laid aside and that I may call up my amendment No. 694, and request its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, the request is agreed to.

The clerk will state the amendment.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] proposes an amendment, as follows:

On page 1, line 10, strike out "paragraph" and substitute "paragraphs".

On page 2, strike out the quotation marks at the end of line 6.

On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

"It is the sense of the Congress that the action of the West German Government giving approval and financial backing to a deal under which an international consortium in West Europe, headed by a West German firm, would supply steel plants to Communist China, the chief supplier of war material to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, is a grave blow to the common defense of the free world and to the safety of American troops in Vietnam."

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, as Senators know, the pending bill, S. 3584, begins with a statement of policy. My amendment No. 694 would add an additional expression of concern on the part of the Senate.

The West German Government, Mr. President, has by official action guaranteed the financing of a steel plant for Communist China. I emphasize that I am not speaking of a private firm, I am not speaking of individual companies, but I am speaking of official action taken by the Government of West Germany. Under that action, the payment for steel facilities for Communist China would be guaranteed.

We have heard from our State Department and our military officials that much of our trouble in Vietnam is due to the Red Chinese. We know, from statements by our military leaders, that the bulk of the war materiel killing American soldiers today in South Vietnam is coming from Communist China. We know that our Nation has drafted and sent to southeast Asia 300,000 Americans.

We know, too, Mr. President, that this Nation has drafted and sent to Western Europe 225,000 Americans, for the purpose of protecting West Germany and Western Europe from Soviet aggression. And yet we have seen that the West German Government, by official action, has guaranteed the financing of a steel plant for Communist China.

When I first brought this matter to the attention of the Senate on March 21, following my statement, the able and distinguished Senator from Rhode Island

made a similar statement in regard to this action on the part of the West German Government, and I shall quote now from the statement of Senator PASTORE, who incidentally is a cosponsor of amendment No. 694, as is the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE].

Senator PASTORE, on March 21, made this statement:

This steel mill will have the capacity to produce steel which could be used to manufacture bombs, missiles, guns, and bullets to be used against American boys. This country should protest it. If the Administration does not do so, then I think Congress should do something about it.

I have felt since that time, Mr. President, that the administration should officially protest—and strongly and publicly protest—this action by the West German Government. It is true that the State Department has voiced concern. Under date of June 29, I received a communication, responding to one which I had sent to the Secretary of State, from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, which contained this paragraph:

There is no Allied agreement which would prohibit the sale or the guarantee of credits for the sale of this equipment to Communist China. I know, however, that you are acquainted with the reservations which Secretary Rusk expressed publicly concerning the transaction. The Secretary's public statements were followed, in early April, by conversations conducted, on instructions of the Department, between our embassy in Bonn and the German Government, in which we officially brought the Secretary's comments to the attention of the German Government, and expressed our hope that the German Government would continue to review the matter.

So the State Department has made an official protest. I feel that it is appropriate and desirable, and could be very helpful, if Congress were also to make an official protest. While the West German Government has given its official approval, work on the project has not yet been started. Not all the other members of the consortium have put up their share of the finances. So I think it is very probable that if the Congress of the United States were to speak out on this issue, the West German Government might withdraw its official sanction and its official guarantee of the financing of this steel plant for Red China.

That is what my amendment No. 694 would do. It would be an expression of concern. It would be an expression of disapproval, on the part of the Senate, of this action by the West German Government, and I believe could very readily result in the saving of American lives in Vietnam.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I commend the able Senator from Virginia for offering this amendment, and I wish to associate myself with the remarks he has made concerning it.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I yield to the Senator from Iowa, but first I should like to express my appreciation to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia is a very meritorious amendment in my judgment. However, I suggest that this proposed action poses a threat not only to the lives of our troops in Vietnam, but also to the lives of the troops of our allies fighting in Vietnam—Korean, South Vietnamese, and all other forces presently in South Vietnam.

I wonder if my friend, the Senator from Virginia, would consider possibly modifying his amendment on page 2, line 3, to insert after the word "American" the words "and allied" because I believe that this is right on the point and will strengthen the amendment.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I feel that the suggested modification is very desirable. I am very happy to accept the words "and allied." I think the words strengthen the amendment. Certainly our allies who are fighting with us in South Vietnam should have recognition in this measure.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I ask the Senator if he will modify his amendment so that on page 2, line 3, the words "and allied" be inserted after the word "American."

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I so modify my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I extend my warmest commendations to the able and distinguished junior Senator from Virginia for his amendment.

I think Congress should express its condemnation of the building by West Germany of a steel mill in Red China at the present time, particularly when the Red Chinese are the principal suppliers of the weapons and sinews of war which are being used daily in Vietnam to kill our American sons who are being sent there to fight in the campaign in this unfortunate country.

I am pleased to be a cosponsor, and I compliment the distinguished Senator, for calling this matter to the attention of the Senate.

I hope that his amendment will be agreed to overwhelmingly.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I express by appreciation to the Senator from Georgia for his comments and for his firm support of the proposal.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is not a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were not ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I have great sympathy with the feelings of the Senator from Virginia, but two or three observations should be made.

The Italians and the French participate in this consortium, and if we are going to denounce one country, we ought to denounce all of those involved. If we are going to start denouncing people who sell to the Chinese, we should denounce the Canadians, because they have sold a great deal of wheat to them and people cannot fight without eating. We ought to denounce Argentina, because even though they have a new government, they sold some wheat to Communist China.

I think it is a very risky business to denounce countries whose trade policies we do not approve in a policy statement of this sort.

We have very few friends left, and one of the principal ones is the Federal Republic of Germany. Personally, I would not want to take the responsibility of denouncing them for actions which they thought were in their national interest.

Obviously, there is a difference of opinion in many places in the world as to our policy in Asia. I happen to question the wisdom of our policy there. I think there is at least some reasonable ground for honest differences of opinion, and I do not believe it is wise for the Senate to take it upon itself to pick out and denounce one country. Germany happens to be one of the most powerful and loyal allies of this country today, a country upon whom we depend in many ways. I do not think it is wise to single them out and insult them in this manner. It would be a great mistake, in my opinion.

If we are going to pass this sort of amendment, we should include every country who is doing business with Communist China. This would include quite a number of the more important countries of the world.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, is it not correct that West Germany is the only government which has taken official action insofar as guaranteeing the financing of steel plants for Communist China is concerned? Private investors of other nations have been involved in other examples, but the West German Government is the only government that has officially taken this action.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I did not make a study of this particular consortium. I did read an account of it in the newspapers. I believe the account I read said that this is a consortium of several countries. I believe that France and Italy participate with Germany in this project, but I do not recall whether or not they extend credits. But they do participate and, presumably, will profit by it.

Very recently we read of a big deal involving a \$400 million sale to the Russians by the Fiat Co. of Italy.

I would doubt seriously that there is not some government participation in a deal that big. It would be very unusual

if there is not, but I have not made a study of it. I do not object to it.

I am told that in the Fiat deal, the United States will furnish a substantial amount of money or material. It is difficult to draw a distinction between that case and the one involving the steel mill. I believe this raises some complex problems. I believe it would be unwise for us to put this kind of policy statement in a foreign-aid bill. That is one of the reasons why I believe bilateral foreign aid bills do much harm to our national interests. Every year there are vehicles for all kinds of miscellaneous expressions about everything from steel mills to fishing off the coast of Peru.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I wish the Senator would add the States of Washington, Oregon, and California.

Mr. KUCHEL. I join in that last request, and ask that the error be corrected.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I would like to put in the countries which are involved, but none of which are involved as a nation, except West Germany.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What about Canada?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Canada is not involved.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the Government of Canada assisted in the financing of the sale of wheat to China. Canada has an agency which I understand is somewhat similar to our Export-Import Bank.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Does not the Senator see a difference between the sale of wheat and the financing of a steel plant, which would undoubtedly be used to kill Americans? The Chinese are supplying the war materials to the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, who are fighting American soldiers in South Vietnam. I believe there is a great distinction between wheat and steel. Anyway, Canada is not involved in this particular transaction.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not in this particular transaction. But I said in a general way that if we attempt to formally adopt in this bill all our disagreements with the policies of various countries around the world, it would be a very serious mistake.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, if the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations would permit me to ask him a question—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Would it overcome the objection of the Senator if the words "West German" were eliminated and in their place inserted the words "any government"? And then on line 9 of the same amendment, the clause "headed by a West German firm," could be stricken, so as to let this apply to any government which guarantees the financing of warmaking plants for Communist China, which is doing so much to supply the materials for our enemies in South Vietnam.



Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not believe that would cure the problem.

As I said a moment ago, I disapprove of policy statements in general. Although I may be sympathetic with some aspects of these statements I do not believe they are the proper way to deal with differences among nations. Statements are subject to misinterpretation.

I do not know how many countries would be offended if that were done. I have not given the matter much thought. Perhaps everybody would be angry with us. Enough countries are angry at us now.

I do not believe in including this sort of statement in the bill. I have attempted to strike out all of the policy statements in this bill on several occasions. We did strike them out once, and then they were reinstated. Policy riders are an invitation to the inclusion of statements in the act which are not relevant to aid.

The Senator's amendment does not say that we will cut off aid to Germany. That cannot be done since Germany is not receiving any aid. At least, that type of prohibition makes it relevant. But I do not approve of that approach as a general principle either.

There are other ways of dealing with matters of this nature. The proper way in this case would be for our Government, through diplomatic channels, to express our disapproval of any government doing anything that we believe to be inimical to our national interest. I do not wish to lend myself to encumbering the policy section of the act any more than it is now encumbered.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. I hope that the Senator from Virginia will make the modifications in the amendment that he has mentioned, because I do not believe it is good legislative practice ordinarily to single out countries by name for condemnation. Every time we have done that, it has caused trouble. Every time the House does it, the administration rushes down and has us write a little escape hatch saying, "unless the President finds it in the public interest."

If we can delineate certain criteria of action to which we object, and then let the shoe fit any foot that happens to inject itself into this problem, I believe that the Senator would improve his amendment substantially. This could be done by eliminating the names of the countries and setting out the conditions and practices to which we object.

I must say that I am not reluctant to use the foreign aid bill as a means by which we can attach statements as to general foreign policy, because this program is in fact a big arm of our foreign policy. I do not agree with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that this is not the place to talk about it or to legislate about it, but I am a little allergic to the idea of singling out countries by name whenever we can avoid it and still achieve the same results.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. As the Senator from South Dakota has mentioned, the pending bill starts out with a state-

ment of policy. It occurs to me that it is perfectly appropriate to have a statement of policy.

Mr. MUNDT. I see nothing wrong with attaching it to this bill, if we can get across the idea that we wish to convey without needlessly slapping in the face people whose support we may ultimately need.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. If the amendment were changed to delete the words "West German" and insert "any," would that overcome the objection which the Senator raises?

Mr. MUNDT. It would suit the Senator from South Dakota fine, because I do not believe that we should refrain from discouraging our friends from helping our enemies.

The British have also been in this sordid business. They sold tremendous numbers of buses to Castro at a time when he was desperate for transportation. A great many of our foreign friends are engaged in this practice in one way or another. Some of them are actually sending supplies through Hainan to Vietnam to help strengthen the forces shooting at our American boys.

I see no objection at all in our raising a voice of protest and discouragement to those among our friends who engage in practices which help our enemy. I believe we can do that as the Senator has now suggested, without mentioning names but I feel the time has come to express our own convictions and speak our minds.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. In that connection, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 694 be amended, as follows:

On line 7, strike out "West German" and insert "any." On line 9, strike out "headed by a West German firm."

That eliminates reference to a particular government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is objection, and the yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I yield to the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I hope that the Senator will be allowed to modify his amendment. That is customary practice. If it is not allowed to be modified, I have a parliamentary inquiry. An amendment to the amendment could be offered to delete that language, could it not?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. An amendment to the amendment would be in order.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I hope that before a motion is made to table, or otherwise, the Senator will be given an opportunity to at least change his amendment as he wishes. I believe he is entitled to that.

Would the Senator from Virginia make his request again? Maybe we can get it in.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I thank the Senator from Delaware.

My previous request was for unanimous consent to amend amendment No. 694, as follows:

On line 7, to strike out "West German" and insert "any."

On line 9, strike out "headed by a West German firm." No insertion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the amendment?

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—if this amendment were adopted, the finger would still be pointed at a friend of the Government and the people of the United States.

I remember an occasion when I was at the White House during the administration of President Eisenhower. The President commented on how, when the world turns over, friendships change, and he used West Germany as an example.

The cause of freedom, the opposition to communism, is reflected by the people and the government of West Germany just about as vigorously as by any capital in the world.

I do not believe this country can finger a nation and tell that nation how to run its foreign policy, or with whom it is going to trade or with whom it is not going to trade. As a matter of fact, the President sent to Congress a bill dealing with trade with the countries back of the Iron Curtain. That bill has been pigeonholed in the other body.

I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. I wonder how many Members of the Senate know how many countries we would have to stop dealing with if we stopped dealing with all countries that do business with Communist China. We could do business only with ourselves because we are the only country in the world, to the best of my knowledge—and I have been advised by people who know what they are talking about—that prevents trading with Communist China. That country has to get any supplies from us through a third party, if it gets them at all. At least one other country has a law against such trade, but the law is not observed.

Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is correct.

I reserved the right to object in order to express myself. I have no objection, but I shall oppose the amendment in amended form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. YOUNG of Ohio in the chair). Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The amendment will be modified.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD].

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I wish to make one further comment.

The amendment, I might say to the Senator from Vermont, does not express criticism of countries dealing with Red China. It expresses disapproval of the official financing and the building of a steel plant by one government. It does that for the reason that Communist China is the major supplier of war materials which are killing our men in South Vietnam.

If Congress can draft men and send them to South Vietnam, I submit that Congress has the responsibility to protect them while they are there.

Mr. AIKEN. The CONGRESSIONAL RECORD indicates that this is a meaningless question because the discussion has related to West Germany. Maybe we could get along without them. I do not know.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to table the pending amendment, and ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], are absent on official business.

I further announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] would vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 37, nays 53, as follows:

[No. 155 Leg.]

YEAS—37

Aiken	Kennedy, N.Y.	Moss
Anderson	Kuchel	Muskie
Bartlett	Lausche	Neuberger
Cannon	Long, Mo.	Pell
Church	Long, La.	Saltonstall
Clark	Mansfield	Scott
Fulbright	McCarthy	Smathers
Gore	McGee	Tydings
Gruening	McGovern	Williams, N.J.
Hart	Metcalf	Yarborough
Holland	Monroney	Young, Ohio
Inouye	Montoya	
Kennedy, Mass.	Morse	

NAYS—53

Bennett	Fong	Pastore
Bible	Griffin	Prouty
Boggs	Harris	Proxmire
Brewster	Hartke	Randolph
Burdick	Hickenlooper	Ribicoff
Byrd, Va.	Hill	Robertson
Byrd, W. Va.	Hruska	Russell, S.C.
Case	Jackson	Simpson
Cooper	Javits	Smith
Cotton	Jordan, N.C.	Sparkman
Curtis	Jordan, Idaho	Stennis
Dirksen	Magnuson	Symington
Dominick	McIntyre	Talmadge
Douglas	Miller	Thurmond
Eastland	Mondale	Tower
Ellender	Mundt	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Murphy	Young, N. Dak.
Fannin	Nelson	

NOT VOTING—10

Allott	Dodd	Pearson
Bass	Hayden	Russell, Ga.
Bayh	McClellan	
Carlson	Morton	

So Mr. MANSFIELD's motion to lay on the table the amendment of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], as modified, was rejected.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, offered by the Senator from Virginia.

On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I think all Senators should understand that what is pending now is an amendment pointed at the West German Government and, by indirection, suggesting that the action of the West German Government is undermining the position of the United States in southeast Asia.

I regret that the Senate has to vote on this kind of amendment. I am grateful that West Germany stands alongside the other members of the Atlantic Alliance in the cause of freedom in Western Europe and beyond.

The Government of the United States cannot direct her allies as to what kind of trade policy they should follow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. The attachés who are on the floor must either leave immediately or remain silent. The Senator from California, who has the floor, has a right to be heard.

The Senator from California.

Mr. KUCHEL. Earlier it was brought out on the floor what all Senators know, that the people of the United States have no better friend than Canada, our neighbor.

I did not like to read in the papers that Canada had entered into a series of agreements by which she was going to sell wheat to Red China; but I would oppose voting for a junior-grade censure resolution against Canada.

Mr. President, every year this foreign aid debate degenerates into something like a jungle. One zigs and zags his way through it. We are about ready to have the Senate go on record with an insulting amendment to our friend. It is regrettable that we are ready to vote that way. I am going to oppose it.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to answer a question?

Mr. KUCHEL. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Like other Members of the Senate, I was tied up in the committee in executive session on the minimum wage bill, and voted "nay" against the motion to table, precisely because I would like to know what the amendment is about in greater detail.

I have no reason for not voting as the Senator from California says he proposes to vote, if we could get some answer to the factual basic question as to whether there is any serious basis for this amendment. Those of us who did not have the benefit of hearing the debate have no idea. Perhaps the distinguished chairman of the committee or the sponsor of the amendment can enlighten us.

The Senator from California has raised a most serious issue. I have always stood against the idea of a censure role on the part of the Congress in the foreign aid bill. We ought to know what is involved. That is the reason for my opposing the motion to table.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the clerk be asked to read the text of the amendment

as it was originally proposed, and then to read the text of the amendment as it has now been modified.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will read.

The legislative clerk read the amendment (694) as originally printed, as follows:

On page 1, line 10, strike out "paragraph" and substitute "paragraphs".

On page 2, strike out the quotation marks at the end of line 6.

On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

"It is the sense of the Congress that the action of the West German Government giving approval and financial backing to a deal under which an international consortium in West Europe, headed by a West German firm, would supply steel plants to Communist China, the chief supplier of war material to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, is a grave blow to the common defense of the free world and to the safety of American troops in Vietnam."

The legislative clerk then read the language of the amendment, as modified, as follows:

On page 1, line 10, strike out "paragraph" and substitute "paragraphs".

On page 2, strike out the quotation marks at the end of line 6.

On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

"It is the sense of the Congress that the action of any government giving approval and financial backing to a deal under which an international consortium in West Europe would supply steel plants to Communist China, the chief supplier of war material to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, is a grave blow to the common defense of the free world and to the safety of American and allied troops in Vietnam."

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, all I want to say—and then I am through—is that while the particular country, to wit, West Germany, was deleted from the amendment, the sense of the amendment is precisely the same as it was when it was originally proposed, and the debate will disclose that fact beyond any doubt whatsoever. Whether or not it includes any other nation than West Germany, I do not know, but for my purposes, that is irrelevant. I am not going to vote for an amendment that is an insult to a country that is a friend of the free world.

Mr. JAVITS. What is the substance behind the reason for the amendment?

Mr. KUCHEL. I recall a newspaper article, which I think is probably true, that West Germany has approved a business deal by some of her citizens with a country which we abominate. That is not the first time that a business transaction has taken place involving nations friendly to the United States, as the Senator knows. I am not acquainted with all the relationships of the West German Government, but I am sure the Senator will recall when the Government announced that it was approving the request of its citizens to enter into the transaction.

Mr. JAVITS. So the essence of the Senator's point is not that of censuring another government because it enters into business dealings with a country which we abominate, but the principle involved is that we should have a sense of dignity in our relations with another



government like the West German Government. Is that correct?

Mr. KUCHEL. That is correct. I remember when General Eisenhower was in the White House, he remarked on how the world was changing and that there was not any more vigorous supporter of U.S. policy with respect to communism than West Germany. West Germany is divided by the Iron Curtain beyond which remains a large Soviet force. I am not about to participate in the voting of the sense of Congress disapproving a country which is such a friend of this country.

Mr. JAVITS. In other words, whether or not it was West Germany which was involved, the people of West Germany, who have sinned so much against the world, would have a right to be treated without discrimination. There I agree. We must consider whether it is in the highest interest of our country that we ought or ought not to censure, and whether, going beyond the question of principle, we should adopt a sense of Congress resolution against the Government of West Germany.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KUCHEL. I yield.

Mr. HRUSKA. If the material being supplied to Red China were not steel plants, but were arms and munitions, I would like to ask the Senator from California if he would maintain his present position.

Mr. KUCHEL. While my friend does not mention it, that question would implicitly apply to every nation, because I do not think West Germany would send arms and munitions there.

Mr. HRUSKA. I see no objection to casting the question in that way. It is material to the question before us. After all, steel produced in Communist China is used for arms and munitions.

I would like to know how far the Senator from California would go if it were arms and munitions that were being supplied to Red China. I would like to know how far the same principle to which the Senator from New York referred would be applied. The Senate, if it refused to consider this proposition in that instance of arms and munitions shipments, would look odd in the eyes of our troops who are in Vietnam, and those who will be sent there shortly to replace those troops, as well as to all the American people.

Mr. KUCHEL. To deal with the hypothesis which my able friend has brought up, a sense of Congress resolution would not be my idea of the best way of dealing with that hypothetical situation. I simply say I regret that the Senator has to pass judgment on this amendment.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KUCHEL. I yield.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I should like to ask the Senator if he draws a distinction—and this is for information and clarification in my mind—between furnishing steel plants to Red China which will furnish the sinews for the making of materials of war, which will in turn be sent to Vietnam, and furnish-

ing steel plants to North Vietnam which will make materials of war. It does not seem to me there is much difference. I think a great many people would rise in abject horror if they realized one of our allies was sending steel plants to North Vietnam. I wonder if there is any distinction between furnishing steel plants to China and furnishing materials of war to Vietnam.

Mr. KUCHEL. I will answer that question in this way. We must take friends as we find them. I regret very much that our friends in World War II, in Europe, apparently have changed somewhat with respect to the question of the strength of collective security in Europe.

I am glad to recall, in that instance, however, that the one nation in the Atlantic Alliance, aside from the United States, that has never been charged with failure to provide its allocated portion of the sinews of our common defense is West Germany.

The United States, alas, cannot dictate trade policy to our allies. I regret, as an American citizen, that we do not have a common trade policy. It is a matter of real sorrow to me, Mr. President, that the members of the Atlantic Alliance could not agree on some basic rules with respect to dealing with Communist countries. But they have been unable to accomplish that. And while the United States has gone along with her own concept of how to trade with Communist countries in Europe, many of our European allies of World War II have entered into extensive trade relations with the Eastern bloc. That is their right under international law.

But I shall not, as a U.S. Senator, pick out one of our friends and, by implication, try to tweak its nose for its own concept of how it will carry on its trade relations; and in that respect, I can only say to the Senator from Iowa that, having those views on the subject, I shall cast my vote against the amendment.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KUCHEL. I yield.

Mr. CASE. I wish to thank the Senator from California for his calling a halt to precipitate action here. I feel, as the Senator from New York stated he felt, that we wanted to know what we were doing, and therefore we voted against the motion to table. I think this is a most useful thing.

Does the Senator feel that it makes a good deal of difference whether an expression of unhappiness is made by the Senate, or by any number of individual Senators as individuals?

Mr. KUCHEL. Well, surely.

Mr. CASE. Is not that one of the main points we are talking about?

Mr. KUCHEL. Indeed it is; and I must say in addition, Mr. President, I have no doubt that the official views of the Government of the United States, in a diplomatic fashion, have been transmitted to the Government of West Germany. That is another matter entirely. But to use this foreign aid bill for that kind of action is wrong, in my opinion.

Mr. CASE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I have been concerned about the fact that ships bearing the flags of some of our allies are transporting into Haiphong, at this moment, munitions of war to be used by the Vietcong to kill Americans sent there by this Government.

Twice in my lifetime the United States has saved freedom for Western Europe. Since the Second World War ended, we have had hundreds of thousands of American boys over there on duty to protect our allies against any threat posed by Russia and other nations behind the Iron Curtain.

Every Senator knows that Red China is supplying the weapons, the munitions, and the encouragement which keeps North Vietnam and the Vietcong in the war against South Vietnam. This amendment says:

It is the sense of the Congress that the action of any government giving approval and financial backing to a deal under which an international consortium in West Europe would supply steel plants to Communist China, the chief supplier of war material to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, is a grave blow to the common defense of the free world and to the safety of American and allied troops in Vietnam.

Mr. President, that is the truth, and I do not mind the Senate of the United States telling the truth, even though it might cause umbrage to some of our allies, who are our allies in Western Europe, but are indirectly assisting our enemy in southeast Asia.

I support the amendment. This is the foreign aid bill, and I think it is well to serve notice on our so-called allies that we do not approve of conduct which is a blow to the common defense of the free world and to the safety of American and allied troops in Vietnam. And I do not mind the Senate saying that, because it is the truth.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ERVIN. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. I say to the Senator from North Carolina that I subscribe to what he says 100 percent. About a year ago, I brought up on the floor of the Senate, on two separate occasions, the problem we were having with our so-called allies shipping into North Vietnam and supplying them equipment and supplies, and I also brought up the fact that the Italians, at the present time, are financing the construction of the petrochemical plants in Communist China which supply the necessary oil, petroleum, and other things for the Chinese economy to sustain the war in Vietnam and southeast Asia.

I think it is time the Senate takes a position on this matter, and that we tell our allies we do not like it. Whether they listen or not makes no difference; but we can at least tell them we do not like it.

I shall support the amendment of the Senator from Virginia with great delight.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Senator from North Carolina has made some very strong statements which I certainly have never heard before. I do not

know of any of our allies who are sending arms to North Vietnam.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a correction, I did not say that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I understood the Senator to so state.

Mr. ERVIN. I said that ships bearing the flags of some of our allies are carrying weapons and munitions to Haiphong.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. From our allies?

Mr. ERVIN. I said ships carrying their flags.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought the Senator meant our allies were furnishing the weapons.

Mr. ERVIN. I did not say that, but I would surmise, that the ships carrying the flags of some of our allies who are doing that are getting the weapons and munitions they transport to Haiphong from manufacturers in some of the countries which are supposed to be allied with us.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know about the ships. There are a number of ships chartered out of Hong Kong to Chinese and other companies, that I have heard carry the Greek flag, among others, but I do not know what they transport.

I do not believe any of our allies are supplying arms to North Vietnam. However, some of our allies do trade with Red China, it is true. One of the big traders is Australia, the prime minister of which country has been over here twice in the last month, engaged in the most intimate conversations with our President, and the newspapers indicated that the President was extremely appreciative of the support Australia is giving this country. I think they are furnishing or have promised to furnish 4,500 troops. But Australia has been selling large quantities of wheat to Red China.

The mill referred to, as I understand it, is a rolling mill, which will probably take 2 or 3 years to build. It is not an arms plant, according to the reports I have seen in the papers.

I suppose some believe that this war will go on forever and that maybe by the time we take Peking the plant will be finished and that therefore we might as well let it be built. I do not see that the amendment has any particular relevance in this aid bill.

Japan is one of the biggest suppliers to Red China—\$450 million a year. It is expected to be in the neighborhood of \$700 million or \$800 million. If we want to kick her in the teeth, we can do it. We can tell them all off. But it would be very unwise.

I do not see how everything that the Senator from North Carolina has said can be true because there are some very fuzzy points there as to who is supplying these arms and whether they are causing us great harm in the shipments that take place. I do not know.

I doubt very seriously that the Senator from North Carolina knows what the character of the trade by our allies is. It is well known, I think, that Russia and China are furnishing aid of all description, modern missiles as well as ordinary small arms, and all kinds of aid.

I do not know of any allies that are furnishing munitions or war weapons. It may be that surreptitiously and illegally they may be doing so. Recently somebody bought a cannon in Alexandria and took it to Canada and blew up a bank there. You can buy arms in Alexandria, and I expect you can ship them to Vietnam if you went to enough trouble to charter a ship and a big profit might be made.

That is not the point. This is an aid bill. The amendment does not restrict aid. It does not mention aid. It is an expression of disapproval of the action of practically every country that is important to us as allies.

Before the other Senators came in the Chamber, we mentioned that France and Italy are engaged as a part of this consortium. We also mentioned the deal of Fiat Co., of Italy with Russia. The Government of Italy is participating in financing that transaction.

This gets very involved. This is not the proper place, in my opinion, for this statement. It would be a very disorderly way in which to do business. I think it would not do us any good.

I never anticipated that the great debate would take place on this amendment. I thought it was fairly clear that we could bring up the matter and express our disapproval if we felt that way about the deal. However, it would be another thing for the Senate to vote formally to condemn these countries for an action which is, they believe, in their national interest.

I think that, while we are a very rich country, it does not automatically mean that we are the wisest country and have all the wisdom in the world because we are rich and powerful. I do not think we ought to assume that we know all of the answers. Some of these other countries may have valid reasons of their own for following the policies they follow.

If there is any solution to it, that solution is not in the making of gratuitous expressions of opinion. The solution would be the use of wise diplomacy and policies adopted by the executive.

It was quite obvious that some of our allies, our former allies, and friends do not approve of all the policies that our country is following. And they have that privilege of disapproving of it.

The matter should be worked out by persuasion and reason, and not by a statement of this kind on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of the amendment, and I am not ashamed of the amendment. I am proud of it.

I have supported the administration on its policy in Vietnam. We must admit this afternoon that it is becoming harder and harder to convince the American people of our obligation to Vietnam, and why we are committed there, almost to the tune of 300,000 American boys, when the American people pick up the newspaper and read about a country on the other side of the world to which we are committing more than 200,000 American boys to guarantee their safety, what they read is that this other nation is

giving aid and comfort to our Asiatic enemy by building a steel rolling mill which could make steel to make the casings for the bullets to put in the bodies of American boys—that is a possibility.

When the Soviets shut the autobahn, we had an airlift. A number of American boys died in the process. American men and money came down in flames in the burning planes.

Why did America do it? America did it because it wanted to guarantee the security of the German people. We made a sacrifice for that. We paid dearly in blood and money.

Psychologically what is this bill doing? What does it do for that boy who is trotting and trudging his way through the jungles of Vietnam? How does he feel when he picks up a newspaper when he gets back to his base and reads that our friends, who ought to be standing side by side with us in Vietnam, are not doing that? What are they doing? They are beginning to lend money to our adversaries at the moment—they would help those adversaries to build a steel mill to make sure that their industry becomes better and more powerful so that they can give more and more aid and comfort to North Vietnam. Months ago I warned of this danger when I spoke on this subject before. We talk about taking a formal vote on our feelings in this Chamber this afternoon. Why, even the Secretary of State resented this transaction and said so publicly. Nothing ever came of it.

The Senator mentions that Italy is in the consortium, and maybe Switzerland, and maybe France.

What difference does it make? Does the Senator not think it is high time that we, who have understood everybody's problems, begin to say to our friends: "Please begin to understand our problems?"

We have problems for which we are dying in Vietnam.

That is all this amendment would state here this afternoon—our state of mind.

I know what will happen to the amendment if it is agreed to. It will be knocked out in conference. I know that, but why should the people on the other side of the Atlantic not know that we have problems in America? Do they not know that we are committed up to our ears in men and money in Vietnam? Do they not know that during this trying time when they commit these acts which psychologically give aid and comfort to the enemy, they do us irreparable harm?

That is all we are saying this afternoon, that this is hurting the American boys in Vietnam. This does endanger the lives and safety of our boys, and these acts are inimical to the American interest. Surely they are not to the advantage of America.

So, I say that the time for our continuing to be soft is over. I do not want to push anybody around, but let them stop pushing us around. That is all we are saying this afternoon.

The time has come when America must speak, when her toes are being stepped upon—and they are being stepped upon. If our friends on the other side of the Atlantic are interested in profits, and



even to the detriment of American life, let us stand up and say what we think.

When last we discussed this mill I received a letter from the German Ambassador. I do not want to use any harsh language here this afternoon, but it was doubletalk at best.

All this malarkey and all this baloney about the claim that it is only a rolling mill. It is to roll what? Steel. Where does the steel go? It goes into guns. It goes into tanks. It goes into bullets. It goes into bombs. Where do you think the bombs will fall? Do you think they will be falling in Germany? Do you think they will be falling in Italy? Do you think they will be falling in France? No, they will be falling in South Vietnam where our boys are committed.

That is all this amendment is about. I am proud to be a cosponsor of the amendment, and I shall vote for it.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the eloquent statement of the Senator is one with which I thoroughly agree except for one thing. If what the Senator says is so true—and I believe it is—then, why does the Senator say that this will be knocked out in conference?

If it is knocked out in conference, if what the Senator says is true, the conference report ought to be voted down.

Mr. PASTORE. Does the Senator know why the Senator from Rhode Island said that? The Senator has been here for 6 years, and I have been here for 16 years. That is the answer.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not wish to prolong this debate longer. I had not anticipated this. I only regret that the Senator has made the argument he did on this issue.

I do not see anything in this kind of issue that raises the entire question of the validity of our involvement in Vietnam, and yet the Senator has raised it in the manner in which he has discussed this particular issue. We have had much debate about our involvement in Vietnam, and I can only say that I believe the Senator is less than candid in saying that the other members of the community of nations are entitled to their views about the validity of our involvement in South Vietnam.

The intense manner in which the Senator discussed this evidenced to me that he has great concern about our involvement in South Vietnam, and I share his concern. I only wish that I could share with him the assurance that we are there for adequate reasons.

I do not believe that this is the proper time to start an argument about that. We have gone through those arguments before. The administration apparently has made up its mind as to how it will proceed there, and the matter has been settled.

However, I believe that it is unwise, because of differences that exist among nations, and within this country, about the war in Vietnam, for us to go out of our way in a foreign aid bill—where none of the countries involved in the amendment are to receive aid—to take this

means of expressing our disapproval of, and in a sense a censuring of, practically all the allies we have.

There is no logical distinction between the steel mill, in my opinion, and feeding the Chinese. If the Chinese starve to death, they will not make any steel, and they will not cause us any harm. There is no logical difference between whether or not they are given a steel mill, which would not be finished for 2 or 3 years or longer, and giving them wheat now. There may be distinctions in trade in the different items, but they are not differences.

Those involved in the steel mill project simply disagree with us on a major policy. It seems to me they are entitled to disagree. We do not approve of many things they do.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. There is a big difference between giving food to people and helping them to build up their armament industry.

Furthermore, the Senator must realize that in this case we are protecting the security of Germany just as we help South Vietnam against aggression. We are committed in Germany. Our boys are there. When we said we would like to take 18,000 men out of Germany, a remonstrance was made, a protest was made, to our Embassy. In other words, West Germany wants to keep us there to guarantee their security.

I shall not get into a debate on the Vietnam situation this afternoon. Whether we are there rightly or wrongly, we are there. The important thing is that we are there. And we are fighting there. Does the Senator believe that it is complimentary to us, and helpful to our security, for our so-called allies to assist the adversary? That is what they are doing.

One point we have been making right along is that we are attempting to make Hanoi understand that they cannot win. The minute a deal is entered into for the building of a steel mill for the people and the government that are furnishing Hanoi with bullets to kill our boys, does the Senator not think that that gives Hanoi encouragement? Does not the Senator believe that that makes Hanoi stand up more hopefully and fight more bitterly? And who are they fighting? Hanoi and its supporters? Are they not fighting our boys? And when they are stiffened up by these deals do they not hurt us; do they not threaten the security and the safety of our boys? Of course they do.

There is no logical, sensible reason why they should have done this to us at this time. Even their own newspapers have condemned them. Even their own newspapers have published editorials declaring that the timing of this was bad. That proves that they think and worry about themselves alone.

We are not condemning anybody. We are not censuring anybody, only to let them know that their behavior bewilders us. We are merely saying that when they do this, they are hurting us. And what is wrong about saying that?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In the first place, it will be quite a long time before this steel mill is completed and in operation.

Mr. PASTORE. I am talking about now. This is a buildup of Hanoi morale right now.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why does the Senator wish to put this in a policy rider on a foreign aid bill? We have prohibitions in the act and the bill that no aid shall be given to a country which is trading with Cuba, or to anyone trading with North Vietnam. I do not see why the Senator is picking out Germany, which is not receiving any aid and does not ask for any aid. In fact, we are asking her for aid to help support our troops, and I thoroughly approve of such aid. This, to me, seems to be the difference.

I go along with the Senator and say that I do not believe the Germans ought to build this plant. But I do not believe that this is the place to single them out for attack from the other countries involved in trade with China.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not correct that we tolerate a great deal of difference of opinion in our own country? Many of us have differences about what we should do in Vietnam. But we have not voted a resolution to say we disapprove of someone's opinion.

Germany is one of our best friends, one of our best allies. Although we may differ with Germany, we differ a great deal more with France. If we are to pick out a country to find fault with because it does not agree with us on some matter, why not pick out some of the others—Japan, France, and perhaps a number of others—that we believe have proved somewhat ungrateful, who should have done more, who could have been more helpful?

It seems to me that in complaining about Germany, we would do better to complain about the fact that Germany has not done as much as we have done for the defense of their country, that they have not lived up to the commitment they have made under the NATO treaty. To me, that is a much more serious matter—their shortfalls in that regard—than this particular item, which, as the Senator has pointed out is of no immediate consequence to us.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. I would like to ask the majority whip this question: What is the administration stand on this action?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I point out that we wish this were not done. I believe that insofar as some diplomatic leverage is concerned, it is being made clear to Germany that this is the view the administration takes. That is my impression.

For the Senate to vote what amounts to a mild resolution of censure against the West German Republic does not make much sense to this Senator. Our allies are doing many things that we do not wish them to do. We have expressed ourselves to them, but I do not see res-

olutions here, for example, to condemn De Gaulle because he is still exploding atom bombs around the world, even though our country has entered into a treaty not to explode them and not to fill the atmosphere with radiation. The foreign aid bill contains nothing about that, even though we have done more for France than for Germany.

Mr. GRUENING. In other words, the administration's position is that this should better be left to diplomatic channels, through the executive branch. Is that what the Senator is saying?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. That would be my impression. I cannot speak for the administration on this matter. I am not a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. That is the impression I have gained.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator mentioned France. France is included in this modification. It is part of the consortium. The modification includes France. And what is wrong with that? It includes Italy. What is wrong with that? It might include Switzerland. What is wrong with that?

We are telling these people that we do not like such action. And why can we not tell them that?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. When the Senator tells De Gaulle, "I do not like you," he will say, "I do not like you, either."

Mr. PASTORE. That is his privilege. But the Senator should not forget that while our brothers and nephews and neighbors are in South Vietnam, we have an interest. We have an interest to speak out. When anyone does anything to injure their safety and to imperil their security, we have a duty, as Americans, to speak out. Whether it hurts their sensitivities or not, I care very little.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I wish to mention three points in connection with this discussion. I think that it would be tremendously important if all Senators would do as I have done and get a copy of the revised amendment and read it. I have been listening for 45 minutes to arguments that we should not censure France, Germany, or somebody else.

There is not the remotest word of censure in any way in the amendment. There is not a single syllable of criticism of any of these foreign countries.

It is the right and the duty of the Senate to advise and consent and it is time to do something besides consenting all the time. Here is an opportunity for Congress to advise, if we feel that way about it.

If we feel that it is bad for our friends to provide military equipment to kill our boys, we should say so. If we feel the other way and defeat the amendment, we are inviting them to double the ante. We would be saying it is all right with us if they supply material to kill our boys; we are unconcerned. Either way we offer our advice.

I shall read the amendment, because I want the entire Senate to know there

is no word of censure in it. I shall read it slowly: I want the Senate to understand it clearly.

It is the sense of the Congress that the action of any government—

Switzerland, Italy, France as the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] pointed out, Germany, or any countries—

giving approval and financial backing to a deal under which an international consortium in West Europe would supply steel plants to Communist China, the chief supplier of war material to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, is a grave blow—

I wish to repeat—

is a grave blow to the common defense of the free world.

Does anybody wish to vote no on the amendment and say this steel mill is not such a blow? If 1 plant hurts a little bit, then 10 plants would hurt more. Senators know it is a blow. Why be afraid to say it is a blow? You are going to face the administration, the country, and our fighters in Vietnam, and tell them what you think on this issue. Do you or do you not consider it a blow? The amendment concludes by stating:

and to the safety of American and allied troops in Vietnam.

Let us clear the atmosphere. There is not one word here of censure anywhere. The question is: Do you think it is a blow to the common defense when they add additional steel mills in Communist China at a time when they are fighting us and killing our boys in Vietnam? Does it help or hurt the cause of freedom?

What do Senators think about the safety of allied troops in Vietnam? That is what you are voting on, and you have a right to do so. It is not an insult to anybody, nor is it criticism to say what you think, from the standpoint of our boys in Vietnam, to have new steel mills being built in Red China by our friends at a time the Red Chinese are providing the armaments to kill our fighting men in Vietnam.

The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] made a persuasive speech, as he always does. There is the matter of the psychology which is involved. He stressed, and I wish to reemphasize, one point that some Senators may not have caught.

The policy of our administration in this war, as I understand it, is to get Hanoi to quit fighting. That is what we are trying to do. We are not asking for anybody's head, we are not asking for reparations, we are not asking for territory. We are trying to get Hanoi to quit killing people over there. They are killing them and waging war and we are trying to get them to quit.

Senators should ask themselves in good conscience before they vote: Is it going to help induce Hanoi to quit if the Senate votes its approval of the actions of Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, and other countries who are helping to build steel mills in Red China?

If you were Ho Chi Minh what would you do with that? Would you not use it to propagandize your troops and propagandize your people? Would you not say, "Don't get discouraged. We have

serious casualties, but give us time. Hang on; don't quit because even the Western friends of the United States have so little faith in the possibilities of its winning this war and achieving victory that they are beginning to build steel mills for the enemies of the United States in China."

That is the question we are going to vote on. Do not get confused on the issue. It has nothing to do with censorship, junior, senior, lateral, or horizontal. Censorship is not an issue.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator on his stand and I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE].

I have not heard an adequate answer to the question raised by the proponents of the amendment this afternoon.

We are being told and we are being given old perennial promises that this bill is not the proper vehicle to which to attach an amendment such as this; that we should wait for another vehicle. Then it gets lost in the limbo of forgotten things, and that is the end of it.

I can only say that if the boys demand it, if the people back home demand it—and the people back home are demanding it—our consciences should not be so craven as not to stand up against this practice. We should stop it.

I saw this happen at Canberra, at the Interparliamentary Union, when the American delegates stood up against Russia and proved to the neutrals and our allies that we are no longer the paper tiger we have been described by Russia as being. We made some headway.

I shall vote for the amendment. I hope the Senate itself will sustain the amendment and its sponsors, because it is high time we take such proper action.

Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator from Wyoming for his contribution.

With regard to whether we should write or consider policy in this bill, Senators have only to read the first page. It begins:

Part I. Chapter 1—Policy.

This is the place. Now is the time. Senators can vote in any way they wish to. However, it is not correct to say they should not write policy. The very first part of the bill is entitled "Policy." The first chapter is the Policy chapter. We agreed to it in the Committee on Foreign Relations and brought it to the floor of the Senate, where I hope the entire Senate will accept it. It amends the previous policy declarations written into previous authorizations. This is the place to write policy declarations and we already have some in this authorization act.

If the Senate has any disposition at all to have a voice in the field of foreign policy; if we are Senators of full stature; we do not have to limit our contributions to exercising our "consent." Here is a chance to give our advice as to what we want to have written in the bill. Let us do it here and now.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I would like to lend my full support to the



distinguished Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] in his efforts to have a clear-cut vote on this sense of the Senate resolution concerning the proposed sale of steel fabricating plants to Communist China.

I have taken the floor of the Senate in the past to call Senators' attentions to the flagrant disregard of our national interest shown by the Department of State in resting content with feeble protests to our German and French allies concerning their support of this steel mill venture.

Last March, I spoke on the floor to express my dismay that nations professing friendship to the United States would lend their support to the sale of strategic production facilities which could be used to kill American soldiers. Since that time I have twice brought this matter to the Senate's attention, and each time received support for the contention that this transaction should be opposed by the full power of our Department of State.

Nevertheless, the Department of State, apparently feeling that its mandate from the American people is unclear, has continued to limit its efforts to prevent this sale to gentle diplomatic conversation over the tea, cookies, or cocktails of embassy parties in Bonn and Paris.

I hope that passage of the language suggested by the Senator from Virginia will make it clear to our diplomatic representatives and to the nations with which they deal that the people of the United States vehemently oppose this transaction. We do not consider the supply of strategic plants capable of assisting in the killing of American soldiers as a "simple, routine commercial transaction."

I support this resolution now before the Senate. I hope that it will succeed in making it clear once and for all that the U.S. Senate does care about these steel mills. If this amendment does not accomplish its purpose, I believe that the Senate should take any additional steps necessary, including, if needed, the use of the appropriations power to reduce U.S. Government expenditures for all purposes, including military, in the European nations which are now permitting their own skills and resources to be diverted into the strategic goals of Communist China.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I hope the amendment will be adopted. It would be extremely unfortunate if it should not be agreed to. We are at war in Vietnam. Some people think we are over there to prevent the South Vietnamese from being taken over by North Vietnam. But there is only one reason for our being there, and that is to protect the national interest of the United States. It is to prevent Communist expansion. If the Communists take Vietnam, it is felt that they will soon take Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, perhaps Japan and the Philippines, and then Australia and New Zealand. If such expansion were to continue, the Communists could be on the beaches of Hawaii in a few years.

In my judgment, it is important that we win the war in Vietnam. More than 300,000 of our men are fighting there for that principle.

I see no objection to adopting a policy statement or expressing the opinion of the U.S. Government as to the calamitous effect of furnishing steel mills—to whom? Red China. Who is Red China? Red China is the chief nation which supplies the enemy. Without Red China, the war in Vietnam could not last 30 days. Red China is giving more than moral support; she is providing great armored support. She is furnishing whatever is necessary to North Vietnam and the Vietcong to win the war. After all, this war is another battle on the part of the Communists to accomplish their goal of world domination. We might as well realize that.

This is a war between the free world and the Communists. Red China is on the other side. Why should we not call on our allies not to help the enemy, the enemy who is helping to destroy the free world, including the United States?

Mr. President, I hope that the amendment will be adopted, that the word will not go out to our boys in Vietnam that the Senate has turned down an amendment that expresses our feeling about governments, who are supposed to be our allies, furnishing steel plants to Red China, which is our enemy. There is no question as to how Red China stands. Red China is an aggressor. Red China is responsible for this aggression. North Vietnam would not be down in South Vietnam today, and the Vietcong would not be fighting today, if it were not for Red China. I can see no reason in the world why we should hesitate to adopt the amendment.

How many boys fighting in Vietnam today would oppose this amendment? Out of 300,000 boys, I dare say that 99 percent or more would favor adopting the amendment. They do not want a steel mill built in Red China, because they will be the ones to feel the bullets, the armor, and all the rest of it which will come from that steel mill.

How can we enjoy our freedom back here, being supported by those boys in Vietnam who are protecting our freedom and liberty by fighting for us? How can we do anything except give them 100 percent support?

I hope that the Byrd amendment will be adopted, and adopted overwhelmingly.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I do not agree with the distinguished Senator from South Carolina in his interpretation of what has been called from time to time the domino theory. He seems to have the idea that the Communists—if given enough time—are going to fight us on the shores of Hawaii and the United States. He seems to think that all of Asia—if the amendment is not adopted—will fall to Communist China.

I would point out that there is no aid in this bill for West Germany. I would also point out that the Federal Republic of Germany is a sovereign power and has the right to make its own choice, just as any other country has, as to whether it will trade with mainland China.

There is only one major country that I know of—and that is our own—which does not, by law, allow trade with Communist China. It is my understanding that this rolling mill—not a steel mill, as

I interpret it—will take some years to build. It is my further understanding that not only are West Germans involved in this, with the approval of their government, but also some other of our Western European allies as well.

I would hope that the Senate, before it votes, would give the most serious consideration to this responsibility which it is taking unto itself. And I would further hope that it would recognize, regardless of our own feelings in the matter, that other countries are sovereign states and have the right to dictate what their foreign and economic policy will be, just as we have the right insofar as we are a sovereign state.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I should like to ask the Senator a question which perhaps he or the Senator from Virginia could answer himself.

There is an organization of Western, industrialized nations called the Coordinating Committee or Cocom which deals with the question of shipping strategic materials to Communist countries. We belong to it and so does the Federal Republic of Germany. I think it is an essential element of this debate that it should be clear of record whether there is any legal prohibition, by virtue of membership in that particular Committee, on the Federal Republic of Germany to authorize this transaction.

Would the Senator from Montana be aware of that, or could the Senator from Virginia answer it?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I know of no prohibition. I do know that the German Government talked this matter over very thoroughly with the U.S. Government in stages. West Germany indicated to Washington what it intended to do. I believe, furthermore, that insofar as this particular rolling plant is concerned, it will take a number of years to build.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Montana.

I wonder whether the Senator from Virginia could enlighten us? Has he studied the question on this point?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I would say to the Senator from New York that according to a communication from Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, he says:

There is no allied agreement which would prohibit the sale or the guarantee of credits for the sale of this equipment to Communist China.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, it seems to me it is made quite clear from debate on the Senate floor, thus far, that this extremely complicated and complex matter raises a good many foreign policy questions. The Senator from Louisiana raised some of those questions. The distinguished majority leader has raised some fundamental questions about the implications of this move, as has the distinguished minority whip, and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. There are all kinds of questions which it is difficult to appraise quickly

on the Senate floor. The chairman of the committee and the Senator in charge of the bill told me a moment ago that no hearings had been held on this matter whatsoever in the committee. The fact is—

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Have committee hearings been held on all of the other amendments to this bill?

Mr. McGOVERN. No. I am not justifying some of the previous actions. I am just making the point that this is quite a far-reaching problem before the Senate. This is obvious from listening to the debate. Many Senators feel that this is not in the national interest. It seems to me that after more complete consideration, the proposal should be modified in some way. Perhaps a country making wheat available to Red China, as the Senator from Arkansas has stated, is just as much subject to criticism as the government of West Germany. It is difficult to answer those questions. But a few days ago the Senate, by a rather large margin, went on record as favoring referral of the bill relating to the CIA to the Armed Services Committee, apparently on the assumption that that committee, which has a great interest in the measure, had not looked at it and had no opportunity to examine into it. It is clear that this is a measure that falls within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

It may even have some implications for the Committee on Commerce because it is not really an AID matter. It relates to the question of trade and commerce. It seems to be irrelevant to the bill now before the Senate.

Thus, Mr. President, because of all these considerations, and without in any way trying to prejudice the case, I move at this time that the amendment be indefinitely postponed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from South Dakota that the amendment of the Senator from Virginia, as modified, be indefinitely postponed.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President—

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, on that question, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President—

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, was that a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. McGOVERN. No; a motion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A motion by the Senator from South Dakota, the Chair advises the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota withhold his motion so that the Senator from Virginia may be recognized?

Mr. McGOVERN. I will.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Virginia. The motion will be temporarily withheld.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I want briefly to mention several points which have been raised today by the opposition.

One is the question of adding this amendment to the present Senate bill, S. 3584.

I submit that the bill itself, S. 3584, starts out with a statement of policy. The amendment which I present would be an additional statement of policy.

Now the point has been made that West Germany and several other European countries which have been mentioned are not now receiving foreign aid so that the amendment should not be incorporated into a foreign aid bill.

First, I think, since it does start out as a statement of policy, it is perfectly all right to add another statement of policy to it.

Second, West Germany, France, and Belgium have received \$18½ billion in U.S. foreign aid in recent years.

The point has been made also that because some countries permit trading by their private firms to send wheat to some countries, we should not adopt this amendment, pointing out what a steel plant will do when sent to Communist China.

I do not think there is any similarity between sending wheat to people who are starving, or permitting trading in wheat, and the guaranteeing by a government the sending of a steel plant to a nation which is the major supplier of weapons which are killing Americans in South Vietnam.

All this amendment does is to say that any government that gives official approval and financial backing—I am not speaking of private firms; I am not speaking of individuals trading as individuals in a country—to any nation, and gives official and financial backing to a plan to build steel plants in Communist China, which is the chief supplier of war materiel to North Vietnam and the Vietcong, "is a grave blow to the common defense of the free world and to the safety of American troops in Vietnam."

I do not see how there can be a great dispute on those points.

Why in the world cannot the Senate of the United States pass a point of view on the official action of a government of a nation when the action of that nation jeopardizes the lives of Americans who have been drafted and sent to southeast Asia to fight against communism?

I hope the Senate will see fit to vote today on this amendment.

This point was raised by the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] 4 months ago, along with the Senator from Virginia. Four months ago attention was called to this deal, and no action has been taken by Congress, and little, or no action, has been taken otherwise. It seems to me time for the Senate or the Congress of the United States to speak loud and clear on a matter which I believe is of grave consequence to the men whom we have drafted to go to South Vietnam, particularly so when we have drafted others and sent them to West Germany and Western Europe to protect those nations from Soviet aggression.

Mr. MANSFIELD obtained the floor.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I voted against the motion to table because I thought we ought to talk about it a little more. I have come to the conclusion that I shall not support the amendment. I say this as one who happens to agree with the feeling of the Senator from Rhode Island about that particular matter. I say it as one who thinks it is a most unfortunate, almost unfriendly, act, so far as this country and its personnel in Vietnam are concerned, but, nevertheless, believe that action by the Congress, officially taken on a bill of this nature, would do more harm than good.

I think this is what we really should be thinking about, not whether we approve or disapprove of the furnishing of a rolling mill to Communist China, but whether the action proposed in this amendment would have the effect we want it to have, or would be merely an expression of indignation on our part.

I shall express again my complete disapproval of and indignation over the action taken by the consortium, and at the same time vote against the amendment, the adoption of which would be unwise and undesirable.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG].

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, it seems to me we make a poor case before the world when we undertake to slap on the wrist our friends and allies, who perhaps are not allies of ours in Vietnam, but who are our allies elsewhere.

France has withdrawn from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. One of the principal reasons for the withdrawal of the French Government, headed by Mr. de Gaulle, is that she fears we may draw France into a nuclear conflict by some of our policies, when they prefer different policies.

France was defeated in Vietnam. She took that defeat and moved out. France thinks we ought to accept defeat and move out of Vietnam.

When we start condemning France, even though it is a mild rebuke, it seems to me we are inviting the French Parliament to condemn our action. We invite them to pass judgment on something we are doing. They may have something to say to the effect that it is this country which is endangering the peace of the world, and not Red China. It invites our other allies, such as Italy, to say we are wrong in what we are doing.

When friends fall out and have a misunderstanding, the thing to do is to get together and talk it over and try to arrive at an understanding of each other's point of view.

The people against whom this amendment is directed are friends and allies who, under other circumstances, would conduct themselves in ways of which we approve. To pick out one action by them, and adopt a resolution against it would be a mistake.



I am sure some of our allies could say to us, "Why do you disapprove of our doing business with Red China?" Did you not trade wheat for gold with Russia? Did not your government get in on the transaction to provide credit? Who are you to tell us we should not trade with Red China when you traded with Russia?"

I do not approve of Canada wheat sale, which I understand was the biggest sale ever made with Red China. Yet Canada thinks it is good business. I would be happy for the officials of our country to talk to the Canadian officials, but I do not see how we help ourselves with this amendment, when this matter was not discussed before the Foreign Relations Committee, and when it could better be discussed among friends and allies, to try to arrive at an understanding of each other's viewpoint, rather than have the Senate condemn our allies. This matter was not discussed in the committee and it has not been presented in any other way. It seems to me it will make for misunderstanding rather than understanding.

I know of nothing that the Communists want more at this time, whether it be the Chinese Communists, the Russian Communists, or the Vietnamese Communists, than to see us fall out with our allies and our friends all over the world by undertaking to judge their conduct rather than seeking to work out with them an understanding, and gain the utmost cooperation that might be forthcoming under better circumstances.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, for the reasons expressed by the Senator from Louisiana, and because of other questions and issues that have been raised here on the floor of the Senate, I renew my motion.

I ask unanimous consent that the names of the following Senators be added as cosponsors of this motion: the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Does the Senator renew his motion?

Mr. McGOVERN. I renew the motion, and ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from South Dakota. On this question, the yeas and the nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] would vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present, and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 34, nays 55, as follows:

[No. 156 Leg.]

YEAS—34

Alken	Javits	Muskie
Anderson	Kennedy, Mass.	Neuberger
Bartlett	Kennedy, N.Y.	Pell
Case	Kuchel	Saltonstall
Church	Long, La.	Scott
Clark	Mansfield	Smathers
Fulbright	McCarthy	Smith
Gore	McGee	Tydings
Gruening	McGovern	Yarborough
Hart	Monroney	Young, Ohio
Holland	Morse	
Inouye	Moss	

NAYS—55

Bennett	Griffin	Prouty
Bible	Harris	Proxmire
Boggs	Hartke	Randolph
Brewster	Hickenlooper	Ribicoff
Burdick	Hill	Robertson
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Russell, S.C.
Byrd, W. Va.	Jackson	Russell, Ga.
Cannon	Jordan, N.C.	Simpson
Cooper	Jordan, Idaho	Sparkman
Cotton	Long, Mo.	Stennis
Curtis	Magnuson	Symington
Dirksen	McIntyre	Talmadge
Dominick	Miller	Thurmond
Douglas	Mondale	Tower
Eastland	Montoya	Williams, N.J.
Ellender	Mundt	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Murphy	Young, N. Dak.
Fannin	Nelson	
Fong	Pastore	

NOT VOTING—11

Allott	Dodd	Metcalf
Bass	Hayden	Morton
Bayh	Lausche	Pearson
Carlson	McClellan	

So Mr. McGOVERN's motion was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD]. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], and the Senator from Con-

necticut [Mr. DODD] would each vote "Yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 56, nays 33, as follows:

[No. 157 Leg.]

YEAS—56

Anderson	Griffin	Pastore
Bennett	Harris	Prouty
Bible	Hartke	Proxmire
Boggs	Hickenlooper	Randolph
Brewster	Hill	Ribicoff
Burdick	Holland	Robertson
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Russell, S.C.
Byrd, W. Va.	Jackson	Russell, Ga.
Cannon	Jordan, N.C.	Simpson
Cooper	Jordan, Idaho	Sparkman
Cotton	Long, Mo.	Stennis
Curtis	Magnuson	Symington
Dominick	McIntyre	Talmadge
Douglas	Miller	Thurmond
Eastland	Mondale	Tower
Ellender	Montoya	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Mundt	Yarborough
Fannin	Murphy	Young, N. Dak.
Fong	Nelson	

NAYS—33

Alken	Javits	Moss
Bartlett	Kennedy, Mass.	Muskie
Case	Kennedy, N.Y.	Neuberger
Church	Kuchel	Pell
Clark	Long, La.	Saltonstall
Dirksen	Mansfield	Scott
Fulbright	McCarthy	Smathers
Gore	McGee	Smith
Gruening	McGovern	Tydings
Hart	Monroney	Williams, N.J.
Inouye	Morse	Young, Ohio

NOT VOTING—11

Allott	Dodd	Metcalf
Bass	Hayden	Morton
Bayh	Lausche	Pearson
Carlson	McClellan	

So the amendment, as modified, of Mr. BYRD of Virginia was agreed to.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TALMADGE in the chair). The bill is open to further amendment.

# TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE IN SECRET SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in accord with Senate resolutions, the transcript of the recent secret session of the Senate has been made available to the chairmen of certain committees as well as to individual Senators who participated in the debate. The offices of all Senators who, under the Senate resolutions, have the right of access to this transcript have been notified of its availability.

I wish to announce today that the transcript, as adjusted, will go to the

Printer on Wednesday afternoon, July 27, 1966. Any Senator who has the right of access to the transcript and who desires to exercise it should do so in room S-208 prior to noon on Wednesday. At that time as adjusted, the transcript will be sent to the Printer for publication.

#### FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, 1966

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3534) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, I send to the desk the modified form of amendment No. 704. Section (c) is the only part of the amendment offered yesterday that has been modified, and I ask that that section be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment as modified.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. As modified, section (c), beginning on page 4, line 3, reads as follows:

The proposals should include an assessment of the role that economic assistance by the United States and other developed nations can and should play in economic and social development.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, there was some discussion about this amendment yesterday afternoon. There were some objections raised by various Senators.

I have discussed the change made in section (c) with the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE]. I have discussed it in depth and at length with the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], who is a cosponsor of the amendment. I have also received the approval for the change from our cosponsors, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN]. It has also been discussed with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT], as well as the majority and minority leaders.

I believe that the amendment is acceptable to all the Senators I have mentioned.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I request that the amendment be read in full.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment in full.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 21, after line 7, add the following:

#### "CHAPTER 3—RE STUDY

"SEC. 301. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS.—The President is requested to submit to the Congress, on or before January 1, 1968, his recommendations, including legislative proposals designed to carry out such recommendations, for such future foreign assistance programs as may be necessary and appropriate in the national interest and taking into account the principles set forth in section 302.

"SEC. 302. PRINCIPLES TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS.—(a) In the formulation and submission to the Congress of proposals for foreign assistance for fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 1968, such proposals should include, among others, the following categories:

"(1) Assistance intended primarily for humanitarian purposes, including grants, loans, contributions, or other aid to be made available for relief purposes through international organizations or relief agencies, or otherwise, famine relief and other assistance authorized by title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, and similar relief programs.

"(2) Assistance for development purposes (A) to be extended only to countries in which progress is being made toward respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression and of the press, and recognition of the importance of individual freedom, initiative, and private enterprise; and (B) to be in furtherance of sound plans for economic and social growth to the end of developing the resources of the recipient countries to make them self-sufficient at the earliest possible date.

"(3) Assistance for political or contingency purposes, to be extended to a limited number of countries or areas, primarily for purposes of advancing or protecting the mutual interests of the United States and the other countries or areas concerned, such as programs relating to the creation of special relationships with recipient countries, reinforcement of alliance-type relationships, or other political or contingency purposes.

"(4) Military assistance to be furnished for purposes that serve the military defense of the United States as recommended by the Secretary of Defense, subject to approval by the Secretary of State.

"(b) In order to provide for better coordination of all programs of United States assistance to foreign countries, and for more efficient, economical, and effective administration of such programs, the proposals referred to in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) shall also include provisions for unification, insofar as practicable, of the administration of such programs under a single officer or agency.

"(c) The proposals should include an assessment of the role that economic assistance by the United States and other developed nations can and should play in economic and social development.

"SEC. 303. TEMPORARY PLANNING COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED.—(a) There is hereby created a Foreign Aid Planning Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee") which shall consist of twelve members, no more than seven of whom shall be members of the same political party, to be selected as follows:

"(1) Four members to be appointed by the President from private life, none of whom shall have served at an executive level in the administration of the AID program in Washington;

"(2) Four members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, to be designated by the Vice President;

"(3) Four members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, to be designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

The Committee shall select a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among its members.

"(b) It shall be the duty of the Committee (1) to make such studies and investigations as may be necessary to enable it to make recommendations to the President and to the Congress concerning the proposals referred to in section 302(a), and (2) to provide the President, or such officer or agency as the President may designate, with such assistance as the President or such officer or agency may request in the formulation of such proposals.

"(c) The Committee is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such secretarial, clerical, and other staff assistants as may be necessary to enable it to perform its functions, and to procure, without regard

to the civil service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized for the departments by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (60 Stat. 810; 5 U.S.C. 55a), but at rates not to exceed \$100 per diem for individuals.

"(d) Members of the Committee appointed under subsection (a) (1) who are not otherwise employed by the United States shall be paid compensation at the rate of \$100 per diem while engaged in the work of the Committee, and shall be reimbursed for travel and other necessary expenses incurred while so engaged, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 73b-2) for persons in the Government service employed intermittently.

"(e) The Committee may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section, hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, administer such oaths, and require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents as the Committee may deem advisable. Subpoenas may be issued under the signature of the Chairman of the Committee and may be served by any person designated by the Chairman. The provisions of sections 102 to 104, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes (2 U.S.C. 192-194), shall apply in the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this subsection.

"(f) Each department and agency of the Government shall furnish to the Committee, upon its request, such information or other assistance as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions.

"(g) The Committee shall from time to time transmit to the President, and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, reports of its activities, including its recommendations, and shall file its final report on or before September 1, 1967. Upon the filing of its final report, the Committee shall cease to exist.

"(h) There shall be made available to the Committee out of sums appropriated pursuant to this Act such amounts, not to exceed an aggregate of \$400,000, as the Committee deems necessary to enable it to carry out its functions."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the amendment as modified.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I rise to ask the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] a question with regard to subsection (c) on page 3.

It is my understanding from the reading by the clerk that this is totally different language than appears in printed amendment No. 704. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I do not believe it is totally different. There is a difference in language. There are six or seven lines in the beginning that were struck out, and the last four or five lines are substantially the same.

Mr. DOMINICK. I was concerned with the wording under amendment No. 704. I would like to know what difference it makes.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator heard the discussion of the minority leader today, as I did. The section was changed—I think the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] will confirm this to be satisfactory to the objections raised by the



minority leader. The portions he discussed have been stricken.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator from South Dakota.

I would like to know what the wording is at the present time.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask that the clerk read the language.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it was just read in full.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask that the clerk read section (c) of amendment No. 704, beginning on page 3, line 18.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Section (c) will be read again.

Has the Senator from New York modified his amendment accordingly?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That is correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator please give to the clerk the amendment as he has modified it, so that the clerk may read it?

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The proposals referred to in subsection (a) should include an analysis of the role that economic assistance by the United States and other developed nations can play in economic and social development through foreign aid.

Mr. DOMINICK. That is the whole of the subsection?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. The rest has been stricken.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I should like to ask a question of the Senator from New York. On page 2, paragraph 2, the modified amendment reads:

(2) Assistance for development purposes (A) to be extended only to countries in which progress is being made toward respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression and of the press, and recognition of the importance of individual freedom, initiative, and private enterprise;

I heartily applaud that provision, but I wonder whether it is not a little indefinite leaving it the way it is—"in which progress is being made toward"—I believe it would be almost impossible to get any country to admit that progress is not being made.

I would therefore like to make the suggestion and wonder whether the Senator would accept it in his amendment, to substitute in lieu of the words "in which progress is being made toward," the words "which exhibit," so that it would read, "only to countries which exhibit respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression and of the press."

In other words, to say, "in which progress is being made toward" in a field so large, is so vague and may prove so controversial that I think it would not mean much; but if we say, "only to countries which exhibit respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression and of the press," then I think we would be nailing it down more specifically to the certain objective which the Senator obviously desires, and which I agree to be desirable.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. All this amendment does would be to establish a commission to look into this matter, which would report back to the Senate. It was therefore felt that with that

broad language, it could perhaps accomplish a good deal more. I have no strong objection to the Senator's suggestion. I say that what we are trying to do is to establish a commission that will come up with reports, suggestions, and recommendations on this basis.

Mr. GRUENING. Nevertheless, it seems to me there has been so much ambiguity and evasions in the foreign aid program, that I strongly favor being as specific as possible. It is important that we try, in connection with the aid we hand out, to try to uphold the rule of law, freedom of expression, and of the press in the recipient countries and I therefore think that if the Senator would agree to my suggestion I feel we would come closer to achieving the objective a little more definitely than by simply saying, "in which progress is being made toward." I cannot imagine any country finding that progress is not being made. That is my suggestion and I hope that the Senator will accept it in his amendment.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Inasmuch as the Senator feels strongly about it, I would say that really is a good point, but the commission would look into it anyway, itself; it would look at this current debate in the Senate, and reach an agreement as to what it might recommend to the Senate. I think that the language already in the amendment covers that matter satisfactorily. I do not feel that strongly about it.

Mr. GRUENING. If the Senator has no objection, I should like to move that the suggestion be incorporated into his amendment.

Mr. MUNDT. Would the Senator identify the amendment for us, please?

Mr. GRUENING. It is on line 16, on page 2 of the Senator's amendment, I suggest striking out the words "in which progress is being made," and substituting "extended only to countries which exhibit respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression, and of the press," and so forth.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from South Dakota have any objection?

Mr. MUNDT. I do not believe it makes any difference.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. If it makes the Senator from Alaska any happier, I think that we should accept it.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank my colleague from New York.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from New York modify his amendment accordingly?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will take note of the change in the amendment.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I should like to address a few questions to the Senator from New York. I notice on page 2 of his amendment, among the categories to be looked into by this board is specifically mentioned title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended—that is the surplus program.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes; the Senator is correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. Why limit this to title II?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Because that is a small percentage of the whole effort made in this field by the food for peace, and the food for freedom, which we discussed yesterday. It was felt that if the Committee on Foreign Relations had the responsibility in the aid program, we would concentrate on the aid program and not try to cover all the other areas, although we were going to take them into consideration, as I mentioned yesterday.

Mr. ELLENDER. They are all under one AID program. Food and fiber has been made available to the countries we are assisting under the AID program. Food for peace, as well as food for freedom supplements the AID program covered in the pending bill.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That is correct; \$1.6 billion, I believe, this year.

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes. I wish to point out to the Senator that during fiscal year 1964 we made available \$1.7 billion for the food-for-peace program. In 1965, we made available \$1.7 billion and in 1966, \$1.7 billion. In 1967, it is contemplated that we will make available \$1.6 billion.

Now, why does not the Senator include in this study all titles of the Food for Freedom Act? Why confine the study to title II only? Why limit the study of the committee?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Let me say to the Senator from Louisiana that the part of the program which has raised the greatest controversy and the part which has been debated so strenuously on the floor of the Senate this year, and every year, has been the foreign aid bill program. Obviously, the committee is going to take into consideration that we are making this other effort; but it is a fact that what causes the greatest difficulty, on which Senators feel most strongly, and where there is the greatest opposition, is that part of the program that we have described in this amendment. It is the Foreign Relations Committee—split as it is, with all sides feeling as strongly as they do—which, if we are to have an adequate and sufficient foreign aid program, we must support it. It was for that reason that the concentration of effort was made in this particular field.

There are other committees which have jurisdiction over the other aspects of the program and it was felt that we should not go into all those at this time.

Mr. ELLENDER. It is not as much a question of jurisdiction as it is finding out what is encompassed in foreign aid. The Senator argued here a few days ago that we should make available at least 1 percent of our gross national product, or a figure approximating that sum.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Could I interrupt the Senator there by pointing out that, of course, this did not originate with me. The original statement was made under President Eisenhower to the United Nations in 1960. And it has been repeated by various Presidents since then.

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes, but it has been repeated by the Senator, and of course he believes it?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Exactly.

Mr. ELLENDER. I want to point out to my good friend from New York that in fiscal year 1964, aside from the money that was made available in economic aid which was \$2 billion, and military aid, which amounted to \$1 billion, there must be added food for peace, and the various programs of loans under IMF, IDA, and IDB, which when aggregated total \$4.8 billion.

For 1965, the amount made available for military and economic aid, food for peace, and the various loans made by banks, our total effort was \$5.6 billion.

In fiscal year 1966, the fiscal year ending last June, even though the President stated the amount he asked for was a "bare bones" request of \$3.4 billion, the aggregate amount of assistance totaled \$7.5 billion, or a little more than 1 percent of the inflated GNP of the second quarter of 1966 which at an annual rate was \$732 billion.

For the current fiscal year, if the sums authorized are eventually appropriated, total foreign assistance will be in excess of \$6 billion, of course, this would include supplemental requests that may be forthcoming if the Vietnam matter is not brought to a conclusion.

I am wondering why the study by the Commission, should not be comprehensive instead of restrictive, as the amendment contemplates. Why not have the Commission study every facet of aid and look into every spigot before it comes to a conclusion?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. As I think I tried to answer, perhaps not completely satisfactorily, this was the part of the program which caused great controversy. We thought therefore that the Commission will concentrate here. Of course it would be aware and would take into consideration what was being done in the other fields. But the pending amendment relates to the foreign aid program which we have been discussing in the past week to see if there could not be a new approach to a program over which there has been controversy in the Senate, and through the country.

I would have no objection to expanding the Commission along the lines suggested. There might be difficulty created because of the jurisdiction of other committees. The proposal is limited to this particular situation. We are keeping it limited. If as a result we come up with suggestions or recommendations, I think the country will benefit.

Mr. ELLENDER. Does the Senator concede—

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. The Senator from Louisiana and I have had discussions over the last few days about this, so I concede the figures.

Mr. ELLENDER. Does not the Senator think it is as important to look into the other aspects of foreign aid rather than solely dealing with the assistance embraced in the pending measure.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I think it is important. This is a more restrictive study. We thought it well, under the circumstances, to limit it to the area over

which there has been the greatest controversy, and that it would be well to make a study of it and come up with some recommendations. Perhaps we might be able to expand the Commission.

Mr. ELLENDER. If the Senator will look at the debate, he will find we raised the issue with respect to the funding for 1965, the increase in the quota in the International Monetary Fund to \$1,031 million. That is certainly important. That involves dollars.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I agree.

Mr. ELLENDER. The first installment on the \$750 million commitment we have to provide funds for the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank is \$250 million. That also is foreign aid and should be included in the study. It would seem to me that our contributions to international organizations must be looked into if the Commission is to do the proper job.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be order in the Senate. Visitors in the galleries will please be quiet. Senators who desire to converse will please retire from the Chamber.

The Senator from Louisiana may proceed.

Mr. ELLENDER. In addition to the items I have just mentioned, in fiscal year 1966 Congress appropriated \$205,880,000 for the second and final installment to the callable capital of the Inter-American Development Bank.

We also appropriated as our second installment of \$250 million for the Fund for Special Operations of this same Bank and then we provided for another installment to the International Development Association, IDA, of \$104 million.

In addition to all that, Mr. President, in the supplemental appropriation bill that was passed this year, we provided another \$715 million for foreign aid.

Whenever any Senator states on this floor that we have been niggardly with our foreign aid, as has been stated during this debate several times, I think he is misinformed.

I repeat that, although we made an initial appropriation of only \$3.3 billion for fiscal year 1966, we finally ended up with a foreign aid program totaling \$7,594,500,000. I repeat, because I feel strongly that emphasis is required, it seems to me that the Commission should examine every facet of aid that we are dealing with and make any criticisms it desires to make about them.

It would seem to me that the Commission should also go into what our allies are doing and what the other rich nations of the world are doing, but that is not covered by the pending amendment.

As I have pointed out, many nations have made money available.

In 1961, foreign aid furnished to the developing nations of the world by the Federal Republic of Germany amounted to \$600 million. In 1964 aid furnished by the West Germans had declined to \$460 million, a decrease of \$140 million or 23.3 percent.

According to information furnished the Congress by the Agency for International Development, the high point in assistance supplied by the Federal Republic of Germany was reached in 1961.

Since that time this aid has been on the decline and in 1964 was less than one-half of 1 percent of the gross national product of the Republic. It is expected that the amount of aid furnished the developing nations by West Germany will decline further in 1965 and in future years.

In 1962, French assistance to developing nations amounted to almost \$1 billion and approximated 1.3 percent of the French GNP. This aid has declined since then and in 1964 aggregated about \$840 million, or a reduction of approximately \$160 million since 1962. This decrease stated in terms of a percentage reduction amounts to 16 percent.

Total assistance provided by Japan in 1964 amounted to \$180 million, which is less than one-fourth of 1 percent of its GNP. Roughly one-third of Japanese assistance is in the form of indemnification and reparation payments. Most of the remainder of the assistance supplied by the Japanese is in the form of loans with maturities of between 5 and 10 years at average rates of interest of about 6 percent. Furthermore, as is pointed out in the aforementioned justifications, Japanese assistance is used largely to promote Japan's exports in the areas where its trade is concentrated, namely in south Asia and the Far East, which areas receive almost all of the Japanese aid.

It strikes me that the commission should be specifically charged with the duty of ascertaining what other nations are giving aid. I do not believe this proposal spells it out specifically, and in my opinion, I feel we have been too soft with our friends across the seas.

Mr. President, I have hoped that at some time in the future we might be able to end this foreign aid. In this connection I believe there should be included in the amendment a timetable, to let the commission look into the matter and make a determination as to how long they think that foreign aid, as it has been going on for the last 19 years, should proceed. It seems to me that we have put up more than our share in this effort, and it strikes me that if a good job is to be done, we should have the commission come up with a conclusion as to a termination date for foreign assistance as we know it today.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I must go to another committee meeting, but I wish to affirm my support of the amendment offered by my colleague from New York. I have been present while it has gone through the various stages of debate and modification. I think fundamentally it seeks to approach our problems with intelligence and planning. Though many may not like that word, it is absolutely essential in our modern day, considering the diversity of the effort and of the problems involved, and the number of constituent elements represented. I think it is a worthy effort to join the Congress with the President in advance planning for the foreign aid program.

No matter how some may delude themselves as to the proposition that foreign aid will be over shortly, it will not. I have been in Congress since 1948, and



have voted on foreign aid every one of those 18 years, with the exception of two when I was attorney general. We do not know when it will end. We only know it will continue as long as the need persists. Instead of kidding ourselves, and doing it on an annual basis, there have been many efforts to put our planning on a long-range basis.

I have tried, for example, in the matter of private enterprise participation in foreign aid, to proceed in much this way. In fact, we have an amendment to this bill in the Senate which was adopted and which would do precisely that as far as private enterprise is concerned. The junior Senator from New York, my colleague, is trying to put the planning on an overall basis. I think it is a most estimable effort, and I hope very much the Senate will support him in it, and that it will be seen for what it is, an effort to accept reality and to put the future planning of our foreign aid efforts on a sound and continuing basis.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to take this amendment as it is, if the Senate is willing to allow me to make it, because I believe we have now reached general agreement.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me, it is my intention to ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment, and I do so now ask.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is all right. The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, it is not my intention to vote for this amendment. In my own experience over the last 12 or 14 years, I think this will represent the fourth or fifth special study by a special commission for this special purpose. Perhaps some good might come of it; I do not know. Certainly it amounts to almost a plea by the Senate, saying that the committees charged with servicing and making reports as to authorization bills and appropriation bills are not capable of undertaking and doing the very things that are embraced in the pending amendment.

I make this further observation: Here we propose a study commission to consist exclusively of members of one committee of the Senate; and yet inherently, and in a broad and a very deep way, there are at least two very extensive fields that this amendment gets into and contemplates besides that of foreign relations. One of those fields is appropriations, and the other is the military, the field of the Armed Services Committee, because there are embraced in the amendment an assessment, a study, investigation, and recommendations with reference to military assistance in the role of foreign aid.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I simply call to the Senator's attention, and also to the attention of the Senator from New York, whose amendment this is, that on the original military assistance bill, when it was before us for the first time, the Foreign Relations Committee took over the hearing, and it was agreed at that time, rather than to have a joint hearing—I think the first one was a joint hearing, and then it was agreed that the Foreign Relations Committee should take it over, and if there was any military question,

it should be referred to the Committee on Armed Services thereafter.

For 1 or 2 years, the matter was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and then I think it was the feeling of those who were on the Armed Services Committee that it really would be better to have it come directly to the floor; so that arrangement was not carried on.

But I wonder, in that connection, if the Senator from Nebraska will permit me to say so, whether the Senator from New York and the Senator from South Dakota, whose amendment this is, would agree to a modification of subsection (2) on page 4, line 18, to read, instead of just four members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, "four members chosen from the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations of the Senate."

In other words, leave the statement "to be designated by the Vice President" unchanged, and not change anything else, except that the four members be chosen from the three committees, which all three have something to do with the matter, rather than just the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HRUSKA. I am happy to yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. I can see some merit, perhaps, in bringing in the Appropriations Committee in some way, if it can be done, but why bring in the Committee on Armed Services? Because we have taken the military section out of the bill, and this deals only with economic assistance.

Mr. HRUSKA. On the contrary, if the Senator will yield, we have, on page 3 of the pending amendment subsection (4), which reads:

(4) Military assistance to be furnished for purposes that serve the military defense of the United States as recommended by the Secretary of Defense, subject to approval by the Secretary of State.

That is part of the study the commission would make.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes, but it is attached to the economic aid part of the bill. If we are to have a Commission with only that many committee members on it, no committee will have adequate representation to provide any cross section of views at all.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If the Senator from Nebraska will permit me to say so—

Mr. HRUSKA. Certainly.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I did not intend to increase the number at all. I simply said the Vice President should be able to choose from members on the three committees, rather than merely the one.

Mr. MUNDT. I think it is important to increase the size of the committee if that is to be done, because, for example, on the Foreign Relations Committee, as the Senator knows, each of us is more or less typed as having certain ideas on economic aid. If the Vice President were to select one member from each of the committees, the decision could be predetermined in advance. By increasing the number, it could be expected that there would be some pros and some cons.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HRUSKA. I yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I think the supporters of the amendment failed to read it carefully. I see the possibility that, under the amendment, the committee might investigate the CIA, in which case it would be most dangerous to have four members of the Committee on Foreign Relations on it. We might wish to take that into account, because section 3, on page 2, reads:

Assistance for political or contingency purposes, to be extended to a limited number of countries or areas

That might very well involve the CIA. It would be most dangerous to have four members of the Foreign Relations Committee on such a committee.

Mr. HRUSKA. That is a very interesting observation, particularly in view of the recent debate on the floor on that general subject which had an unfortunate termination so far as the viewpoint just expressed is concerned.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, in addition to what the senior Senator from Massachusetts just said about the Committee on Foreign Relations, I point out that in 1964, food for peace provided 33 percent of our foreign aid. In 1965 it was 28 percent. In 1966 it was 20 percent. Considering these facts, why should not the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry have a berth on this committee?

Mr. HRUSKA. I see no reason why not. To narrow this committee down for a study and investigation of such monumental scope and to limit the committee to four members of only one committee seems to me to make it a little bit off balance, in fact very ill balanced.

I point that out as an added reason why I do not propose to vote for the amendment.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I should like to address a question to the junior Senator from New York.

I note that in subsection (1) of section 201, on page 2, of the pending amendment reference is made to the inclusion of title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended.

That is the title that has to do with famine relief.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HOLLAND. And that comes under this heading, "Assistance Intended Primarily for Humanitarian Purposes."

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HOLLAND. Do I understand from that that the only research that this committee would make, looking to suggestions or changes of programs lying in the field of agriculture would be in that field covered by title II of the Food for Peace Act?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. The Senator is correct. As I said to the Senator yesterday, and as I said to the Senator from Louisiana today, they would certainly take into consideration the fact that these other programs exist

and how they operate and how much is expended each year while they are determining what should be done under this program, rather than under the foreign aid program.

Mr. HOLLAND. The study commission, however, would not take up matters arising under titles I, III, and IV of the Food for Peace Act. Title I, for instance, deals with the sale of food commodities or agricultural commodities for soft currencies; title III, as I recall it, for barter; and title IV, the sale for dollars on the installment plan or credit terms. All such details would still be left exclusively to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. It would be left to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Obviously the Senator from Florida understands that the planning committee would be aware of that and would take into consideration what was being done under those programs, while considering the foreign aid program.

Mr. HOLLAND. No provision would be made for suggested changes in titles I, III, and IV of the Food for Peace Act.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. The Senator is correct. I emphasize to the Senator from Florida and to the Senate that all we have been talking about over the period of the last day or so is a study. After the study has been made—and there will be eight Members of Congress on the study committee—the committee will make its report back to the Senate and to the House of Representatives. Everybody will have an opportunity to consider that study and to make his own judgment as to its validity.

Mr. HOLLAND. And the appropriate committees having jurisdiction of the specific subject matter would still have the responsibility of examining and reporting upon suggested legislation.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. They would examine and report upon any suggestion they might make. Some suggestions might be made to other committees. But each Representative would have to pass on the matter and each Senator would have to pass on it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from New York. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] for working out an acceptable adjustment of what were our differences. I think all of our differences were more in form than they were of serious substance all the time.

The amendment now allays the concern, if not the fears, of some who thought there was an implied commitment under the language originally proposed to commit ourselves to narrow the gap between the have and have-not nations. But, be that as it may, we will benefit from the study that will flow from the special commission the amendment calls for.

The purpose and direction of the Kennedy-Clark-Mundt amendment is quite different from the amendment I helped draft in the Foreign Relations Committee last year. It is also very different from the version which was passed by the Senate after the Kennedy-Clark-Mundt amendment was added on the floor. It is not completely accurate to say this is what the Senate approved last year. The Senate must take into account the other amendment that it approved last year.

The committee version of 1965 began by terminating future aid under what are called foreign aid measures and also terminating title I of the Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act of 1954. This was put into the committee amendment to make certain that the review of foreign aid would include all kinds of assistance, including that under food for peace. Our bill ended the largest program under food for peace along with the current version of foreign aid just so all these forms of aid would be considered and dealt with as a piece.

Take a look at this language in the 1965 bill. It began:

SEC. 701. TERMINATION OF EXISTING PROGRAMS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance shall be furnished pursuant to this Act or pursuant to title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, or any extension thereof, to any country or area (or enterprise thereon) subsequent to June 30, 1967.

The reason for that language was to include Public Law 480 in any review of foreign aid. The committee fully recognized and appreciated that so-called food for peace is one of the biggest foreign aid programs we have. Beginning this year, Public Law 480 will no longer be a surplus disposal program. We will begin raising food specifically for the purpose of distribution abroad. It is every bit as much a part of economic assistance as the manufactured commodities we also produce for distribution under AID contract.

Senators will recall that last year my good friend, the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, seemed to believe that this action would constitute trespassing upon the jurisdiction of the Committee on Agriculture. We sought no trespass upon the jurisdiction of the Committee on Agriculture. We took the position that what they do under Public Law 480 and food for peace is a substantial part of foreign aid, and any commission looking into foreign aid ought to look into that matter, too.

We made some adjustments and got his agreement to the language I have just this afternoon read because he shared our view that Public Law 480

should be included in any review of foreign aid.

I was gratified to hear Senator ELLENDER—if I understood correctly—make the same point, that food for peace and Public Law 480 really are part of the foreign aid program. It is not specifically set forth in this resolution, as it was last year, but I do not see any reason why the Commission that is to be set up here could not cover all forms of foreign assistance, including those authorized in other laws.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. As one of the many co-authors whose names are associated with this proposal, I can assure the Senator from Oregon that, early in our discussions, the first amendment which was adopted by the then sole author, the gentleman from New York [Mr. KENNEDY]—although I believe it had two authors, the gentleman from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK]—was to provide the words "among others." So that the Commission, in addition to anything we stipulate here, would have a wide-open field in which to carry out its investigations—any place that it felt its investigations would be valid.

So the legislative history recounted by the Senator from Oregon certainly would prove an inducement to them to do that which they could legally do under this amendment.

Mr. MORSE. That statement is very helpful. I understand, then, from his intervention, that the Senator from South Dakota, one of the authors of the pending amendment, advises the Senator from Oregon and the Senate that if the amendment is adopted and the Commission is set up, it would have general power to go into a review of Public Law 480 and food for peace or any other assistance program available.

Mr. MUNDT. As now written, the Commission would have the power to make investigations of anything, anywhere, relevant to the whole foreign assistance program, until it runs out of its \$400,000.

Mr. MORSE. That was my understanding, but I desired to make the record clear, because we clearly contemplated that in my amendment of last year.

A second section of our committee amendment directed the study commission to seek unification of all such aid programs under a single officer or agency. The language reads as follows:

In order to provide for better coordination of all programs of United States assistance to foreign countries, and for more efficient, economical, and effective administration of such programs, the proposals referred to in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) shall also include provisions for unification, insofar as practicable, of the administration of such programs under a single officer or agency.

The Senator from Louisiana has already spoken about the omission from this amendment of a termination provision. I wish it were in. But we must face the fact that there would be no



chance of getting it through the House, and I doubt whether it would get through the Senate under the circumstances prevailing this year.

Nevertheless, this comment should be made, to show the difference between the position I took last year on the amendment that the Senate adopted, including the addition of the Kennedy-Clark amendment of last year, and the situation this year with the Kennedy-Clark-Mundt amendment.

Omission of the termination provision, with its inclusion of food for peace, would leave entirely up to the study group the review of all aid programs or just those provided for in this bill and in the military aid bill. The only type of assistance specifically described as including other laws which the Commission is directed to study is in the area of humanitarian relief. No mention is made of specific laws in the area of development, nor the area of political aid, nor the area of military aid.

Another omission from this amendment offered this year is subsection (b) of the committee bill of last year. It reads:

The proposals referred to in subsection (2) should also provide that after June 30, 1967, the total number of countries receiving assistance referred to in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (a) should not exceed a total of fifty.

I should prefer some limitation in this amendment. But there is a reference to this matter in current bills.

I should like to have the attention of the Senator from South Dakota, because he is the only coauthor of the amendment.

Does the Senator from South Dakota agree with me that the terms of reference of the Commission are sufficiently broad so that in any study of foreign aid it could take into consideration—it seems to me that it should take into consideration—the number of countries that ought to receive aid?

Mr. MUNDT. I am sure that it is broad enough to do that, because actually no arbitrary limitations are in the amendment.

As the Senator will recall, I introduced a companion amendment of my own. The Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] introduced one. When the amendment of the Senator from New York was called up first, I called attention to the basic difference, which was that included in the amendment of the Senator from New York were some stipulations and some suggestions and some guidelines to which I objected. I objected because the guidelines, if established, seemed to mutually exclude anything else.

Realizing that we could not strike the whole subject, I suggested that we include the words "among others." When the Commission is told that among others it may include this, it means that among the other things they may include is everything else in the world relevant to the problem.

So the Senator from Oregon need have no concern about that, provided a Commission is appointed which would follow the leadership of its own noses, instead

of accepting direction from some ulterior source.

Mr. MORSE. When this Commission is appointed, it should read this debate very carefully.

Mr. MUNDT. I should hope so.

Mr. MORSE. At least, it would be responsible for following the legislative history of the bill. Therefore, I desire this legislative history to show clearly that if we pass the amendment this afternoon—I shall support it—it is understood that the Commission would have within its terms of reference the authority to make inquiry into the extent of the program for the future, including the number of countries that should receive aid by way of foreign aid from the United States.

Mr. MUNDT. It would certainly be a very short-sighted Commission that would ignore that salient factor.

Mr. MORSE. In my judgment, it would not be carrying out the objectives of the amendment if it did not do so, and it would be subject to criticism if it did not.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question of the Senator from South Dakota?

Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator from Minnesota to ask a question of the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McCARTHY. Will the Senator from South Dakota tell me whether or not it is the intent of the authors of this proposal that the Commission's studies would really include everything that is in the policy declaration that is part of the basic Foreign Assistance Act of 1961? Does the Senator contemplate any limitation?

Mr. MUNDT. No. This amendment deals primarily with foreign aid.

Mr. McCARTHY. This is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which sets forth the general purposes of the foreign aid program. Is it the intention of the Senator from South Dakota that this special committee or commission be set up to study this whole field and all of the objectives which have been set for the foreign assistance program through the years and are still part of the basic act?

Mr. MUNDT. I am not sure about that, but I am sure that the Commission should discuss all of the various records and types and programs of foreign aid which have been engaged in, and all possible other determinations which might be made, governing any foreign aid programs for the future. I am not sure that it is broad enough to go into foreign policy and military policy, and things of that type.

Mr. McCARTHY. I say it is simply the policy which has been set in the Foreign Assistance Act, I assume that is the policy which it is the intention that Congress pursue. In other words, the Senator from South Dakota desires that the Commission have rather general jurisdiction in the whole field of foreign aid.

Mr. MUNDT. In the specific field of foreign aid, I desire the Commission to have general jurisdiction.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, since the bill before us is an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in

the RECORD part I, chapter 1, section 102 of that act, which is a three-page statement of policy of the foreign aid program, so that the Senators may know the limitation and scope of the objectives we have set for this program.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

##### PART 1

##### Chapter 1—Policy

SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the sense of the Congress that peace depends on wider recognition of the dignity and interdependence of men, and survival of free institutions in the United States can best be assured in a worldwide atmosphere of freedom.

To this end, the United States has in the past provided assistance to help strengthen the forces of freedom by aiding peoples of less developed friendly countries of the world to develop their resources and improve their living standards, to realize their aspirations for justice, education, dignity, and respect as individual human beings, and to establish responsible governments.

The Congress declares it to be a primary necessity, opportunity, and responsibility of the United States, and consistent with its traditions and ideals, to renew the spirit which lay behind these past efforts, and to help make a historic demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand in hand to the end that an enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity.

It is the policy of the United States to strengthen friendly foreign countries by encouraging the development of their free economic institutions and productive capabilities, and by minimizing or eliminating barriers to the flow of private investment capital.

It is the sense of the Congress that the institution of full investment guaranty programs under title III of chapter 2 of this part with all recipient countries would be regarded as a significant measure of self-help by such countries improving the climate for private investment both domestic and foreign.

In addition, the Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to support the principles of increased economic cooperation and trade among countries, freedom of the press, information, and religion, freedom of navigation in international waterways, and recognition of the right of all private persons to travel and pursue their lawful activities without discrimination as to race or religion. The Congress further declares that any distinction made by foreign nations between American citizens because of race, color, or religion in the granting of, or the exercise of, personal or other rights available to American citizens is repugnant to our principles. In the administration of all parts of this Act these principles shall be supported in such a way in our relations with countries friendly to the United States which are in controversy with each other as to promote an adjudication of the issues involved by means of international law procedures available to the parties.

Accordingly, the Congress hereby affirms it to be the policy of the United States to make assistance available, upon request, under this part in scope and on a basis of long-range continuity essential to the creation of an environment in which the energies of the peoples of the world can be devoted to constructive purposes, free of pressure and erosion by the adversaries of freedom. It is the sense of the Congress that in furnishing assistance under this part excess personal property shall be utilized wherever practicable in lieu of the procurement of new items

for United States-assisted projects and programs. It is the further sense of the Congress that assistance under this part shall be complemented by the furnishings under any other Act of surplus agricultural commodities and by disposal of excess property under this and other Acts.

Also, the Congress reaffirms its conviction that the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered so long as international communism continues to attempt to bring under Communist domination peoples now free and independent and to keep under domination peoples once free but now subject to such domination. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to continue to make available to other free countries and peoples, upon request, assistance of such nature and in such amounts as the United States deems advisable and as may be effectively used by free countries and peoples to help them maintain their freedom. Assistance shall be based upon sound plans and programs; be directed toward the social as well as economic aspects of economic development; be responsible to the efforts of the recipient countries to mobilize their own resources and help themselves; be cognizant of the external and internal pressures which hamper their growth; and shall emphasize long-range development assistance as the primary instrument of such growth.

It is the sense of Congress that in the administration of these funds great attention and consideration should be given to those countries which share the view of the United States on the world crisis and which do not, as a result of United States assistance, divert their own economic resources to military propaganda efforts, supported by the Soviet Union or Communist China, and directed against the United States or against other countries receiving aid under this Act.

The Congress further declares that in the administration of programs of assistance under this Act the highest practicable emphasis should be given to: programs providing for loans or loan guarantees for use by institutions and organizations in making repayable low-interest rate loans to individuals in friendly foreign countries for the purchase of small farms, the purchase of homes, the establishment, equipment and strengthening of small independent business concerns, purchase of tools or equipment needed by individuals for carrying on an occupation or a trade or financing the opportunity for individuals to obtain practical education in vocational and occupational skills, and to those programs of technical assistance and development which will assist in carrying out and in preparing a favorable environment for such programs. While recognizing that special requirements, differing development needs and political conditions in various assisted countries will affect the priority of such programs and of each country's relative ability to implement them, it is further the sense of Congress that each such assisted country should be encouraged to give adequate recognition to such needs of the people in the preparation of national development programs.

The Congress reaffirms its belief in the importance of regional organizations of free peoples for mutual assistance, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Economic Community, the Organization of American States, the Colombo Plan, the South East Asia Treaty Organization, the Central Treaty Organization, and others, and expresses its hope that such organizations may be strengthened and broadened, and their programs of self-help and mutual cooperation may be made more effective in the protection of the independence and security of free people, and in the development of their economic

and social well-being, and the safeguarding of their basic rights and liberties.

It is the sense of the Congress that, in the administration of programs of assistance under chapter 2 of this part, every possible precaution should be taken to assure that such assistance is not diverted to short-term emergency purposes (such as budgetary purposes, balance-of-payments purpose, or military purposes) or any other purpose not essential to the long-range economic development of recipient countries.

The Congress urges that all other countries (including private enterprise within such countries) able to contribute join in a common undertaking to meet the goals stated in this part. In particular, the Congress urges that other industrialized free-world countries increase their contributions and improve the forms and terms of their assistance so that the burden of the common undertaking, which is for the benefit of all, shall be equitably borne, by all. It is the sense of Congress that, where feasible, the United States Government invite friendly nations to join in missions to consult with countries which are recipients of assistance under this part on the possibilities for joint action to assure the effective development of plans for the economic development of such recipient countries and the effective use of assistance provided them; and that the President may request the assistance of international financial institutions in bringing about the establishment of such missions.

It is the sense of the Congress that assistance authorized by this Act should be extended to or withheld from the government of South Vietnam, in the discretion of the President, to further the objectives of victory in the war against communism and the return of their homeland of Americans involved in that struggle.

It is the sense of the Congress that assistance under this or any other Act to any foreign country which hereafter permits, or fails to take adequate measures to prevent, the damage or destruction by mob action of the United States property within such country, should be terminated and should not be resumed until the President determines that appropriate measures have been taken by such country to prevent a recurrence thereof.

*This Act, or the furnishing of economic, military, or other assistance under this Act, shall not be construed as creating a new commitment or as affecting any existing commitment to use armed forces of the United States for the defense of any foreign country.*

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], without losing my right to the floor, so that he may ask a question of the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT].

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I invite attention to the language contained in lines 1 through 6 on page 2 which provides that this Commission is to formulate and submit proposals for foreign assistance for "fiscal years"—and I notice that that is in the plural—beginning on or after July 1, 1968.

Does not this proposed amendment contemplate that the foreign aid program is going to be continued until the last lingering echo of Gabriel's horn trembles into silence?

Mr. MUNDT. I think not, because those who study the RECORD and debate on this matter will observe the fact that the Senate emphatically in a rolcall vote called for this to be a 1-year authorization. The program ends at the end of this fiscal year.

Mr. ERVIN. This amendment, regardless of what it would do to foreign aid to

foreign countries, would cut off aid to members of this Commission at the end of 1 fiscal year.

Mr. MUNDT. The Commission expires when it makes its report. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ERVIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, as the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] and I pointed out last night in colloquy on the floor of the Senate, it is not accurate to say that the amendment that we have under consideration is the same thing we voted for a year ago. It has many of the characteristics of the same thing we voted for but we have to take into account what else we voted for that was related to the subject matter of this amendment.

We have to take into account that some of its characteristics did not come out of the committee, but were added on the floor of the Senate. When you look at the total amendment that we reported from committee, including the facts I have pointed out that are not in the bill this year, I think there is a partial explanation of why the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] and I were right last year in insisting we should modify the amendment this year. That is to the great credit of the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] and I appreciate it very much. He agreed to do it along the lines which I will mention in a moment.

But because the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] made the record he made last night, I thought it fair to him, as well as myself, to point out the differences between the bill and amendment this year, and the bill and amendment of last year.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, in the colloquy that took place last night I emphasized the fact that the amendment as written laid down directions to the Commission of 12. After it laid down directions it proceeded to state that the Commission shall make a study, and that at the conclusion of that study make recommendations.

My anxiety was provoked by the paradox of what is sought to be done. It was declared, in effect, that we shall have an impartial study from which a commission advises about what our course of economic assistance in the future shall be.

But as I have already stated, as a preliminary, the bill proceeded to tell this Commission of 12 what in effect it should do.

I now read from page 3, beginning on line 18 the material which I understand has been stricken from the amendment through the discussions that have been had. Is that correct?

Mr. MORSE. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The language of the bill was, as follows:

The proposals referred to in subsection (a) should be based on an analysis and estimate of the funds required by the developing nations of the world to close the widening gap between the economically privileged nations and those nations striving to achieve a developed economy.



This analysis should examine the relationship between development requirements and the rising gross national product of the United States.

The amendment to the bill that was under consideration last year, proposed by the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], envisioned, in essence, a termination of the foreign aid program, or a substantial reduction of it. That was the basis upon which we proceeded.

However, this amendment was accepted, as proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK]. It is true that the RECORD shows that 78 Senators voted for it, and 1 Senator voted against it. But I submit that a complete reading of the RECORD and the proceedings in 1965 will disclose that the primary objective of the study was to bring about a termination or reduction of the program.

In conclusion, the striking of lines 18 down to a part of line 23 puts the language of this amendment in a form that will require an objective study of the advisability of either increasing, decreasing, or terminating foreign aid.

On that basis, I favor this amendment.

Mr. MORSE. I appreciate that. I wanted to give the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] the opportunity to make his statement in view of the colloquy we engaged in last night with our friends, the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], and others.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Last night I asked the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] why he accepted the amendment last year.

Mr. MORSE. I said I had made a mistake.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I merely want to add that I think the Senator from Oregon tried to be polite to the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from New York.

Mr. MORSE. I do not have to try to be polite to them; it is always a pleasure.

Mr. LAUSCHE. And also, as a tactical operation, he agreed to accept it, believing that, by so doing, the amendment he offered would be adopted; and it was adopted by a vote of 78 to 1.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. I should like to have the RECORD show that the cordial relationship between the Senator from Oregon and myself, which has existed for some 10 years, makes it quite unnecessary for us to be polite to each other. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] and I also have a cordial relationship.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Except that some time ago the Senator from Pennsylvania, on television, described me as demagog. This is the first time I have had a chance to call attention to that or point it out.

Mr. CLARK. I have the feeling that the Senator from Ohio has been misinformed. I never think of him as a demagog; nothing would be further from my

mind. I consider him a staunch defender of the age that has passed against the age that is "thronging before." [Laughter.]

May I complete my statement by saying that I regret the changes which have been made in the amendment; nevertheless, I shall support it. I hope that the Commission, when appointed, will read very carefully the debate in the Senate during the last 2 days. If they do, they will give great consideration to what will have to be done to bridge the gap between the poorer nations and the richer nations. I realize that my views did not prevail to change the amendment, but I believe that the amendment is better than no amendment, and I shall vote for it.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it is fitting that I should make this comment immediately following what my good friend from Pennsylvania has just said, because I appreciate very much the spirit of cooperation which the Senator from Pennsylvania, the Senator from New York, and the Senator from South Dakota have extended to us, so that we can have an amendment that will provide for a study. That is what we all seek.

The revised amendment eliminates the word "assessment" which was presented several times in the original draft of the amendment as first offered. I think that is desirable, in order to put at rest in the Senate certain concerns and fears that the word "assessment" is becoming common in international finance circles. To talk about an assessment of the gross national product to be levied on industrial countries for use in underdeveloped countries has become quite common.

I stated yesterday, in connection with a couple of items in the bill, that the delegates of some Latin American countries to economic conferences have developed quite a habit of talking about assessments. I do not think that we should commit ourselves to any legislation that uses that term in it, in view of the meaning that seems to have been given to it by some of the Latin American delegates to international conferences.

To say "assessed," meaning to evaluate, does not change the fact that assessed also means "to subject to a tax, charge, or levy."

The original version of this amendment stated that the commission should examine the relationship between the development requirements and the rising gross national product of the United States. That is before we modified the pending amendment. It provides that we should examine the relationship between the development requirements of the rising gross national product of the United States, assessing the percentage of the gross national product that should be devoted to such developmental assistance.

If we mean to have a study that the American people can ever have any confidence in, then I think we were wise in getting the agreement to eliminate the word "assessment" this afternoon.

Again, I want to thank the Senator from New York, the Senator from Pennsylvania, and the Senator from South

Dakota for going along with us on this proposed modification, which reads:

The proposal referred to in subsection (a) should include an analysis of the role that economic assistance by the United States and other developed nations can play in the economic and social development through foreign aid.

I made this statement because I did not want someone studying the legislative history of the Senate to believe that I agreed last year to this amendment. I agreed to major language in the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania, the Senator from New York, and the Senator from South Dakota as part of a much broader section of the bill, some of which, as I have pointed out, does not happen to be covered in this amendment.

I shall support the amendment.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY].

On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH] and the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] would each vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 74, nays 17, as follows:

[No. 158 Leg.]

YEAS—74

Aiken	Church	Griffin
Anderson	Clark	Gruening
Bartlett	Cooper	Harris
Bible	Dodd	Hart
Boggs	Dominick	Hartke
Brewster	Douglas	Hickenlooper
Burdick	Ervin	Hill
Byrd, Va.	Fannin	Holland
Byrd, W. Va.	Fong	Inouye
Cannon	Fulbright	Jackson
Case	Gore	Javits

Jordan, N.C.	Miller	Proxmire
Kennedy, Mass.	Mondale	Randolph
Kennedy, N.Y.	Monroney	Ribicoff
Kuchel	Montoya	Robertson
Lausche	Morse	Russell, S.C.
Long, Mo.	Moss	Saltonstall
Long, La.	Mundt	Sparkman
Magnuson	Murphy	Symington
Mansfield	Muskie	Tower
McCarthy	Nelson	Tydings
McGee	Neuberger	Williams, N.J.
McGovern	Pastore	Yarborough
McIntyre	Pell	Young, Ohio
Metcalf	Prouty	

## NAYS—17

Bennett	Hruska	Stennis
Cotton	Jordan, Idaho	Talmadge
Curtis	Russell, Ga.	Thurmond
Dirksen	Scott	Williams, Del.
Eastland	Simpson	Young, N. Dak.
Ellender	Smith	

## NOT VOTING—9

Allott	Carlson	Morton
Bass	Hayden	Pearson
Bayh	McClellan	Smathers

So Mr. KENNEDY's amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

At the end of the bill, add a new section, as follows:

"Sec. 203. There is hereby authorized to be printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 14,000 additional copies of its hearings on supplemental foreign assistance, fiscal year 1966—Vietnam, of the Eighty-ninth Congress, second session."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I should like to ask the majority leader whether he is aware of any further amendments, or whether we can proceed to a third reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Chair has just put the question, and there seem to be no further amendments. I hope we can proceed to third reading as soon as possible.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was read the third time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 15750, which is the House bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 15750) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Arkansas.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move to amend the bill (H.R. 15750) by striking out all after the enacting clause

and substituting the text of S. 3584, as amended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Arkansas.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment of the amendment and the third reading of the bill.

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered on passage?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have not been ordered.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

## A NEW CONCEPT ON FOREIGN AID

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I have great misgivings about this year's foreign economic assistance bill. I wish to make it clear, however, that my misgivings are not about foreign aid as such, nor about the Agency for International Development, its personnel and their administration of the program. My misgivings have to do with the basic character of the program and the need, as I see it, for a new concept of foreign aid. In its present bilateral form foreign aid, though composed principally of interest-bearing loans, is run as a kind of charity, demeaning to both recipient and donor. In addition, it is becoming a vehicle toward deep American involvement in areas and issues which lie beyond both our vital interests and our competence. For these two essential reasons, on which I shall elaborate, I propose the transformation of aid, through internationalization, from private charity to community responsibility, from a dubious instrument of national policy to a stable program for international development.

The obligation of the rich to help the poor is recognized, so far as I know, by every major religion, by every formal system of ethics, and by individuals who claim no moral code beyond a simple sense of human decency. Unless national borders are regarded as the limits of human loyalty and compassion as well as of political authority, the obligation of the rich to the poor clearly encompasses an obligation on the part of rich nations to poor nations. Indeed, it is no more than commonsense to recognize that, among nations as within them, the security of the rich is best assured by providing hope and opportunity for the poor.

Neither we nor any other nation, however, has yet accepted an obligation to the poor nations in any way analogous to that which we accept toward the individual poor and the poorer States and regions within our own country. In America and other democratic societies, higher income people provide the bulk of the tax money to finance public services of which the poor are the principal beneficiaries; the redistribution of wealth has become a normal and accepted function of democratic government. The rich pay not as a private act of noblesse oblige

but in fulfillment of a social responsibility; the poor receive benefits not as a lucky gratuity but as the right of citizens. The effect of the great social reforms in our country from the time of Theodore Roosevelt to the Great Society has been the virtual displacement of private philanthropy by public responsibility. The Salvation Army has just about been put out of business by social security and, with due respect for the humanity and kindness of the Salvation Army, who can deny that unemployment compensation is a major improvement?

With no less respect for the competence and dedication of our Agency for International Development, I suggest that we begin to replace bilateral foreign aid, which is analogous to private philanthropy, with an internationalized program based on the same principle of public responsibility which underlies progressive taxation and the social services we provide for our own people. I suggest that we extend the frontiers of our concern so as to transform our aid to the world's poorer nations from something resembling a private gratuity to a community responsibility.

The crucial difference between bilateral and international aid is the basic incompatibility of bilateralism with individual and national dignity. Charity corrodes both the rich and the poor, breeding an exaggerated sense of authority on the part of the donor and a destructive loss of self-esteem on the part of the recipient. Whatever the material benefits of our aid—and they have been considerable in some countries—I am increasingly inclined to the view that they have been purchased at an excessive political and psychological cost to both lenders and borrowers. The critical question is whether the transfer of wealth between nations can be made compatible with human dignity as has been done within our own country. I think that it can be done, by the internationalization of foreign aid.

It is with such thoughts in mind that I have decided, after almost 20 years of American foreign aid, that I for one can no longer actively support an aid program that is primarily bilateral. I would, however, support and do all within my power to secure an expanded program of economic aid—a greatly expanded program of economic aid—provided that it were conducted as a community enterprise, that is, through international channels such as the United Nations, the International Development Association of the World Bank, and the regional development banks.

The disruptive effects of bilateral American aid have been referred to by some prominent individuals who know something about it. They emphasize the importance of the way in which the gift—or loan—is given.

There is wisdom if also malice in Prince Sihanouk's comparison of American and Chinese aid to his country.

You will note the difference in the ways of giving—

He writes:

On one side we are being humiliated, we are given a lecture, we are required to give



something in return. On the other side, not only is our dignity as poor people being preserved, but our self-esteem is being flattered—and human beings have their weaknesses, and it would be futile to try to eradicate [them].

General Ne Win has all but ended foreign economic aid to Burma despite its great need of capital and technical assistance.

Unless we Burmans can learn to run our own country—

He says—

we will lose it. Of course, there are hardships. But we must put our house in order.

Noting the effects of vast American military and economic assistance on such countries as South Vietnam and Thailand, Ne Win says:

This kind of aid does not help. It cripples. It paralyzes. The recipients never learn to do for themselves. They rely more and more on foreign experts and foreign money. In the end they lost control of their country.

Extended in the wrong way, generosity can be perceived by its intended beneficiary as insulting and contemptuous. I rather suspect, in this connection, that the well-intentioned public American offer to include North Vietnam in a south-east Asian development program may have been interpreted by the North Vietnamese as an attempt to buy them off from the war and make them an American dependency. Coming as it did from a nation with which North Vietnam is at war, a nation which is bombing its territory, the American offer, though sincere, was perhaps too generous to be credible, and that may explain why it was rejected as another peace plot, as an effort on the part of the United States to win by bribery what it had been unable to win on the battlefields. If the same offer of aid were made privately to the North Vietnamese by the representatives of an international agency, it is possible that it would elicit a different kind of reaction.

The problem of bilateralism is psychological and political rather than managerial. It is a problem of pride, self-respect and independency, which have everything to do with a country's will and capacity to foster its own development. There is an inescapable element of charity and paternalism in bilateral aid—even when it is aid in the form of loans at high rates of interest—and charity, over a long period of time, has a debilitating effect on both its intended beneficiary and its provider; it fosters attitudes of cranky dependency or simple anger on the part of the recipient and of self-righteous frustration on the part of the donor, attitudes which, once formed, feed destructively upon each other.

Foreign aid is not in a literal sense the cause or the reason for American military involvement in Vietnam. It was, however, an important factor contributing to the state of mind of policymakers who committed the United States to a major land war in Asia after having stated forcefully, repeatedly and, to many of us, quite convincingly, that that was exactly what they intended not to do. The relationship between Ameri-

can aid and the Vietnamese war is no less significant for being psychological rather than juridical; indeed it is probably more significant.

The idea of foreign aid as a source of American military involvement is certainly not my own; on the contrary, such a connection never even occurred to me or, I daresay, to other members of the Foreign Relations Committee, until administration officials began referring to the aid program as cause and evidence of what they judge to be an American military obligation in Vietnam. Nor, I think, can the connection between aid and military involvement be dismissed as mere excess of rhetoric by partisans of the Vietnamese war.

Although he has now disavowed aid as a source of military obligations, the Secretary of State on no less than three occasions referred to congressional approval of aid programs as a basis of authority for the American military involvement in Vietnam. He did so at a Senate hearing in August 1964. He did so again in a hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee on January 28, 1966, when, after citing the SEATO Treaty as authorizing American military action in Vietnam, he went on to say:

In addition to that, we have bilateral assistance agreements to South Vietnam. We have had several actions of the Congress. We have had the annual aid appropriations in which the purposes of the aid have been fully set out before the Congress. . . .

The Secretary made the same point most explicitly in a speech in Las Vegas on February 16, 1966. He said:

We are committed to assist South Vietnam resist aggression by the SEATO Treaty, which was approved by the Senate with only one dissenting vote; by the pledges of three successive Presidents; by the aid approved by bipartisan majorities in Congress over a period of 12 years; by joint declarations with our allies in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific; and by the Resolution which Congress adopted in August 1964, with only two dissenting votes.

I very much doubt that any Member of the Senate ever supposed that by voting for foreign aid the Senate was authorizing or committing the United States to use its Armed Forces to sustain the ruling government of any recipient country against foreign attack, much less against internal insurrection. I rather doubt that those who later cited such a connection thought of it, either, before the United States took over the Vietnamese war.

What seems to have happened is that large-scale military and economic aid, along with our gradual assumption of the French role in Indochina and the adoption of Ngo Dinh Diem as an American protégé, created a state of mind among American policymakers under which it was felt that the United States had a proprietary investment in Vietnam—an investment of prestige and money which those responsible were naturally unwilling to see go down the drain. A gambler is always tempted, once he has begun to lose, to keep raising the stakes in the hope of recouping his losses; since early 1965 American policymakers have been steadily raising the stakes of a gamble which began in part with aid and which

until a year and a half ago could have been liquidated with a fairly small loss. Once the stakes became high, however, explanations were called for, and, apparently without awareness of the implications of what they were saying, our policymakers began referring to foreign aid as one of the factors that committed the United States to the war in Vietnam.

Explicit references to foreign aid as legal basis for an American military obligation seem, therefore, to have been *ex post facto*; policymakers who came to feel that the United States was obligated to take over the Vietnamese war, in part because aid programs authorized with no such intention contributed to the sense of an American investment, later referred back to foreign aid legislation as one source of justification and authorization for the American military commitment. Subsequent disavowals of aid as a source of military obligation cannot undo its prior contribution to that state of mind which made military involvement seem essential.

It is a little late to be locking the barn after your prize herd has galloped off into the distance. Nonetheless, in order to disabuse the administration of the view that the Congress, by adopting aid legislation, is authorizing the President to go to war in defense of the beneficiaries, the Foreign Relations Committee added language to the policy statement of the foreign economic aid bill indicating that the authorization of military and economic aid "shall not be construed as creating a new commitment or as affecting any existing commitment to use Armed Forces of the United States for the defense of any foreign country."

As a further precaution the committee, which previously had approved multiyear authorizations, limited this year's foreign aid authorization to 1 year. I myself would strongly favor long-term authorization of an internationalized foreign aid program; should the Congress ever be asked to approve such a program, I for one will not only support the principle of long-term authorization but will do all that I can to secure its adoption. This year, however, I have been unwilling to support a long-term aid authorization because of a lack of confidence in the purposes for which bilateral aid is likely to be used. I have been particularly disturbed by the implications of what is being referred to as an Asian doctrine under which the United States would accept unilateral responsibility for maintaining order and extending the Great Society to non-Communist Asia. Until confidence in the uses to which our aid is likely to be put is restored—and I hope that it will be in the near future—I think it prudent for the Congress to retain its full authority to review the authorization as well as the appropriation of funds for foreign aid.

Many country programs are justified by the Agency for International Development on the ground that they will maintain an "American presence." These programs are too small to have much effect on economic development but big enough to involve the United States in the affairs of the countries con-

cerned. The underlying assumption of these programs is that the presence of some American aid officials is a blessing which no developing country, except for the benighted Communist ones, should be denied.

I think this view of aid is a manifestation of the arrogance of power. Its basis, if not messianism, is certainly egotism. It assumes that the size, wealth, and power of the United States are evidence of wisdom and virtue as well; it assumes that, just as the right-thinking, hard-working laborer in a Horatio Alger novel might have counted it a privilege to take counsel with the local tycoon, every right-thinking, hard-working underdeveloped country must consider it a privilege to have some resident Americans around to tell them how to run their affairs.

Bilateral foreign aid, like some of the other "instruments" of American foreign policy, has become a vehicle toward the involvement of the United States in matters lying beyond its proper concern. Though by no means the sole cause, or even the major cause, of the developing role of the United States as ideological policeman for the world, bilateral aid has been a factor in that development. It has become a factor in a general tendency to go it alone, a tendency reflected in our neglect of the United Nations, in our neglect of the views and sensibilities of allies and other countries, and in the diversion of money and effort from those promising and essential domestic reforms which only a year ago bade fair to make the United States an example of progress and social justice for the world.

Foreign aid does not have to contribute to such results. It can indeed be a powerful means toward the renewal of strained partnerships, toward the reconciliation of national animosities, and above all toward the economic growth of the world's poor countries under conditions that foster dignity as well as development. To accomplish these ends we will have greatly to increase our aid program and to transform it from an instrument of national policy to a community program for international development.

I propose, therefore, the internationalization and expansion of foreign aid. I propose its conversion from an instrument of national foreign policy to an international program for the limited transfer of wealth from rich countries to poor countries in accordance with the same principle of community responsibility that in our own country underlies progressive taxation, social welfare programs, and the effective transfer of wealth from the rich States to the poor States through programs of Federal aid. The time has come to start thinking of foreign aid as part of a limited international fiscal system through which the wealthy members of a world community would act sensibly and in their own interests to meet an obligation toward the poor members of the community.

So great a transformation in the character and conduct of aid cannot be achieved all at once. At present, however, virtually no progress is being made

toward the internationalization of aid. The implementation of the Foreign Relations Committee's amendment to the foreign economic aid bill requiring the channeling of 15 percent of the Development Loan Fund through the World Bank and its affiliated agencies would be an encouraging but, in itself, inadequate step forward. A more significant advance would be a favorable American response to the request of Mr. George Woods, the President of the World Bank, for greatly increased contributions to the International Development Association, the Bank's soft-loan affiliate.

What steps can be taken toward the development of an international system for the limited redistribution of income between rich countries and poor countries? First, the aid-providing countries of the world should terminate bilateral programs and channel their development lending through the World Bank and its affiliated agencies, especially the International Development Association. Secondly, the Bank and its affiliates should be authorized to dispense the increased development funds that would be at their disposal as they now dispense limited amounts—that is, according to social needs and strict economic principles. Third, the Bank and its affiliates should execute aid programs through an expanded corps of highly trained international civil servants, encouraging objectivity by the assignment of field personnel, so far as possible, to countries and regions other than their own. Fourth, the Bank and its affiliates should be authorized to recommend amounts to be contributed each year by member countries to an international development pool; contributions should be progressive, with the main burden falling on the rich countries, but, in keeping with the principle of a community responsibility, with even the poorest countries making token contributions.

There are many possibilities for the gradual strengthening of an international fiscal system over a period of years. Some proposals to this effect, although not making reference to the World Bank as the appropriate international agency, were put forth by Mr. Dudley Seers in a thoughtful and creative article calling for the limited transfer of income from rich countries to poor countries.

An internationalized system would provide a framework within which the great powers could convert their aid programs from cold war instruments of competition to cooperative ventures that would benefit their own relations as well as the economic needs of the developing countries. It would be a great thing indeed if the United States and the Soviet Union, the world's two most economically powerful nations, would join in endorsing the principle of an international fiscal system. In this connection it would be highly desirable for the Soviet Union to join the World Bank, of which Yugoslavia at present is the only Communist member. Perhaps the U.S. Government could take the initiative of suggesting to the Russians that they join and of offering, if necessary, to sponsor amendments

to the Bank's charter that might make membership more attractive to the Soviet Union.

There are many possibilities for Soviet-American cooperation through development aid. It would be a boon to their own relations and a splendid example for other countries if the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divert equivalent sums of money from armaments to the international development pool. Under an internationalized development program, one can envision Russian and American engineers and economists working together in many parts of the world as members of an international corps of civil servants. The internationalization of aid, by creating a framework for cooperation between the great powers, could thus provide a powerful impetus for world peace as well as for economic development.

The transformation of economic aid from a national charity and an instrument of cold war competition to an international responsibility would put an end to the peculiar and corrosive tyranny which donor and recipient seem to exercise over each other in bilateral relationships. Aid would be converted to a community responsibility characterized by continuity, predictability, and dignity for all parties. The economic development of the poor nations of the world would be treated for the first time as an end in itself, insulated from international political rivalries and internal political pressures.

It may be contended that such a program is unrealistic, that there are insuperable obstacles to its realization. There are indeed obstacles and they are formidable, but they are not insuperable; they are not natural obstacles, like man's inability to fly by flapping his arms, or technological, like his momentary inability to fly a rocket ship to Mars, but psychological. If the program I recommend is unrealistic, it is unrealistic because, and only because, people think it is unrealistic.

As with most important adjustments in human affairs, the first and most important requirement toward the formation of an international fiscal system is a change in our thinking. We must learn to think of the world as a community in which the privileged accept certain responsibilities toward the underprivileged just as they do in our own country. We must develop a new idea of generosity, one which purports to help people without humiliating them, one which accepts the general advancement of the community rather than cloaking expressions of gratitude as its just and proper reward.

Much will be required to accomplish such a transformation in the meaning and purpose of foreign aid. For my own part, whenever the administration is prepared to ask for legislation authorizing the United States to participate in a program of aid to developing countries involving significantly increased amounts of money, softer lending terms and international management, I pledge to use all my resources as a Senator and



as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee to secure its enactment.

#### SOFT LOANS AND THE WORLD BANK

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, there has been considerable discussion in the review of this bill on the floor of the World Bank and its soft-loan window. The President of the Bank has announced that he will seek a quadrupling of the funds for his Bank's soft-loan window—the International Development Association—IDA.

It is also reported that the Bank calculates the countries desirous of receiving such soft loans can now absorb some \$3 to \$4 billion more, each year, than they are currently receiving; and based on past history we can expect that, in the not too distant future, those who now run the World Bank will be asking for additional billions.

This is a strange business.

The continuing unfavorable balance-of-payments situation in this country is becoming steadily more serious. Britain's current and fourth sterling crisis in 21 months is by far its most serious. The United States has been voting, by large majorities, to reduce its multibillion-dollar bilateral foreign aid program.

Nevertheless the head of this World Bank, an international bank that is not controlled by the United States, a bank that has a reserve surplus of nearly a billion dollars, now announces plans which can only exacerbate the growing balance-of-payments crisis in the United States by requesting this country to appropriate hundreds of millions more dollars of the American taxpayer, to be loaned out on terms which, in effect, make these loans gifts. In addition, in the future the question as to what countries will receive the money, and on what basis, will be decided by the Directors of a Bank that is uncontrolled by the United States, even though this country would be putting up far more money than any other country.

An editorial of the Sunday Star of July 24, which discusses the timing of this billion-dollar proposal, concludes:

But there also is a limit to the total aid the United States should provide annually, and a need to fix priorities. Congress can't do an intelligent job of this if the World Bank lets slip, while debate on foreign aid is nearing a climax, a whole new set of demands. We contribute 40 percent of the IDA's support. Some kind of forethought should have been given to the timing of such a major proposal.

I ask unanimous consent that this entire editorial be inserted in the Record at the end of these remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, we are told that granting aid on a multilateral basis, instead of a bilateral basis, would help avoid the political pitfalls inherent in a bilateral lending arrangement. But how about the economic pitfalls inherent in multilateral arrangements, pitfalls which could result from lack of control of the funds demanded and dispersed.

Because of the size and nature of this more recent decision of the World Bank,

it would appear that the present management of the Bank has little concern for the current fiscal and monetary problems of the United States. This is a far cry from the days of leadership of this international bank under Eugene Black.

An article in the Washington Post of July 24 describes Secretary of the Treasury Fowler as being disturbed about the amount of new money the World Bank states it will seek.

I ask unanimous consent that this entire article be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, part of it reads as follows:

He (Fowler) is fretting about the rising domestic budget and the worsening deficit in the American balance of payments. Fowler has indicated to Woods that he wants a chance to back out of any IDA commitment if the American payments abroad aren't in balance.

In Woods' eyes, such an uncommitted commitment would frustrate his difficult selling job with other countries. So the World Bank President is preparing a strong brief for Fowler to consider.

Woods will argue that IDA's balance-of-payments drain is small. His estimates show that 60 per cent of the American contribution comes back to the United States in the form of orders for American goods and services. Thus, a \$400 million payment to IDA should cost the American balance about \$160 million a year.

First, with respect to the strong brief that Mr. Woods is reported to be preparing for Secretary Fowler, I would hope that the Secretary himself would remember the following remarks he made to the Virginia State Bar Association, over a year ago, on July 10, 1965:

We must never forget that America's ability to succeed in its difficult and demanding role as leader of the Free World—that all the political, diplomatic and military resources at our command—depend upon a strong and stable American economy and a sound dollar.

We must never forget that our lives can be vitally affected, not only by the events in Saigon or Santo Domingo, but also by such apparently far removed occurrences as the outflow of American gold and dollars abroad.

In connection with the estimate by the World Bank that 60 percent of the American contribution to IDA comes back to the United States in the form of orders for American goods and services, I am reminded of a memorandum of the Secretary of the Treasury last February 3, which dealt with enlarging assistance through the World Bank and IDA, its soft-loan window. This memorandum stated that in the fiscal year 1967-68, U.S. procurement under the loans of these two institutions is estimated to be 25 percent.

In any case, it is interesting to note that this and other differences which have now arisen between the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and Mr. George Woods, the present head of this World Bank, are now being circulated in the press.

There are not always such differences, however; and in this connection, why at times is the appeal of the World Bank so irresistible? Only this past month,

and despite the knowledge that, during the first 5 months of 1966, \$224 million more gold has been lost by the United States, in a period of tight money and historically high interest rates, the World Bank floated \$175 million more of its bonds in the United States market. Under the articles of the charter of the Bank, Treasury had the authority to disapprove the issue. I wish they had.

In a statement concerning this issue made on the Senate floor last June 29, I presented the fact that the principal argument now being made for the foreign aid program, and for such soft loan windows as the World Bank's IDA, had to do with the debt burden of aid-receiving countries.

At that time I said:

It is all getting to be quite interesting. The World Bank continues to make hard loans from borrowings in the United States market, which borrowings add to the dollar drain. Then later the World Bank comes out for soft loans from their soft loan window, in order to help many of these borrowers repay their World Bank obligations on what we the people had presumed was a sound hard loan. This further adds to the dollar drain.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to my able friend from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I have followed the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Missouri closely, and have read through his entire speech, because he was kind enough to give me a copy of it.

I desire to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Missouri. The problem he raises is another reason why I shall not vote for the foreign aid bill this afternoon. I shall not vote for any foreign aid bill until this administration revises the standards and procedures of AID.

The administration has been told over and over by the Comptroller General where the wastes and the inefficiencies take place.

I heard no evidence submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations this year that indicated that a good faith attempt has been made on the part of the AID people to stop those abuses.

This soft loan program just explained by the Senator from Missouri is another reason why I cannot vote for a foreign aid bill. Although this World Bank program is not within the foreign aid bill, it is part of a total foreign assistance program. A foreign aid bill cannot be considered alone, without taking into account the total foreign assistance program of this Government, which the estimates show, I am satisfied, is well over \$7 billion.

The taxpayers of this country put up the hard, cold cash; and then, as pointed out by the Senator from Missouri, these countries move over to the soft loan window and make these soft loans. A large percentage—well over 50 percent—of the soft loans will never be repaid in any value to the American people.

This is another instance in which the American public continues to be taken—this time, through the soft loan window of the bank.

We have a responsibility—which we are not fulfilling—to protect the American taxpayer with respect to the money that goes out of the pockets of the American taxpayer. That is not being done when we continually add the international aid programs onto the bilateral programs.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the senior Senator from Oregon for his fine contribution.

A speech the Senator made in the Senate some years ago with respect to this World Bank soft loan program is one of the reasons I became really interested in this subject.

At that time, IDA money was defended on the grounds it would be primarily used in Central and South America. Investigation at that time showed, however, that 60 percent of all IDA loans went to India, and 20 percent went to Pakistan. Actually, as of today, 78 percent of all IDA disbursements have gone to India and Pakistan.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to the able and distinguished minority leader, who has also been interested in this subject for many years.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I believe that the distinguished Senator from Missouri is making a most important statement.

A little while ago we adopted an amendment, and in its original form was language to the effect that there should be an assessment of the role that economic assistance of the United States and other developed nations can and should play in the economic and social development of the rest of the world. That is a pretty big order. Agreement was finally reached on striking that language.

If we are to redress the grievances and ills of the entire world, we had better look out, and particularly about the stability of the dollar. In connection with a cut in this bill, I said that under the World Bank we have subscribed to over 63,000 shares, in addition to making a down payment of \$635 million, and we are still callable for nearly \$5¼ billion.

Now the President begins to explore the American market for a billion dollars in these soft loans. I have another name for it. As I look at the record, I call them concealed grants.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The able minority leader is right.

Any businessman or banker knows that a 50-year loan, without interest, and without repayment of principal for the first 10 years, is in effect a gift.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. First, I would thank the able minority leader for his constructive comments.

Inasmuch as we are now spending between \$1 and \$2 billion a month in South Vietnam, it is only logical for a Senator to ask:

How can any economy, even this the greatest economy in the world continue indefinitely to defend this percentage of the free world and at the same time finance this percentage of the free world, with relatively little help from many of

those countries it is spending tremendous amounts in effect to protect?

I yield to my friend the able Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Senator from Missouri and I generally agree. I must enter a demurrer now, as we lawyers say, for this reason: The World Bank was a great innovation and an extremely efficient institution as far as the United States was concerned. It marshalled enormous amounts of capital from other countries in the world, whereas when I came on the scene in the late 1940's, we were carrying this load alone.

Therefore, I do not believe we should be too quick to jump with both feet on the World Bank, which has made an enviable record of performance. It is making money, as a matter of fact. As far as the hard loans are concerned, it is a most admirable institution, and it has helped us very much.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Its operations in the past are one thing, and in any case nobody is jumping on the World Bank. As Senators know, I have been apprehensive about some of this operation for many years. Nobody is jumping on the World Bank. I do say that under the management of Mr. George Woods, the bank is operating somewhat differently from the way it did under the management of Mr. Eugene Black. I refer to that in my statement.

My talk today includes an effort to question these heavy soft loan requests at the same time the bank, a nonprofit organization, does not dip into its surplus of nearly a billion dollars.

It is becoming clear, as I shall develop later in my statement, that one of the reasons, if not the chief reason, for this request for heavy additional soft loan funds is that otherwise many of the hard loans could not be paid out. I believe that that situation should be faced frankly by the management of the bank, instead of, as we say in business, putting good money after bad.

Mr. JAVITS. I wish to point out that George Woods, in my judgment, is one of the ablest bankers in the world, as was Eugene Black. Personally, I hold both in very high esteem.

As to the soft loans, I point out that when I came to the foreign aid business in the House of Representatives, in 1948, we were making grants where there are now soft loans. There is at least, as the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] has said, a 50-percent chance of getting some of this money back; and 50 years is not a long time in the life of a nation.

There are excellent reasons for the need to shift more development loans from the World Bank to the International Development Association, principally because of the crushing burden on aid recipients of the mounting costs of financing their external indebtedness. In most less developed countries external debt service liabilities have increased at a considerably higher percentage rate than exports of goods and services, gross national products, or savings. We cannot ignore the fact that a considerable part of new gross lending to developing coun-

tries today is offset by interest and amortization payments arising from lending in the past. For example, estimates of India's need for foreign exchange on her fourth development plan indicate that about one-third is needed for interest and amortization. According to estimates of CIAP, the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, one-third of the foreign exchange deficit envisaged for Latin America is for internal use and two-thirds is to be paid back to the creditors. In many cases, increasing debt service difficulties result in the need to postpone and refinance these external debts. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Turkey are examples of these situations.

As the Senator from Missouri knows, I am not given to empty speeches. If the Senator would allow me, I should like to submit his speech to the World Bank and request a reply. When I receive the reply, I will take the floor, and then the Senator will have the same privilege that I have, to controvert the situation as they present it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, an excellent idea, and let me say to the able Senator from New York that I have already submitted this to the World Bank. I shall be glad, myself, to enter any contribution from them into the Record.

As always, I appreciate the remarks of my friend, the Senator from New York, a thorough student of international trade.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I shall be glad to yield to my able friend from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. I congratulate the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri on his presentation.

Some of us have asserted for years that these soft loans, made for periods of 30, 40, and 50 years at three-quarters of 1 percent interest, and no repayment of capital for 40 years, are a fraud and a deception on the American people; that in effect they are gifts, and that the American public is taxed in a kind of concealed way to make up the difference between the cost to the American taxpayer and the terms on which we lend under the foreign aid program.

As the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] pointed out, and I share his conviction, these loans will never be repaid.

There has been much in the way of indications of that in my various investigation of the foreign aid program. Three years ago I made a study of our AID program in 10 foreign countries in the Near and Middle East, which was published in a 472-page Senate Government Operations Committee report. My report on Chile is now on every Senator's desk.

When the attention of the AID officials in a given country was called to some colossal error, some act of corruption and some great waste of money that had taken place previously, and an explanation requested the reply is always, "I was not here when that took place. That was before I got here. The records have gone to Washington." At Washington the details were unavailable.



One can see that that is going to happen 30 years from now when those loans come due and the AID agency officials at that time, if it is still in existence, will say, "That was long before our time. We did not make that loan. Besides we cannot expect this poor country to pay this old debt." And so the loans will be written off.

That is what is going to happen. Perhaps we will do it by refunding. That is another way of evading. That has been done with respect to Brazil. When their loans have fallen due and have been unpaid, the administration merely refunded them putting off the day of reckoning. When that day comes the loans may again not be declared in default, but they will once more be refunded. This goes on and on. Ultimately the accumulated debt will be defaulted. It is a fraud on the American taxpayer. It would be far more honest to call these loans grants, which is what they are and avoid the cost of book-keeping for repayments which will not come, except in a very few cases.

When we talk about this being a barebones bill—\$3 billion or whatever it is—it is easily one-half or less than one-half of the total amount which will be disbursed for foreign aid. In addition to these so-called loans which are nothing but gifts are all kinds of other spigots such as our major share of aid through the United Nations, and still others which I have mentioned from time to time.

I congratulate the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], on bringing out the facts about our foreign aid lending. He is performing a useful service in exposing these little known aspects.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] an expert in this field who has done so much fine work.

When we spoke to the Treasury about this World Bank bond issue their reply was:

The fact is that by and large the borrowers from IDA are different groups of countries. As shown on page 6 of the Bank's annual report for FY 1965, only three of the eleven countries receiving IDA financing also received World Bank loans. Where countries receive financing from both institutions, it is in accordance with an explicit objective of the Bank to provide a "blend" of funds on World Bank terms with funds on IDA terms, in order to reduce the total service burden of these resources in the future. The resources so provided are all directed toward current development purposes. This is far different from your suggestion that IDA is in effect refinancing World Bank loans.

But this Treasury comparison of the number of countries receiving both hard and soft loans in the fiscal year 1965 is not relevant. One would not expect that World Bank hard loans to such countries as Japan, Italy, Spain, Australia, and other developed countries, would be accompanied by soft loans from their soft loan window, IDA. A statement of World Bank-IDA loans through the fiscal year 1965, however, shows that several of the less-developed countries which had received large World Bank hard loan commitments also had received a very large percentage of all IDA soft loan disbursements.

As example, the largest borrower of hard loans from the World Bank is India, with 34 commitments totaling \$1 billion. Note, however, that India has also received the bulk of World Bank soft loan assistance, 16 IDA commitments totaling \$485 million.

Pakistan is next, the beneficiary of 20 World Bank hard loan commitments totaling \$361 million, plus 17 World Bank-IDA soft loans, totaling \$270 million.

In other words, as of the end of fiscal year 1965, these two countries alone have accounted for \$1,371 million of World Bank commitments, 15.3 percent of the Bank's hard loan commitments; and \$755 million, or 69½ percent of its soft loan IDA commitments.

On a disbursement basis, the same two countries account for \$969 million, or 15 percent of the World Bank hard loan commitments, and \$323 million, or 78 percent of its soft loan commitments.

We do not mean to imply that every hard loan to a less developed country is automatically accompanied by a soft loan. But should we not ask this frank question: In the absence of further soft loans by World Bank-IDA or AID, would the World Bank hard loans to such countries as Pakistan and India be repaid?

Articles have appeared from World Bank sources about the need to increase soft loan capacity so as to relieve the debt burden of certain countries. These articles are evidence in themselves of a serious and growing question in the minds of proponents of more aid. That question is whether or not the so-called hard loans of the World Bank are as hard as once thought; and whether, accordingly, the increase in World Bank hard loan commitments can only in turn increase the pressures for World Bank soft-loan commitments.

As a result of the above, the United States may be building up a financial house of cards, wherein hard loans to less developed countries, lacking foreign exchange and suffering from stagnating exports, result in a continuing and possibly increasing need for soft loan aid. Let us note in passing that, despite unprecedented prosperity in most of the other developed countries, only the United States appears willing to provide this soft loan aid on any substantial scale.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield to the able Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, we cannot have it done this afternoon, but I think it is important that we have an answer: I am going to ask to have counsel for the Committee on Foreign Relations prepare a memorandum to obtain it for us. I think that we need to know the answer to the point which the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] has just made when he said:

Let us note in passing that, despite unprecedented prosperity in most of the other developed countries, only the United States appears willing to provide this soft loan aid on any substantial scale.

I shall ask the counsel for the committee to prepare for us a table analysis showing the contributions to IDA and the bilateral soft loans made by other countries in comparison with hard loans, and also to prepare the same information with respect to the United States.

I fear we will find that under the semantic word "loan" the United States is pouring out millions of dollars under the representation that we are making a loan, when, in fact, it is a grant, and in fact it is not coming back. I should be surprised if as much as 15 percent is ever returned to the American taxpayers in hard coin for the millions and millions of dollars that we are spending.

As long as we have this kind of financial program through international banks, we cannot justify voting for a bilateral foreign aid bill on top of it, and I am not going to do it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator for his contribution. In that connection, the other evening I again read a book published in 1938 by Judge Thurman Arnold entitled "The Folklore of Capitalism." In that book the famous judge gave charts on the total amount of bonds issued by American investment houses to certain parts of the world in the period between the First World War and the Second World War; and the recovery therefrom.

I would say to the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] that his remarks and estimates about the amount that will be recovered are verified by what happened to those other bonds discussed in Judge Arnold's book. It turned into a capital levy on a good many American people.

We are told that the foreign assistance program is essential to U.S. security and national interests. We are also reminded that no steps will be taken to solve our balance-of-payments problem in any way which would injure the broader economic interest of the world community.

But other developed countries do not feel any comparable responsibility for the economic interests of the world community, any more than they feel a necessity to assume what we believe is their fair share of the cost of defending the free world. Instead they continue their unilateral efforts toward prosperity; and continue to receive gold from the United States.

As a result, over the last 10 years all the developed countries except the United States have heavily increased both their gold stocks and their total reserves. The United States on the other hand, during the same period, has lost over 45 percent of its gold, with comparable losses in reserves; and has increased, by over 400 percent, its current obligations abroad which it guarantees to redeem, upon call, in gold.

The lending commitments of the World Bank are now more than double the available financial resources of that Bank. But under the Bank's present management, lending has been increasing steadily. This concerns us. Under present fiscal and monetary circumstances, would it not be logical for the Bank to reduce, instead of increase, its

commitments? This would be but comparable to the request made by this administration to private investors in connection with the voluntary restraint program.

The Treasury Department justifies its approval of this recent World Bank bond issue on the grounds the money would affect the balance of payments only when disbursed, and then only to the extent used to finance purchases outside of the United States. But U.S. procurement under World Bank disbursements has been declining steadily over the years, reaching a low of 21 percent in the fiscal year 1965. Further, are we so sure of success in balancing our payments by 1968 that holding off the use of the funds until then was a satisfactory condition on which Treasury could rely for approval of the issue.

Is it not clear that this sudden sharp push toward greater multilateral lending is a push toward an overall increase in foreign aid for debt servicing?

I am convinced that the United States should demonstrate, in more concrete fashion, concern for its own international financial position from the standpoint of the value of the dollar; because in the long run, the security as well as the prosperity of the free world depends a lot on that value.

We should insist on arrangements with the international lending agencies that are designed to prevent a dollar drain during this period in which we are suffering continuous balance of payments difficulties.

In the early years of World Bank operations, when the European countries had serious balance of payments problems, the Bank did not insist that the Europeans pay in even their commitments to capital subscriptions of the Bank, nor did the Bank float its bonds in Europe during that period. This was appropriate recognition of the balance of payments difficulties of the European governments immediately after the war.

All we are asking is that under the present circumstances when the United States is suffering from payments difficulties, we should expect and receive comparable treatment.

Ever since the end of World War II, for over 20 years, the United States has followed the New Testament precept that it is more blessed to give than to receive, to the point where our money is now beginning to run out.

There are some who do not agree, and who insist that it is the duty of the United States to continue to finance so much of the free world, at the same time it defends most of the free world.

As we view such problems as our inadequate educational facilities, the poverty of Appalachia, and the explosions caused by poverty and unemployment in our cities, let us also remember an even earlier observation made by the Roman Playwright Terence, "Charity begins at home."

#### EXHIBIT 1

[From the Sunday Star, July 24, 1966]

#### UPPING THE ANTE

There was a curious and unfortunate timing in the recent news leak that the World

Bank is seeking a fourfold increase in contributions from member nations.

This huge new amount, which will total \$1 billion a year, is destined to go to a subsidiary, the International Development Association, which makes long-term loans at extremely low interest rates to backward nations.

There is no doubt that these countries can use bigger injections of money. The economic progress of many, particularly the fledgling African nations, has been discouragingly slow. The World Bank in fact thinks they could absorb up to \$4 billion more than what they're now receiving annually and put it to productive use.

But it remains a strange coincidence that an official waited until our foreign aid bill was so far along in its annual pilgrimage through Congress before unloading this blockbuster, for the issues raised have a very pertinent bearing on our aid program.

Under the proposal, Uncle Sam's contribution to the IDA would rise from \$100 million to \$400 million a year. Lawmakers might well ask why this couldn't have been taken into account in determining our own aid bill, since it will fulfill one of the aid program's own purposes, namely, long term loans at low rates to developing countries.

The emphasis in IDA loans of course is on projects such as power plants, whereas our loans tend nowadays to go for commodities bought from the United States. And it also is true that there is room for both types of help.

But there also is a limit to the total aid the United States should provide annually, and a need to fix priorities. Congress can't do an intelligent job of this if the World Bank lets slip, while debate on foreign aid is nearing a climax, a whole new set of demands. We contribute 40 percent of the IDA's support. Some kind of forethought should have been given to the timing of such a major proposal.

#### EXHIBIT 2

[From the Washington Post, July 24, 1966]  
DESPITE AID CUTS, WORLD BANK SEEKS  
QUADRUPLING OF LOAN FUND

(By Bernard D. Nossiter)

George Woods, the practical visionary who runs the World Bank, has an audacious sense of timing.

At almost the very moment when the Senate was whittling down the foreign aid bill, Woods proposed that the United States and other rich nations quadruple their contributions to the Bank's soft-loan affiliate.

Instead of the \$250 million that the rich have been giving each year to the International Development Association, Woods asked them for \$1 billion a year.

He tells visitors that he is not star gazing, that his figure is not inflated for bargaining purposes. Anything less, he insists, ignores the dimensions of the development problem.

As he told a meeting of aid-giving nations here last week, the greatest threats to "international tranquility and order" are not the problems now engrossing Western, foreign, finance and trade ministers. These ministers are worrying about international monetary reform, NATO and the Kennedy Round. But in Woods' view, bargaining among the rich about the difficulties of the rich ought not to be the central concern.

"The real and present danger," he said, is that "a large part of humanity will remain on the ragged edge of subsistence" unless "concerted and adequate help" is given.

Although he was addressing all the big aid givers, Woods' biggest immediate problem is the United States. Other nations won't move to replenish IDA's coffers until they know how much Washington will put up.

If the United States maintains its present share of the IDA load, the annual American

contribution would come to \$400 million under Woods' plan.

This amount disturbs Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler. He is fretting about the rising domestic budget and the worsening deficit in the American balance of payments. Fowler has indicated to Woods that he wants a chance to back out of any IDA commitment if the American payments abroad aren't in balance.

In Wood's eyes, such an uncommitted commitment would frustrate his difficult selling job with other countries. So the World Bank President is preparing a strong brief for Fowler to consider.

Woods will argue that IDA's balance of payments drain is small. His estimates show that 60 per cent of the American contribution comes back to the United States in the form of orders for American goods and services. Thus, a \$400 million payment to IDA should cost the American balance about \$160 million a year.

Secondly, Woods will say that he doesn't need any money budgeted for IDA for three more years. Thus, Fowler would have to reply that the balance of payments will still be unbalanced so drastically three years hence that \$160 million would be too painful a loss.

Even if Woods wins an American pledge, his problems are far from over. The other major aid givers are unenthusiastic about increasing IDA's funds.

Woods knows all this as well as anybody. But almost with a sense of resignation, he believes his job now is to press home the size of the problem and let the aid givers decide whether they are serious about meeting it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT and Mr. SALTONSTALL addressed the Chair.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to my able colleague from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I have listened most carefully to what the Senator has just said. It has been most informative and educational, and I commend the Senator very highly.

Let me ask the Senator if it is a fair statement to say that he believes the World Bank today should confine its loans to a greater degree to hard loans; that if it goes into the soft loan business, it should go on a multilateral basis, rather than a bilateral basis; is that not a fair statement?

Mr. SYMINGTON. First, I thank the able Senator for his kind remarks. I would hope that at this time, when we are urging our private investors to reduce their investments in Europe, that when we put out World Bank bonds they not be placed for sale in the New York market, in direct competition with the already extremely difficult problem American business is having today in borrowing, primarily because of the very high interest rates.

These are Triple A bonds. There is no difficulty whatever in selling them; therefore there is no necessity for putting them out in New York, paying brokers fees to sell them. If they must be sold, why not sell them where the money is going, abroad. If that is not agreeable, why not sell them direct? Again, they are Triple A.

In any case, I do not see why the Government takes one position with respect to our private sector businessmen and investors, and another position with respect to the operations of the World Bank.



It actually is a Government program, because these bonds could have been sold only with the approval of the United States Treasury. I presented this to the Secretary of the Treasury, what I am presenting to the Senate today. I said I was distressed that the sale of \$175 million bonds in the New York market, under these interest rate conditions, was approved by the Treasury.

So much for hard loans. As to soft loan situation as my able friend from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] knows—who has made a detailed study of this—the reason the soft loan idea is now in such vogue is that it is the only way many of these hard loans can be repaid.

We all know conditions in some of the countries which have received heavy aid from the United States in recent years. One country owes over \$700 million in hard loans to the World Bank. The only way that country can repay hard loans is to have the United States put up more money in the way of soft loans.

Does that answer the able Senator's question?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I thank the Senator for his comments, but what I had in mind was that in listening to him, and also to the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], if I heard him correctly, the soft loan business is really, in substance, pretty nearly aground, so that if we are going to go into that business we should go into it on a multilateral basis. The difficulty, as I see it, from a multilateral point of view is that we would lose control, as the Senator said, of the undertaking.

Mr. SYMINGTON. We would lose control. The Senator is correct. In effect, it would be a grant. In fact, it would be better to give it as a grant because if we take all the bureaucratic expenses incident to following a loan for 50 years, with no interest and no repayment of principal for 10 years, the taxpayers would actually be better off if we simply gave them the money and forgot it.

That was pointed out by a former head of the AID program, who once said that when we shifted much of that program into loans in AID, we made AID the biggest bank in the free world, but there were very few people in the agency who had had banking experience. Grants would be better, in my opinion, than such a continuation of soft loans.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I want to say just a brief word, as I do not wish to let pass this reflection upon what I believe is about the only effective development assistance institution now operating in the international arena, and which has, so far, been free of any serious faults. It has done an extremely good job, made a great deal of money, and has been operated efficiently.

I think that George Woods is one of the ablest bankers and one of the most imaginative financial men in the United States today. I do not quite know why the Bank has suddenly become the object of this criticism. I think that the bank, as well as IDA, is one of the best bargains we have. The United States now contributes only 42 percent, on the average, of IDA's funds. There have been

some new members to come in. I think that the Bank officials do an extraordinarily good job and I would hope that all our financial investments for development purposes could be made through these or similar organizations.

All I want to say is that I think Mr. George Woods is an extremely able man, as was Mr. Eugene Black.

Mr. President, I do not want to delay the passage of this extremely troublesome bill before us, so I shall not pursue this matter further at this time, but I hope at a later time to have something more to say about the operations of IDA, the Bank, and the IFC. The World Bank is truly a multilateral organization and deserves our support.

I hope the criticisms will not be taken too seriously at this stage, until we have had an opportunity to go further into the matter.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, with all due respect to my able chairman, for whom I have the greatest respect and know he speaks with sincerity, I am not criticizing Mr. George Woods in any way. I am sure he is a man of high caliber, and an able banker. But if I criticize a policy he has put in effect, it is surely not only my right but my duty—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was not criticizing the Senator. Of course he has a right to say what he likes. I did not want the RECORD to stand—and this statement was being made as though there was something wrong with the World Bank—without replying. I believe that the Bank conducts an excellent operation. I know of few mistakes it makes.

I am completely in accord with what the Senator from Missouri said about the problem of our balance of payments.

This problem arises because of the failure of our own policies. When we become involved in a war which is costing us \$2 billion a month, I do not think IDA should be blamed for the difficulties this creates for balance of payments. The imbalance in tourism causes a far greater problem in our balance of payments than our contribution to IDA does. Look at the way the trade balance is going. IDA plays a very small part in the balance-of-payments problem.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I was not talking as much about the contributions the World Bank has made with respect to our continuing unfavorable balance of payments as I am about the soft loans and the increase in those type loans which I believe have been made against the best interest of American taxpayers.

This is no sudden position on my part. I have been discussing it on the floor of the Senate as my colleagues know, for months and years.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has talked about the balance of payments. This is the first time I have heard the Senator talk about the World Bank.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I have expressed myself many times about the World Bank and its soft window, IDA. The two institutions have the same President and the same Board of Directors. I would not want the American people to think they are two entirely different organizations.

I have become convinced that the soft loan activities of the World Bank, through IDA, are being increased to insure payment of the World Bank hard loans, which otherwise would not be paid out because the countries in question just do not have the money.

There is another point I would make before yielding the floor. As to the AID agency, we decided that here. As far as IDA is concerned once we agree to participate in the soft loans, our vote as to what is done with these IDA funds is 26.3 percent, as against our 100 percent right of decision in connection with AID funds appropriated by the Congress.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, this year's foreign aid bill has many improvements over foreign aid bills of recent years. For the first time in the contested and somewhat muddled history of the U.S. foreign assistance programs, there is evidence of a considerably more realistic approach toward the feasibility of giving away huge sums of money.

I am particularly pleased to note the determination of this body to exercise an annual review over the vast majority of the programs created by the bill. We cannot delegate away our duty to the American taxpayer in this area. We must continue to scrutinize closely the administration of the foreign aid program so that we may determine if it is accomplishing the goals for which it was intended. And, Mr. President, in fulfilling our obligation, we must have the courage to admit our errors and to eliminate the unworkable parts of the program when commonsense and clear facts tell us that our plans have gone awry. The retention of our annual review over the bulk of the foreign aid program is a necessary precondition to a realistic and effective program.

May I say that I believe it most significant that the Senate modified its annual-review position to allow 2-year planning of Alliance for Progress programs. In the past, the Alliance has suffered severely from a proliferation of socialistic programs in areas where private enterprise might better have served. But the Alliance is such an important part of our worldwide effort that it deserves special attention.

My own State has special ties to Latin America, and Texans are especially desirous of seeing the Alliance improved and successful. By its action the Senate has served notice that it, too, regards the Alliance as of extraordinary significance. We now hope that the administrators will give it the extra attention the Senate deems wise.

I also am pleased that the military and economic assistance sections of the foreign aid bill have been separated. I have felt for several years that economic aid and military assistance could be more rationally considered by Congress as separate measures.

I may say that the assistance, both military and economic, which I have seen being applied in southeast Asia has been unusually well administered. Despite some very difficult burdens and some losses to blackmarketeers and corrupt officials our aid to South Vietnam has been making a major contribution to our

efforts to achieve stability and peace in Asia. This is an example of U.S. aid skillfully and effectively applied. With a little tightening of security precautions, this will be the showplace of how foreign aid may best be used to further American foreign policy and national security.

Perhaps the most important improvement in this year's foreign aid bill over those of previous years is the significant cut, authorized by the Senate, in the total amount of aid to be included in the program. The amendment submitted by the distinguished and able Senator from Illinois will do much to reassure the American taxpayer that his money is not being thrown away and unnecessarily wasted in a time of pressing domestic inflation.

All too often we forget the taxpayers when we consider foreign aid; we forget that the money for our grand plans and projects must come out of the pockets of millions of hard-working Americans. Too often we forget that the taxpayer might not approve of a wasteful and inefficient aid program just because "we need to do something." With a smaller amount of money with which to work and a limited number of countries eligible to receive aid, we can hope that the administrators of the foreign aid program will at last abandon the scattergun approach to economic and military assistance.

I have long been a critic of this scattergun approach to foreign aid. I have argued on many occasions that our foreign aid funds should be used on a more selective basis, that we not contribute to the building of socialistic governments or socialistic schemes abroad.

Yes, Mr. President, this year's foreign aid bill is an improvement, a step in the right direction. But it is not a large enough step. We have only begun to move in the direction of an effective foreign aid policy. I look forward to the day when we will start with a very minimal amount of money in our plan and add to it when proposed projects are worthy of the support of the American taxpayer.

Under the present system, we start with a large sum of money and whittle away at it, placing the burden of proof upon those who seek to insure an effective program by eliminating unwise projects. This is not right. Those seeking funds should be required to show the worth of their plan and then, and only then, should they receive the funds to carry it out.

I must withhold my support from this bill. I cannot be satisfied with a token gesture or even with one step toward the goal of a sound and effective foreign aid program. My duty as a U.S. Senator to my constituents and all other Americans who must pay for our foreign aid programs forces me to say "No" to any bill which does not weed out all the weaknesses and waste which have for so long been a part of our aid programs.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass?

On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] are absent on official business.

I further announce that if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH] would vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 66, nays 27, as follows:

[No. 159 Leg.]

YEAS—66

Alken	Hickenlooper	Montoya
Anderson	Hill	Morton
Bartlett	Holland	Moss
Boggs	Inouye	Mundt
Brewster	Jackson	Muskie
Byrd, W. Va.	Javits	Nelson
Cannon	Kennedy, Mass.	Neuberger
Case	Kennedy, N.Y.	Pastore
Church	Kuchel	Pell
Clark	Lausche	Prouty
Cooper	Long, Mo.	Proxmire
Dirksen	Long, La.	Randolph
Dodd	Magnuson	Ribicoff
Dominick	Mansfield	Saltinshall
Douglas	McCarthy	Scott
Fong	McGee	Smathers
Fulbright	McGovern	Smith
Gore	McIntyre	Sparkman
Griffin	Metcalfe	Tydings
Gruening	Miller	Williams, N.J.
Harris	Mondale	Yarborough
Hart	Monroney	Young, Ohio

NAYS—27

Bennett	Fannin	Russell, Ga.
Bible	Hartke	Simpson
Burdick	Hruska	Stennis
Byrd, Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Symington
Cotton	Jordan, Idaho	Talmadge
Curtis	Morse	Thorndom
Eastland	Murphy	Tower
Ellender	Robertson	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Russell, S.C.	Young, N. Dak.

NOT VOTING—7

Allott	Carlson	McClellan
Bass	Hayden	Pearson
Bayh		

So the bill (H.R. 15750), as amended, was passed.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, in the engrossment of the Senate amendment to H.R. 15750, the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to make technical corrections.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed as passed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move that the Senate insist upon its amendments and ask for a conference with the House of Representatives thereon, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to, and the Presiding Officer appointed Messrs. FUL-

BRIGHT, SPARKMAN, MANSFIELD, MORSE, GORE, HICKENLOOPER, AIKEN, and CARLSON conferees on the part of the Senate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move that further consideration of S. 3584 be indefinitely postponed.

The motion was agreed to.

#### COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION TOMORROW

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency and the Committee on Finance were authorized to meet during the session of the Senate tomorrow.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate tomorrow afternoon, beginning at 1:30 p.m., to consider the airline situation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES ACT OF 1966

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1323, S. 3583.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 3583) to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward internal and external security.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, respecting the military assistance bill, which is now before the Senate, I have pending an amendment the substance of which I wish to call to the attention of Senators.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, may we have order? We are in a state of confusion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. Senators will take their seats.

The Senator may proceed.



Mr. LAUSCHE. Until now, the military assistance program placed a limitation of \$55 million on the quantity of military grants that we could make to the 19 Latin-American countries. That is, grants in excess of \$55 million could not be made.

The bill as reported by the committee would change the present law, to provide that the limitation of \$55 million on grants shall also apply to sales. Thus the language of the bill, as reported, reads:

The total value of military assistance and sales . . . under this Act . . . for American Republics in each fiscal year shall not exceed \$55 million.

This applies to both grants and sales. I think that the recommendation of the committee is wrong. The \$55 million at present applies to grants. If this recommendation is accepted, the Department will be permitted to make \$55 million in grants. Beyond that, the Latin American countries, if they wish to buy, will go to Britain, Germany, France, or even perhaps Russia.

My amendment contemplates striking out the word "sales."

If my amendment is agreed to, the limitation will be \$55 million in military grants. Beyond that, our Government will be able to negotiate as to whether sales shall or shall not be made.

I call that to the attention of the Senate. I do not intend to call up my amendment tonight.

For those who want to acquaint themselves with what the Department has said about the matter, I recommend that they read page 674 of the transcript of hearings. That is a full explanation of the position of the Department of Defense on the subject.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the statement just made by the Senator from Ohio concerns a very controversial issue. I do not believe that we want to pursue it at this time.

I wish to make a brief statement regarding the bill. One thing I want to say is that sales of military materials may be made in the regular course of business without regard to the limitation in the bill. There is no prohibition against our selling on a straight commercial basis. The provision in the bill simply means that sales under the credit program of the act will count against the \$55 million ceiling.

The countries of Latin America can still buy anywhere they like, in this country or anywhere else. The fact is that these countries cannot afford to buy without credit assistance. They buy, but they really should not. That is what the committee found and is part of the basis for this amendment. However, I should like to discuss this amendment a little later.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, we can discuss it later. That is not the language of the bill. The language says that we shall not make grants and sales in excess of \$55 million.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They cannot do so under the terms of this act. There is nothing in here to prevent them from buying from Du Pont or anyone else.

This merely means that the credit terms under this act would not be available after the \$55 million limit is reached. That is what it means.

There is no attempt to prohibit them from buying from private companies here under regular commercial terms.

The amendment adopted by the committee does not mean that they cannot buy from U.S. concerns on the same terms that they could buy from the British or from anyone else who does not subsidize the sales.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have the floor. I would like to finish.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas has the floor.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask the majority leader whether it is his purpose to try to get a vote this evening on any amendment. I am perfectly willing if that is the will of the leadership.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in response to the question of the Senator from Arkansas, it is not anticipated that there will be votes on any amendments tonight.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the majority leader.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, does not the chairman of the committee feel that in restricting this \$55 million to grants only, some are trying to protect American manufacturers when they lose business in competition with the Federal Government on many of these sales? I think there are two or three different versions of why this came about.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the main reason in my view is that we have overdone this business of being the world's largest arms salesman. We are generating arms races all over the world even to the extent of pushing them on countries that may not really want them under the justification that this helps our balance-of-payments problem.

This is a very poor posture for our country to be in. We are overdoing it.

Many people in the world think that we are trying to save our own bacon by selling arms of any kind almost everywhere. I do not think we ought to do this. That is why I voted for the restriction. I do not see why we should supply arms to countries the world over and contribute toward the generation of wars as we did between Pakistan and India.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will yield for a question.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I wanted to make a statement.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want to make a brief statement.

Mr. President, the Military Assistance and Sales Act, which has just been laid before the Senate, is essentially a rewrite and clarification of the present provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act as they affect military aid. There is little in the bill that is new; but by considering military assistance in legislation separate

from that which provides for economic assistance, it is possible for the Senate to focus on the program more sharply. In this connection, I want to repeat that the separation has no effect on the relative roles of the Departments of State and Defense.

The committee has authorized an appropriation of \$892 million for the 1967 fiscal year. This does not include any of the military costs of the war in Vietnam, which are paid out of Defense Department appropriations. The committee figure is only \$25 million less than the administration requested; it is approximately offset, or more than offset, by the tighter ceiling the committee has approved for military assistance and sales to Latin America and by the limitation on the total number of countries which can receive grant aid other than training in the United States.

This limitation is 40. Its immediate, practical effect will be to eliminate three countries—to be chosen by the administration—from the list of those scheduled to receive such aid in 1967. This limitation is consistent with the committee's action in limiting the number of countries which can receive various kinds of economic assistance. It reflects a feeling which has been growing for a good many years that the program is too diffuse and is spread too thin. It is a moderate restraint on proliferation, and it is my personal hope that next year it can be tightened somewhat.

The tighter budgetary ceiling the committee has put on military assistance to Latin America might be helpful to the administration in operating within the 40-country ceiling.

For many years, Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee has had misgivings about the nature and extent of U.S. military assistance to Latin America. These misgivings have resulted in several provisions now in the law—authority to use military assistance funds for a multilateral force, a directive—which has not been implemented—that military assistance be extended on the basis of joint plans, and a limitation of the purposes for which assistance can be furnished, as well as the present budgetary limitation.

The committee has now moved to restrict military assistance to Latin America further by including within the present limitation of \$55 million a year a number of activities which are now excluded. There is now included only grants of defense articles. The committee bill would also include sales made under the act, defense services—other than training—and naval vessels transferred under other laws. The present ceiling permitted the Defense Department to plan a total program of military assistance and sales to Latin America of \$146.4 million. Under the committee bill, only \$12.3 million of this amount will be exempt from the ceiling. The balance of \$134.1 million will have to be compressed to \$55 million.

This is a substantial reduction, but it is one which is long overdue. The United States has put entirely too much military equipment into Latin America. This has been an economic burden which the

Latin American countries cannot afford, and it has strengthened a group which is on the whole politically regressive.

There is a need for a small amount of military assistance in Latin America, principally for internal security requirements. But this exists in only a few countries, and it can be adequately met within the limits imposed by the committee bill. What the committee bill will stop is the sale of jet aircraft, the loan of destroyers, the grant of mortars.

I wish to call attention also, Mr. President, to provisions of the committee bill which urges caution upon the administration in making arms sales to underdeveloped countries generally. I hope this is a subject to which the committee can give closer attention in the next year. There are disturbing signs that American arms have contributed to instability as well as to stability. Action to make weapons available, whether on a grant or a sale basis, should be taken with the greatest care.

I urge the Senate to give this bill careful consideration and study.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment to the pending bill, the Military Assistance and Sales Act, which I have just filed at the desk within the past 5 minutes may be made the pending business before the Senate tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 33, lines 17 and 18, strike out "\$892,000,000" and insert "\$792,000,000".

#### U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, in a recent floor speech I pointed out that the first-quarter balance-of-payments statement indicated a declining trend in our current position. There were two reasons for this: First, the rapid rise of imports—a result of our domestic prosperity—and, second, a rise in military spending abroad.

The decline occurred despite a highly satisfactory expansion of our export receipts. Clearly, we shall not permit our military expenditures at their present range to be imprudently curbed merely because of our balance-of-payments position.

Since we will not impose restraints on our imports, it seems that in the near future our current-account trade surplus will not grow larger again.

There is no simple cause-and-effect relation between the current-account balance and any particular part of the capital account in the short run. Yet, it is certain that we are experiencing a lessening of our capacity to sell so much more abroad than we buy from abroad to be able to afford our huge capital outflow.

In the existing pattern of capital movements, there has been a fairly steady rate of private investment abroad maintained since about the middle of last year, a rate that is substantially lower than that of the early part of 1965. In itself,

this is a tribute to the effectiveness of the President's program of voluntary restraints to improve the balance of payments. But for these restraints, the outflow would have been considerably greater.

The evidence of the past may be good enough, but the prospects for the remainder of the year are less good. This has two aspects.

First, foreign affiliates of U.S. firms are scheduling some sharp rises of plant and equipment expenditures for the remainder of the year, according to Department of Commerce projections.

Second, the process of restraint in direct investment to conform to the President's program has had the side effect of increasing borrowing abroad by these affiliates and, in consequence, of applying severe strain on foreign capital markets, especially those of Western Europe.

Indeed, competition for borrowing in European currencies and in Euro-dollars has been most effectively waged by U.S. corporations. Not only has this given rise to local resentment at the tightness of credit available for domestic borrowers in these countries, but also it has had the natural effect of pushing up the cost of borrowing in these markets.

The performance of European capital markets was the subject of a study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee as long ago as 1964. The general argument of that study was that, despite a significant expansion of capital market activity, there were institutional and legal barriers to further growth.

Clearly, the problem of this inadequacy has not yet been resolved, and it is not going to be quickly resolved. For as the outflow of funds from the United States to Europe has declined, American firms there have redoubled their efforts to finance their direct investment by the retention of earnings or by borrowing in European markets. Despite the higher cost of this borrowing than of borrowing in the United States, and despite the restrictions of European capital markets, the significant fact is that foreign affiliates of American companies have in the past decade or so become familiar with these markets and gained a high rating on the basis of demonstrated performance.

The manner in which this affects the American position is complex. But to the extent that pressures on these markets raise the cost of credit and because the flow of savings into them remains inadequate, tight money abroad will exercise its influence in many different ways.

The net effect is to maintain, especially for large financial institutions able to operate on both sides of the Atlantic, the relative attractiveness of borrowing here rather than there. The program of voluntary restraints, which was intended as a temporary measure only will thus face a severe test, in that there has not been a quick reduction in our overall deficit.

Furthermore, the diversion of the capital flow brought about by the restraints represents an underwriting of our position at some private cost. In any event,

we are trying to prevent credit from finding its own natural level; and we are likely to find that controls—voluntary or compulsory—are almost certain to generate tendencies in the direction of their own frustration.

This argument has several implications. First, conditions would appear to favor a continuing outflow of financial funds from New York. The only basis for forecasting a diminution would be the expectation that the rate of European economic growth was about to slow down somewhat more, with the result that pressures on domestic capital markets would be lessened and the terms of borrowing there would be eased.

In that event, however, we should have to beware of another development. Whatever improvement we might enjoy on private capital account would, in all probability, be outweighed by a deterioration in our commodity exports receipts and a further lowering of our surplus on current account.

In other words, if the European economic situation deteriorates and they have a recession, it is true that we may not lend as much abroad. The important point to recognize is that in that event, on the basis of past experience, our capital investment in Europe would decline more sharply and our exports would decline even more.

We have absolutely no reason to wish for a less prosperous Europe, and the odds are that European growth and tight money will have the effect of maintaining and perhaps increasing our private capital outflow during the remainder of 1966. On balance, then, we can expect our overall deficit on an official reserve basis to be greater and not less than in 1965.

Second, the only combination of circumstances that would tend to reduce our overall deficit would be a reduction of growth at home, as well as abroad. For then there would be both less demand for capital abroad, which would reduce the outflow from the United States, and less demand for imports. Demand for imports may be at a cyclical peak. With a worldwide recession the cut in our expenditures on imports would be both swift and at least as great as the loss of our receipts on commodity exports.

Third, on the assumption of sustained prosperity both here and in Europe, tight money policies in Europe can pose serious problems for our domestic monetary policy. We have been experiencing a ratchet effect on interest rates, an alternating upward movement of rates here and in Europe, which has provided a continuing lure to U.S. capital.

Unfortunately, the maladjustment arising from this is not going to be corrected by the action of one nation alone. What we must continue to advocate, as recent reports of the Joint Economic Committee have emphasized, is the development of guidelines establishing the appropriate mix of domestic fiscal and monetary policies for both surplus and deficit countries. At present, it seems clear that major countries of Europe ought to be giving greater weight to fiscal action in order to relieve some of the strains imposed by monetary policies.



They should be doing so, Mr. President, and we have been urging them to do so. But, obviously, they will not follow our advice, certainly not in the near future.

Finally, at the very moment when I am expressing pessimism over the overall balance, I wish to emphasize the impossibility of accurate prediction—some would say the impossibility of making any useful prediction at all. The overall balance is mostly a result and not a cause of changes; but it is a result of a vast number of influences—from trade, from governmental activity, from financial movements. These influences may offset each other or reinforce each other.

What may be said with certainty is that nothing is certain. Yet, the trend of events suggests that we should be prepared to take new measures to protect our position in the event that the deficit continues to widen, and the conditions both at home and abroad seem to be increasingly adverse to our balance-of-payments position.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator from Wisconsin is one of the leading authorities in the Senate on fiscal and monetary matters in general and the balance-of-payments deficit in particular. As a member of the Joint Economic Committee, he has rendered important service in analyzing these complex and difficult problems and calling them to the attention of Senators.

I am particularly struck with the short and succinct speech the Senator from Wisconsin has just made. I wonder whether the Senator would agree with me that one of the most—if not the most—significant adverse factors in our balance-of-payments situation is the war in Vietnam.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Unquestionably, the war in Vietnam, combined with the expenditures which we feel necessary to make for our troops stationed in Germany, Korea, and elsewhere in the world, are very important factors.

The balance-of-payments situation presented by the war in Vietnam is puzzling, as to how we can eliminate or control it, short of a policy determination that lies outside of the economic area.

The Secretary of Defense and others have attempted to do their best to minimize it by paying in scrip and by other means, but it is a very difficult and troublesome situation. The situation probably will become worse as the number of troops abroad increases, and as our commitment seems to be increasing.

Mr. CLARK. As the war escalates, almost inevitably—and I realize that is not the only cause—but almost inevitably the balance-of-payments situation will get worse.

I do not expect the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] to agree with me, but my feeling is very clear, indeed: End the war in Vietnam.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania.

Of course, if the war in Vietnam does end, this would enormously contribute to

improvement in our balance-of-payments situation. I do think, however, that this is an important and significant argument with regard to Vietnam, but I think that the Senator would agree with me that this should not be the controlling argument, as significant as it is. It is an argument that we have to keep in mind and be concerned about.

Mr. CLARK. I agree with the Senator, but it seems to me that some of us in the Senate—and I ask the Senator from Oregon who is in the Chamber to listen for a moment to what I have to say—some of us in the Senate should draw up an overall balance sheet with respect to the war in Vietnam which will show anything having to do with the arguments of the President and the Secretary of State about the alleged defense of freedom, and to show what the assets of the American people are in the economy which may arise from a continuance or an escalation of the war in Vietnam, and to total up on the balance sheet, which is an important fact in the impact on domestic programs. The brutalization of hundreds of young Americans who are being taught the ways of guerrilla and air warfare is a third factor. Perhaps we could come out in the end with a determination as to whether the game is worthy of the candle.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I wish to add one point with regard to the balance-of-payments situation. I believe that the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] has made a great contribution to the Senate by continually talking about this situation and calling it to the attention of the Senate.

Many critics of the Senate have said that one of the most important problems facing our country is our balance of payments and there should be a great deal more debate and discussion of this in the Senate. The Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] has done a wonderful job in contributing his well-informed viewpoint.

Frankly, while our gold supply has sharply diminished to \$13 billion and while our obligations are great overseas, the basic fact is that this country is enormously strong financially. We have a problem in our current accounts, but \$13 billion is 30 to 40 percent of all the gold in the world. Serious as our balance of payments is becoming, I cannot see that this is such a decisive problem that it should profound and seriously affect the situation in Vietnam.

Furthermore, I think that if we did run out of our gold, it is interesting to speculate what would happen. As I have said, I intend to develop this point further in another speech. Some economists have said that gold would lose much of its value.

We have real economic power and to contend under these circumstances that this country would be bankrupt or that the value of the dollar would enormously diminish, is not realistic.

Mr. CLARK. I am in accord with the statement of the Senator. I share his admiration for the speeches made by the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON].

I wish to point out that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the

Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], and myself, as well as several other Senators, have been conferring regularly with the Secretary of the Treasury to keep informed on this problem.

To my way of thinking, gold is an utterly obsolete medium of foreign exchange. The sooner we get away from the gold standard—back to the Roosevelt days—the better it will be.

There is not enough gold being produced to enable us over a foreseeable period of time to create the reserves necessary to finance the constantly growing international trade. One of the principal factors are efforts being made by the Department of the Treasury—and I wonder if the Senator from Wisconsin does not agree—particularly Secretary Fowler and his deputy, Mr. Deming, in an effort to persuade 10 central nations to create a new medium of foreign exchange in the form of CRUS which will, as quickly as possible, get us off the gold standard and onto a basis of international finance in which the gold available will balance, in a sense, in relation to the needs of international trade.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator could not be more correct. I think that the Senator has overlooked the enormous expansion in world trade in the last few years which has only been possible because of the U.S. deficit.

When we recognize that fact we can see that the limited supply of gold and the amount being mined, primarily by Russia and South Africa, will not provide enough liquidity to permit world trade to grow to the level we hope it will in the next 10 years. We will need a greater degree of international exchange and we will not get it from gold.

Mr. CLARK. This will be true if we are able to move to the greater development of underdeveloped countries so they can participate on a suitable basis in world trade which would enable them to market their products.

Mr. PROXMIRE. It is conceivable that we could raise the value of gold by devaluing all currencies, but in doing so we not only confuse and demoralize savers throughout the world, we pay a premium to South Africa and Russia, and none of us want to do that.

Mr. CLARK. It is unfair because it would penalize the part of the community which lives on savings and investments. I do not believe this would be fair in the long run.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is correct. I thank the Senator for this most useful colloquy.

#### TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent since there was no period for the transaction of routine morning business today, it be in order to lay before the Senate various departmental communications and Presidential messages, and print in the RECORD various routine matters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States withdrawing nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Jones, one of his secretaries.

## WITHDRAWAL OF NOMINATIONS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States withdrawing the nominations of Ubaldo V. Pambianco to be postmaster at Peckville, Pa., and Fred E. Magee to be postmaster at New Milford, Pa.

## TRADE AGREEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT (H. DOC. NO. 461)

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on Finance:

*To the Congress of the United States:*

In accordance with section 226 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, I herewith transmit a copy of a trade agreement concluded on April 5, 1966, with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, together with a statement of the reasons for entering into the agreement.

The agreement reestablishes in terms of the revised Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) that entered into force in 1963 the U.S. concessions negotiated by the two Governments in previous years under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It also grants new U.S. concessions, under the authority of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, in order to offset the net impairment, incidental to bringing the TSUS into force, in the value of those old concessions. The first reductions in tariffs resulting from the compensatory concessions in the present agreement took effect on May 1, 1966; the subsequent stages of these reductions will take place annually through May 1, 1970.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 26, 1966.

## REPORT OF COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying report, was referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry:

*To the Congress of the United States:*

The Commodity Credit Corporation is a useful instrument in America's effort to build a stronger economy, and a more secure foundation for world peace.

The CCC is the financial mechanism through which we share our food abundance with the hungry people of other nations.

It is a principal means through which we work to balance supply and demand,

to maintain ever-normal granary reserves, to expand agricultural exports, and to provide a floor under the farmer's returns from commodity sales.

## FOOD FOR FREEDOM

The food for freedom bill, now awaiting final congressional action, is a firm expression of our national policy—and of the personal desire of most citizens to share our food abundance in the interest of world peace.

No longer is it our policy merely to share what is left over from cash markets. Rather, we shall plan our sharing in accord with the needs and best interests of the developing countries and their own resources.

But we know that we cannot provide for all the world's food needs, even if we were to bring every acre of American soil under cultivation. Thus our food aid programs must, and will, benefit those who demonstrate their willingness to help themselves by a deeper commitment to agricultural development.

## SURPLUSES AND EXPORTS

Farm programs authorized by the Congress from 1961 through 1965 have helped farmers bring their production of surplus grains and other products into line with demand. They have enabled the CCC to reduce inventories that had grown too large. Storage and handling costs have been reduced \$500,000 a day.

Surplus grain is no longer a threat to the livestock industry. Cash receipts from livestock products are up, and the outlook for the industry is bright.

Meanwhile, our exports of agricultural products are setting new records. They are expected to total 40 percent more this year than in 1960, due largely to tremendous increases in feed grains, wheat, and soybean exports. Farm commodity exports amount to one-fourth the value of all U.S. merchandise exported—and thus are vital in creating the foreign exchange necessary to carry on all of our business with foreign countries. The balance-of-payments problem is alleviated by our expanding agricultural exports that are aided in various ways through the Commodity Credit Corporation.

## FARM INCOME

The domestic farm programs that have brought surpluses down have carried farm income up. In 1965, net farm income was fully a fifth higher than in 1960 and is expected to be up another billion dollars this year, reaching the highest level in history except for the postwar years of 1947 and 1948. Income per farm has risen 55 percent since 1960.

This is heartening progress, but we still have a long way to go toward our goal of full parity of income for the American farmer.

Though farm prices have increased 4 percent since 1960, they still are 14 percent below what they were in 1952. And this 4-percent increase in farm prices did not keep pace with the 8-percent increase in farm production costs during that same period.

And though the gap between farmer and nonfarmer income was narrowed by 18 percent in the past 5½ years, farmers still earn only two-thirds per capita of what nonfarmers earn.

We cannot rest until we have achieved full parity of income for the American farmer.

## FUTURE PROSPECTS

With grain surpluses nearly gone and demands increasing, farmers now look forward eagerly to the opportunity to increase production. We have already increased the national rice acreage allotment by 10 percent and the national wheat allotment by 15 percent. We have twice increased the milk support price in recent months to encourage dairy farmers to remain on the land, to increase production, and thus to assure consumers a continued, adequate supply of dairy products. We are carefully watching farm commodity supply-demand situations, and we will use our program authorities to encourage increased production whenever this appears desirable.

The flexibility of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, and of the Commodity Credit Corporation, enables us to encourage increased or decreased production, as national needs and market conditions require.

The legislation now available, together with that nearing enactment, will help us continue our progress toward parity of income. That goal is no longer a long-range hope. It is within our reach—hopefully within this decade. It can be achieved not merely by the large and highly capitalized producers, but by all efficient family-type farmers regardless of race or geography.

Like all policy objectives of a truly great society, parity of income is a classless objective, for it will serve the best interests of every citizen.

We shall use such institutions as the Commodity Credit Corporation to work for parity of income. We shall strive to keep them dynamic and viable and ready, always, to meet our future needs.

It is a pleasure to transmit to you the Commodity Credit Corporation's report for 1965.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 26, 1966.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

H.R. 1407. An act for the relief of Leonardo Russo;

H.R. 1414. An act for the relief of Jacobo Temel;

H.R. 4083. An act for the relief of Mr. Leonardo Tusa;

H.R. 4437. An act for the relief of Bryan George Simpson;

H.R. 4458. An act for the relief of Michel Fahim Daniel;

H.R. 4584. An act for the relief of Mrs. Anna Michalska Holoweckyj (formerly Mrs. Anna Zaleski);

H.R. 4602. An act for the relief of Maj. Donald W. Ottaway, U.S. Air Force;

H.R. 7508. An act for the relief of Giuseppe Bossio;

H.R. 8317. An act to amend section 116 of title 28, United States Code, relating to the U.S. district court for the eastern and western districts of Oklahoma;



H.R. 8865. An act for the relief of Ronald Poirier, a minor; and  
H.R. 11718. An act for the relief of Jack L. Philippot.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

#### REPORT ON PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS OF EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

A letter from the Director of Civil Defense, Office of the Secretary of the Army, reporting, pursuant to law on property acquisitions of emergency supplies and equipment, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 1966; to the Committee on Armed Services.

#### PROHIBITION OF PROCESSING OF STALE CLAIMS BY VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION

A letter from the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, Veterans' Administration, Washington, D.C., transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to prohibit the processing of stale claims for special dividends by the Veterans' Administration (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Finance.

#### REPORT ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH GRANTS

A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration, Department of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on scientific research grants, during the calendar year 1965 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

#### REPLY TO REPORT OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL

A letter from the Director, Congressional Liaison, Agency for International Development, Department of State, transmitting, for the information of the Senate, a copy of that Agency's reply to a report of the Comptroller General of the United States on improper payment of port charges on shipments to Colombia of food donated under title III of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Government Operations.

#### AMENDMENT OF ACT ESTABLISHING THE POINT REYES NATIONAL SEASHORE, CALIF.

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the act of September 13, 1962, authorizing the establishment of the Point Reyes National Seashore in the State of California, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

#### PETITION

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a resolution adopted by the City Council of the City of St. Paul, Minn., praying for the rescinding of the 500-mile maximum nonstop order relating to operations at the National Airport, Washington, D.C., which was referred to the Committee on Commerce.

#### REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

The following report of a committee was submitted:

By Mr. RANDOLPH, from the Committee on Public Works, with an amendment:

S. 3155. A bill to authorize appropriations for the fiscal years 1968 and 1969 for the construction of certain highways in accordance with title 23 of the United States Code, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1410).

#### EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session,  
The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. MAGNUSON, from the Committee on Commerce:

Rear Adm. Paul E. Trimble, U.S. Coast Guard, to be Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard, with the rank of vice admiral; and

Harry D. Reed, Jr., and sundry other persons, for permanent appointment in the Environmental Science Services Administration.

#### BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION IN- TRODUCTION

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred, as follows:

By Mr. CASE (for himself, Mr. McGEE and Mr. BREWSTER):

S. 3651. A bill to amend section 2 of Public Law 88-240 to provide that the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission shall cease to exist on June 30, 1968; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

By Mr. TYDINGS:

S. 3652. A bill to amend the National Housing Act to authorize a limited experimental program of insurance for mortgages executed by nonprofit organizations to finance the purchase and rehabilitation of deteriorating or substandard housing for subsequent sale to low-income purchasers; to the Committee on Banking and Currency. (See the remarks of Mr. TYDINGS when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. LONG of Missouri:

S. 3653. A bill to make certain expenditures of the city of Kansas City, Mo., or the county of Jackson County, Mo., eligible as local grants-in-aid for the purposes of title I of the Housing Act of 1949; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. DOMINICK:

S.J. Res. 185. Joint resolution to provide for the settlement of the labor dispute between certain airlines and certain of their employees; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

(See the remarks of Mr. DOMINICK when he introduced the above joint resolution, which appear under a separate heading.)

#### RESOLUTION

#### RELATING TO THE REPORTING OF A MEASURE UPON A SUBJECT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER COMMITTEE

Mr. SALTONSTALL submitted a resolution (S. Res. 287) relating to the reporting of a measure upon a subject within the jurisdiction of another committee, which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

(See the above resolution printed in full when submitted by Mr. SALTONSTALL, which appears under a separate heading.)

#### SELF-HELP FOR ENTERPRISING COMMUNITIES: A HOUSING ACT AMENDMENT

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I want to draw the attention of the Senate to the achievements and the aspirations of the residents of Scotland, Md.

Scotland is a small community on Seven Locks Road between Bethesda and Rockville. Its residents are poor Negroes. Many of its dwellings are pitifully small and lack adequate plumbing.

Though Scotland is poor materially, it is not poor in spirit. The land on which the town is built has come into the path of suburban expansion. But the residents of Scotland have refused to sell their land, see their town fall under the bulldozer's blade, and disperse. They have decided to save their community.

They have banded together to form an organization called Save Our Scotland—SOS. They plan to buy all the land in the town. Then they will sell the outer rim at high suburban prices and use the proceeds to rebuild a smaller but better Scotland.

Already they have cleaned up the debris which formerly littered their town. They have repainted their small houses. They have established a community study hall, with maps and encyclopedias, so that their children can have a place to study outside of their cramped home quarters.

Many Montgomery County residents have pitched in to help. The Reverend Carl Pritchett, pastor of Bethesda Presbyterian Church, is president of the local organization SOS—Save our Scotland. Rurik Ekstrom, a Potomac architect, is designing the rehabilitated and rebuilt homes into which Scotland's residents plan to move.

This housing renewal is perhaps the most important part of the save Scotland program. Most of the buildings in Scotland today are too flimsy and too small to be made liveable by any amount of cleaning or painting. These buildings must be rehabilitated or wholly replaced if Scotland is to become the attractive community which its people want to make it.

Today I am introducing a bill which, if passed, will help Scotland and other communities like it throughout the country lift themselves by their own bootstraps toward community renewal.

The bill provides low interest mortgages for the purchase of substandard housing to be rehabilitated and subsequently resold to low income families. It would supplement the existing low interest mortgage program for construction of housing for rental to those low income housing families under Section 221 d(3) of the National Housing Act.

Congress has wisely decided to provide financing on easy terms for the building of apartment buildings for the poor. Should not we then be even more willing to give the same help to the same low income families when they want to buy their own homes?

Substantially this same bill has been introduced in the House by Congresswoman SULLIVAN, and favorably reported as section 506 of the House version of the Housing and Urban Development Act. There is every reason to suppose it will pass the House.

I have what I believe would be an improvement to the House bill. The House version provides the low interest mortgages for rehabilitation of substandard houses. But any rehabilitation proj-

ect will include some houses in its midst which it would be uneconomic to rehabilitate. They must be torn down and built from scratch.

This is the case in Scotland. Some of the smallest and flimsiest houses—little more than shacks—will have to be completely replaced. Their owners should get the same advantageous mortgage terms as do the owners of the repairable ones. The bill I introduce today would provide such terms.

The Housing Subcommittee of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee is now meeting in executive session to consider the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1966. Although I recognize it is late in the day, I urge the distinguished members of that subcommittee to consider the provisions of this bill in their deliberations on the Housing Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Russell of South Carolina in the chair). The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3652) to amend the National Housing Act to authorize a limited experimental program of insurance for mortgages executed by nonprofit organizations to finance the purchase and rehabilitation of deteriorating or substandard housing for subsequent sale to low-income purchasers, introduced by Mr. TYDINGS, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

#### THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES ACT OF 1966—AMENDMENTS

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I send to the desk five amendments to the foreign military assistance bill (S. 3583) together with my justifications for them, and ask that they lie on the desk until I call them up in the course of the debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments will be received, printed, and will lie on the table.

AMENDMENT NO. 705

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the NATO infrastructure program which was started in 1951, provides fixed defense installations and facilities required for the training of NATO forces in peacetime and for their operational use in wartime. Funds required to construct facilities approved for construction in the NATO infrastructure program are provided through international cost sharing, and each member nation's share is determined on the basis of periodically negotiated cost-sharing agreements. U.S. contributions have varied from about 43 to 31 percent in more recent years. The United States has incurred financial commitments in excess of a billion dollars as its share of the cost of the NATO infrastructure program.

Concomitantly with this program the U.S. military forces in Europe have been spending large amounts of appropriated funds for the construction of facilities for U.S. forces which are utilized as part of the NATO organization.

A limited review by the General Accounting Office uncovered about \$200

million in construction costs which were borne entirely by the United States because the Department of Defense had not sought to obtain NATO funding for these projects. The projects included air weapons control systems, missile facilities, airfield facilities, petroleum storage facilities, ammunition storage facilities, and war headquarters construction. The GAO report notes that the unilateral construction of military facilities in Europe by the U.S. military services without requesting NATO funding has been a common practice. All of these facilities were constructed to support NATO committed forces and were being used for this purpose.

This matter is of particular importance at this time. President de Gaulle has requested the United States to remove its bases and all of its forces from France by April 1967, and the U.S. officials are at present hunting for other sites for NATO bases in the Netherlands and in Belgium and elsewhere. I ask for unanimous consent to include at the conclusion of my remarks a newspaper article from the Christian Science Monitor on the search that is now underway for new sites to relocate NATO bases.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There being no objection, the article is ordered to be printed in the RECORD.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the Congress can take action now to prevent the waste of funds that occurred earlier when the U.S. military services bore the entire cost of the construction of bases for NATO uses without seeking NATO funding and the proration of costs in accordance with existing NATO agreements.

Early last week in connection with the work of the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, I returned from Europe where I received extensive briefings on the impending moves of bases out of France. From what I could determine no effort has as yet been made to explore with the remaining NATO countries the possibility of cost sharing either in the expenses of moving the existing bases or of establishing new bases.

Congressional action is needed immediately. I therefore send to the desk an amendment to S. 3853, and ask that it be printed and lie on the table. I also ask unanimous consent that the full text of the amendment be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

On page 6, line 22 strike out the semicolon and substitute a colon and the following: "Provided, That with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization maximum effort should be made to obtain multilateral rather than unilateral financing of such facilities; Provided Further, That, in connection with the forthcoming removal of NATO military bases and facilities from France, the President shall report to the Congress on October 1, 1966 and each sixty days thereafter until June 30, 1967, what arrangements have been made with each of the remaining NATO allies for each of them to bear their fair share of the costs of moving NATO bases

and facilities from France and of establishing equivalent bases and facilities in other NATO countries."

#### EXHIBIT 1

##### NATO UNITS HUNT NEW QUARTERS

(By Robert R. Brunn)

WASHINGTON.—Special American teams are criss-crossing the Low Countries, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom these days. They are examining facilities, railroad networks, population densities, leasing and sale arrangements, costs, and national legal restrictions.

It's all part of American and NATO efforts to plan for a shift in personnel, headquarters, supply depots, oil lines, and air bases out of France in the wake of President de Gaulle's decision to withdraw his nation from an active role in NATO.

Pentagon planners admit the de Gaulle decision leaves them with monumental problems.

Intricate discussions with the French, already begun on an exploratory basis, will try to pin down details of a proposed NATO-French strategic link-up. But Pentagon officials believe little can be achieved until after President de Gaulle's June visit to Moscow.

#### WEAKNESS IMPENDING?

One general says unless President de Gaulle "gives us a certain promise of specific action and we believe in the credibility of the French assurances" a military weakness will exist fairly soon. He indicated that a military stand at the Rhine River would hardly be feasible without the backing of French territory, manpower, and industrial resources.

Any new strategy could be bolstered in the 1970's by the planned advent of new C-54A jet transports. Each could carry 1,000 troops, or 110 tons of cargo, across the Atlantic.

The Pentagon assesses current Soviet policy in Europe as relatively moderate, but does not take it for granted this moderation necessarily will continue.

A few years ago Pentagon intelligence listed the Soviet Union's armed force as 5,750,000; this estimate now has been scaled down to 3,150,000.

Soviet ground combat troops are estimated at 2,000,000; East European nations have another 1,000,000. NATO nations have 2,200,000 troops in uniform, including the French. Citing these statistics Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain C. Enthoven said recently, "It certainly cannot be said that we are hopelessly outmanned or outgunned."

#### COMPARISON DRAWN

This comparison is offered in the Pentagon as evidence that the Soviet Union, despite the French semidefection, will not be able to take military advantage of Western Europe.

This past week the Pentagon revealed plans to reassign 15,000 highly skilled American soldiers from the seventh Army in Western Europe to undermanned units in the United States. Some offer this as evidence of American confidence in the moderation of the Soviets' European stance.

At this stage of relations with France, Pentagon officials insist the "forward strategy" will remain—the strategy of defending West Germany close to the Iron Curtain.

The French indicate they will keep their 75,000 troops in West Germany. Yet Pentagon planners realize that the joint Chiefs of Staff and the West German military, not to mention the Erhard government, must be reassured.

#### COOPERATION UNCERTAIN

Will the French actually participate in the "forward strategy," promising to move their troops up from the Rhine Valley toward the East German border should a crisis arise? Would the French, in event of a conflict, coordinate their strategy with NATO?



The American military is trying to work out a compromise with the French. The Americans, for example, know that the French have no early radar warning system. The Americans wonder if the French would continue to allow American planes to fly over France—a question that soon will come up for review—if the United States were to provide France with an early warning system.

Faced with a plethora of questions like this, Pentagon officers and officials often argue they literally do not know what the French plan to do, that strategic and organizational decisions must wait, and that every effort should be made not to isolate the French.

High-level Pentagon figures agree that even if the French cooperate to some degree with NATO after pulling out of it officially, NATO will have less viability, less resiliency, and less cohesion.

#### FRENCH IMPORTANCE STRESSED

NATO reviews its strategic plans every year. And every year Pentagon officials feel NATO's military structure could easily be weakened if the French are not with them on a day-to-day working level.

Officers who are dealing with the NATO crisis insist that they will not, and cannot, second-guess the French. What they can do is decide whether or not the NATO Council will remain in Paris, and what happens to the NATO military standing group which met in Washington and was made up of the British, the Americans, and the French.

The French will remain in the council and informed guessing is the council will remain in Paris.

But the standing group has no meaning with the French "outside." One solution might be to make the group a NATO committee of the whole, and shift its operations to Western Europe.

As for shifting other NATO operations headquarters out of France, the Pentagon is talking about placing the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in London. Domestic politics eventually will be the critical factor.

Central group headquarters, now at Fontainebleau, may be placed in Luxembourg. Some lower-level command groups may end up in West Germany.

Warehouse facilities are being sought in Belgium, the Netherlands, and even in Italy.

Already many of NATO's supplies funnel through Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Bremen, not through France. A slow, steady movement of NATO and American personnel and functions out of France has been going on for several years.

#### U.S. FORCE REDUCED

About 26,000 American military men, and 30,000 wives and children, remain in France. In 1961 close to 40,000 military men alone were there.

Chateauroux, an air field 70 miles south of Paris, will be missed. Close to 500 Americans direct military air transport operations into Europe, Africa, and Asia west of Calcutta. Transport planes have also worked out of Evreux.

Five of 10 air bases designed for use by bombers and fighters have already been turned back to the French. The French long ago banned all foreign nuclear weapons from their soil. Reconnaissance planes remain, but also must be removed.

A five-year-old complex of hospitals near Croix Chapeau has never been used. It includes vast warehouses full of medical supplies. The United States Army planned to build its main European repair shops at Fontenot, but built only a costly steam boiler and left it idle.

Six huge American ammunition dumps are located in France.

If the French force the removal of a complex communications line across France into West Germany the replacement cost will be high.

Oil is stored in tanks in St. Nazaire. From there it is pumped at about five miles an hour across France to West Germany. Six or seven tankers call monthly at St. Nazaire. The Pentagon is arranging alternative routes and fuel routes in case the French make it clear the oil pipeline must "go."

How much of the maze of NATO and American bases in France, totaling about 40, will be completely phased out? Will some be placed on a stand-by basis with skeleton crews ready for a Soviet threat? Will the French allow NATO to keep some facilities operating such as the oil pipeline? American officials wish they knew.

#### AMENDMENT NO. 706

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the Department of Defense has construed the authority it has been granted under section 507 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which corresponds in substantial effect to section 32 of S. 3583, to permit it to sell domestic excess property to foreign governments and international organizations before such property is offered to other Federal agencies and to health, education, and civil defense agencies.

The Department of Defense program for selling domestic excess property is administered by the Defense Services Logistics Center in Battle Creek, Mich. The preponderance of sales which have been made under this program concerns property physically located in the United States and under the control of the Inventory Control Points of the Military Services.

During 1962 and the first half of 1963 DOD sold over \$75 million of domestic excess property to foreign governments and realized a return of only 4 cents on the dollar. Countries receiving such excesses included Canada and other countries which have no part in our military or economic assistance programs. Further, the type of property which these countries may obtain is not restricted to strictly military items.

I have discussed this program of the Department of Defense with GSA officials who have expressed their concern over the inroads made by this program on the availability of excess property to meet the needs of other Federal Agencies. However, they said they are powerless to do anything about it under existing legislation.

DOD's program, which is being carried out without any statutory limitation as to volume, contrasts with the limitations placed on AID's excess program. Under section 608 of the Foreign Assistance Act, AID is limited in the amount of equipment which it can hold—\$15 million at any one time—and the amount it can ship abroad to foreign countries—\$45 million in any one year. No such limitations apply to the DOD program.

I see no valid reason for placing foreign countries ahead of our own State education, public health and civil defense agencies insofar as excess Department of Defense supplies and equipment are concerned. I have received hun-

dreds of letters from State agency officials, local communities, school officials and interested citizens who wrote to me of their need for the kind of equipment and supplies which the Department of Defense disposes of as excess. These letters contain eloquent testimony of the excellent use made of surplus equipment and supplies by State agencies, schools, and other eligible local recipients.

I am therefore proposing an amendment which will give State agencies an opportunity to purchase excess Department of Defense supplies and equipment prior to their being offered to foreign countries.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the amendment be printed in the RECORD at this time, and I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed and lie on the table.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

On page 22, before the period in line 25 insert a colon and the following: "Provided, That, prior thereto, the President shall, in accordance with Regulations promulgated by him, offer to sell, and if requested to so do shall sell, such articles on the same terms to any State for purposes of education, public health, or civil defense, or for research for any such purpose".

#### AMENDMENT NO. 707

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, S. 3583 provides no limits on the terms of credit sales to foreign governments for military supplies and equipment insofar as interest rates are concerned. I believe the Congress should make it clear that these credit sales are not meant to be an additional subsidy for governments purchasing defense supplies from the United States.

I therefore am proposing an amendment to S. 3583 which would require that interest be paid on credit sales at a rate not less than the average interest rate paid by the United States on its long-term indebtedness.

I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed in the RECORD at this time. I also ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed and lie on the table until I call it up at a later date.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

On page 26, at the end of line 12, add the following: "The terms of payment shall include a provision for the payment of interest at a rate not less than the average interest rate paid by the United States on its long term indebtedness."

#### AMENDMENT NO. 708

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the proposed military assistance program for 1967 provides, as the military assistance programs in previous years have provided, for delivering military supplies and equipment as grant aid to countries which have long since been fully capable of purchasing the military materiel they feel they require on a cash basis or which have been cut off from any additional grant aid programs. In the latter case, deliveries of military supplies and

equipment continue to meet so-called commitments to these countries made in earlier years when the military assistance programs were approved by the Department of Defense.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this juncture in my remarks a tabulation which shows the value of military materiel given to countries in the above

categories during fiscal years 1961 through 1965.

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

*Deliveries of equipment and supplies under the military assistance program*

[U.S. fiscal years—millions of dollars]

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	Total		1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	Total
<b>Belgium:</b>							<b>Italy:</b>						
Credit assistance.....	0.2			(1)	3.3	3.5	Credit.....				0.2	(1)	0.2
Grants.....	9.6	18.8	7.3	39.6	4.8	80.1	Grants.....	135.0	83.7	55.9	40.0	94.2	408.8
Additional grants from excess stocks.....	.5	.1		.5	.1	1.2	Additional grants from excess stocks.....	1.3	4.3	94.1	34.0		133.7
<b>Total.....</b>						<b>84.8</b>	<b>Total.....</b>						<b>542.7</b>
<b>Cambodia:</b>							<b>Japan:</b>						
Credit assistance.....							Credit.....				34.8		34.8
Grants.....	5.4	8.7	9.9	3.6	.3	27.9	Grants.....	66.9	74.0	33.9	18.6	29.6	233.0
Additional grants from excess stocks.....	1.1	1.6	2.3	.1		5.1	Additional grants from excess stocks.....	29.2	53.4	1.4	2.4	(1)	86.4
<b>Total.....</b>						<b>33.0</b>	<b>Total.....</b>						<b>344.2</b>
<b>Denmark:</b>							<b>Netherlands:</b>						
Credit assistance.....							Credit.....	.2	2.0				2.2
Grants.....	33.4	15.0	13.0	12.1	48.1	121.6	Grants.....	30.3	12.8	18.9	10.7	49.7	122.4
Additional grants from excess stocks.....	2.3	.2	.3	(1)	(1)	2.8	Additional grants from excess stocks.....	(1)	.1	(1)	.1	(1)	.2
<b>Total.....</b>						<b>124.4</b>	<b>Total.....</b>						<b>124.8</b>
<b>France:</b>							<b>Norway:</b>						
Credit assistance.....	11.5	7.1	16.0	11.9	9.2	55.7	Credits.....						
Grants.....	14.4	33.8	8.0	5.2	4.9	66.3	Grants.....	13.2	24.9	22.9	41.1	35.3	137.4
Additional grants from excess stocks.....	.3	.1	.3	(1)	(1)	.7	Additional grants from excess stocks.....	4.7	15.4	.2	1.3	2.6	24.2
<b>Total.....</b>						<b>122.7</b>	<b>Total.....</b>						<b>161.6</b>
<b>Germany:</b>							<b>United Kingdom:</b>						
Credit.....							Credits.....						
Grants.....	16.0	1.5	.4	.3	.2	18.4	Grants.....	14.0	27.5	11.6	.3	.4	53.8
Additional grants from excess stocks.....	(1)						Additional grants from excess stocks.....	2.0	(1)			.8	2.8
<b>Total.....</b>						<b>18.4</b>	<b>Total.....</b>						<b>56.6</b>
<b>Iraq:</b>							<b>Yugoslavia:</b>						
Credit.....							Credits.....				.6	.3	.9
Grants.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	.1	.2	.3	Grants.....						
Additional grants from excess stocks.....	(1)						Additional grants from excess stocks.....	(1)					
<b>Total.....</b>						<b>.3</b>	<b>Total.....</b>						<b>.9</b>

<sup>1</sup> Less than \$50,000.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the military assistance program to the Netherlands was supposed to have come to an end insofar as grant aid is concerned in 1962. Yet we find about \$50 million in grants for military equipment and supplies being delivered in 1965. This \$50 million is in response to commitments made 3 or more years before. The grant aid program to West Germany was supposed to come to an end in 1960 yet 5 years later we continued to deliver military materiel in the amount of about \$200,000. Belgium was supposed to be cut off from grant aid in 1962. Yet, Belgium received \$44 million in grant military aid materiel in 1964 and 1965.

The most shocking example is that of France. Eleven million dollars of military supplies and equipment were given to France without charge in 1964 and 1965 at a time when it had the indisputable capability to pay for any military items it needed. This occurred after the termination of new commitments of grant military aid equipment in 1961. Information obtained from the Department of Defense indicates that the grant aid program to France did not come to an end formally until June 30, 1965, and, if our experience in the other countries I have cited is any guide, actual deliveries

of materiel to France will continue for many years. And, these gifts of valuable military equipment will be made to a country which has ordered our forces off its soil, has made every effort to destroy the NATO organization into which we have poured so much resources and effort, and has proclaimed its determination to be entirely self-reliant.

Once military assistance programs are approved by the Department of Defense they seem to go on interminably and inexorably. Let the country become as prosperous as West Germany; no matter, deliveries of military supplies under grant aid will continue.

Let the country order our troops off its soil and demand that our bases be closed, as France has done; no matter, deliveries of military supplies under the grant aid program will continue.

How does the Department of Defense justify this? By recourse to our international obligations, to the requirement that we meet our commitments, that we live up to the agreements we have solemnly undertaken. But what are the nature of these so-called commitments? What are the international agreements which we have entered?

The programing of military assistance by the Department of Defense is an in-

volved and changing process. Basically, countries desiring military assistance are supposed to request specific items under the grant aid program. In practice, our military assistance advisory officers work closely with their counterparts in the foreign countries to develop lists of equipment and supplies which the country's forces require. These lists are approved by the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and forwarded to the Department of Defense for approval. When this occurs the foreign country is notified and a commitment has come into being.

But how can this kind of commitment bind the U.S. Congress? Can a military assistance program approved by the Department of Defense in 1960 prevent the Congress from halting deliveries of military equipment in 1965 when conditions in a country have changed? Certainly the executive branch reserves the right to terminate these commitments when circumstances warrant, and we have seen such right exercised in the case of Cuba. To preclude the Congress from exercising its prerogative to approve or disapprove deliveries of military equipment, on the grounds that a commitment has been



made years earlier which only the executive branch can terminate or alter, makes no sense whatsoever.

The right of the Congress to revise commitments for military assistance entered into by the executive agencies is clearly spelled out in section 635(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This section states that action may be taken "subject to any future action of the Congress."

I firmly believe that it is high time that the Congress require a halt to these never-ending military assistance programs. We must turn off these pipelines. The President is far too occupied with other matters to make a critical review of these matters, and the responsible executive agencies are taking the course of least resistance by allowing deliveries of materiel to continue regardless of changing circumstances in our relations with the countries and in the countries' own capabilities. But this is a responsibility which the Congress should not and cannot avoid.

I send to the desk an amendment to S. 3583 designed to end this practice. I ask that the amendment be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks, and I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed and lie on the table until I call it up at a later time.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

On page 18 between lines 21 and 22 add the following:

"(d) No further assistance under this chapter or from excess stocks shall be furnished or delivered to Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Japan, and Yugoslavia."

#### AMENDMENT NO. 709

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, section 91(b) of S. 3583 provides that the duration of a contract which entails commitments for the expenditure of funds under the military assistance program shall be for not more than 5 years at any time. This is the same provision contained in existing legislation under section 635(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended with one notable exception. Section 635(h) gives the President the authority to enter into contracts of up to 5 years duration subject to any future action of the Congress.

I am proposing an amendment to section 91(b) which would provide the same limitation as contained in existing legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the amendment be printed in the RECORD at this time and I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed and lie on the table until I call it up at a later time.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

On page 36, line 16, insert the following: "subject to any future action of the Congress". after the word "shall" the following: "be subject to any future action of the Congress and shall".

### IMPROVEMENT OF FEDERAL-STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM—AMENDMENTS

#### AMENDMENT NO. 710

#### AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AMENDMENT TO FACILITATE LABOR MOBILITY

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, for myself and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] I send to the desk for appropriate reference an amendment to H.R. 15119, the unemployment compensation bill pending before the Finance Committee. The amendment was proposed in the hearings by Actors' Equity to cover the difficult problem of multiple interstate claims for unemployment compensation.

Under existing law, all but six States have entered into agreements covering these cases. Credits accumulated, and paid for, in one of the six States are wholly or partially lost when the employee moves to another State; the same thing is true when the employee moves to one of the six States. Even in the remaining States, which do have agreements, some claimants are ineligible for benefits anyway, or are eligible only for partial benefits, because there is no provision in the agreements, much less a uniform provision, for definition of the base period on which eligibility and benefits are computed.

Actors' Equity proposed, and the amendment now being introduced embodies, a simple requirement that all States participate in arrangements with other States including one uniform and quite reasonable principle, that is, that the base period shall be determined under the law of the State which pays the benefits. In that way, employees who meet the requirements of the paying State will receive the full amounts of benefits, regardless of the base period requirements of the State or States in which they previously worked.

This is clearly a needed and desirable amendment to the law. Our Nation is facing manpower demands which make it absolutely indispensable that there be true labor mobility throughout the Nation. The Congress has recognized this fact in a number of ways, including tax relief for moving expenses of employees and labor mobility assistance under the Manpower Development and Training Act. It should also avoid penalizing employees for interstate movement under the Unemployment Compensation Act.

I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and appropriately referred; and, without objection the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment (No. 710) was referred to the Committee on Finance, as follows:

On page 10, line 15, insert "(A)" after "(10)".

On page 10, line 19, strike out the quotation marks and the period.

On page 10, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:

"(B) the State shall participate in the basic and extended arrangements, approved

by the Secretary of Labor for combining wages, and the eligibility of any individual for unemployment compensation, his weekly benefit amount, and the maximum benefits payable to him under either of such arrangements, shall be based on the individual's employment or wages paid, or both, in (i) the paying State and (ii) any transferring State or States as if such employment or wages were in the base period of the paying State; provided, however, that no employment or wages may be used more than once in the computation of any individual's eligibility for unemployment compensation under either of such arrangements."

### THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES ACT OF 1966—AMENDMENT

#### AMENDMENT NO. 711

Mr. CHURCH proposed an amendment to the bill (S. 3583) to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward internal and external security, which was ordered to be printed.

(See reference to the above amendment when proposed by Mr. CHURCH, which appears under a separate heading.)

### ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Under authority of the order of the Senate of July 14, 1966, the names of Mr. BAYH, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. CARLSON, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. HART, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. MUNDT, Mr. NELSON, Mr. PEARSON, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota, and Mr. YOUNG of Ohio have been added as additional cosponsors of the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 101) to provide for use of a major factor of avoiding problems of heavy population concentrations in the location of Federal Government activities and in Federal Government purchasing and contracting, submitted by Mr. MILLER on July 14, 1966.

### ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILL

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], I ask unanimous consent that the names of the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTOYA], the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], be added as cosponsors to S. 3578 relating to amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide coverage under the program of supplementary medical insurance benefits established as part B thereof, of certain expenses incurred by an insured individual in obtaining certain drugs, at its next printing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING ON  
NOMINATION OF JOHN P. FULLAM,  
OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO BE U.S.  
DISTRICT JUDGE, EASTERN DIS-  
TRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, I desire to give notice that a public hearing has been scheduled for Tuesday, August 2, 1966, at 10:30 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, on the nomination of John P. Fullam, of Pennsylvania, to be U.S. district judge, eastern district of Pennsylvania, vice Abraham L. Freedman, elevated.

At the indicated time and place persons interested in the hearing may make such representations as may be pertinent.

The subcommittee consists of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], and myself, as chairman.

**ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED**

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, July 26, 1966, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled bill (S. 2822) to amend various provisions of the laws administered by the Farm Credit Administration to improve operations thereunder, and for other purposes.

**ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTI-  
CLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE  
RECORD**

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

By Mr. BYRD of West Virginia:

Speech entitled "Dedication of Stephens Lake," delivered by U.S. Senator ROBERT C. BYRD, Democrat, of West Virginia, at Stephens Lake, Raleigh County, W. Va., on Sunday, July 17, 1966.

**TRIBUTE TO THEODORE HERZ**

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to make a brief statement about Mr. Theodore Herz, who died Sunday. Mr. Herz was a partner in the international accounting firm of Price Waterhouse & Co.

I came to know Ted Herz well in 1950 and 1951 when he was staff director and I was chairman of the Subcommittee of the Banking and Currency Committee which investigated the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. He was a man of great ability, and did a remarkable job in directing that investigation. His ability to fit together the pieces of the investigation into a coherent and logical picture was uncanny, and the success of that investigation is due in large measure to the word of Ted Herz. He was one of the most imaginative, and able men I have encountered during my entire public life. His work with that committee, and with the Hoover Commission made great contributions to better government. The country can ill afford to lose gifted men like Ted Herz.

I extend my deepest sympathy to his family.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled "Theodore Herz Dies Here at 57," published in the Washington Post of July 26, 1966, may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**THEODORE HERZ DIES HERE AT 57**

Theodore Herz, 57, a partner in the international accounting firm of Price Waterhouse & Co., died Sunday in George Washington University Hospital after a cerebral thrombosis. He lived at 1313 Woodside pky., Silver Spring.

Mr. Herz graduated from the University of Wisconsin in 1930 and began his career in public accounting that year in his native Chicago. In 1945 he came to Washington to serve as assistant director in a newly created division of the General Accounting Office.

In addition to participating in development of policy and training for the GAO, he directed a two-year audit of the Reconstruction Finance Corp. and its subsidiaries that led to substantial reorganization in the agency.

In 1947 Mr. Herz became associated with Price Waterhouse & Co. here. He was admitted to membership in the firm on July 1, 1954, and had been in charge of the firm's Washington office since 1959.

In 1948 Mr. Herz served as staff director for the first Hoover Commission's Task Force on Government Lending Agencies. The Commission dealt with organization of the executive branch of the national government.

Mr. Herz was responsible for coordination and direction of the work of the Task Force and for preparation of its report. When the second Hoover Commission was organized in 1953, Mr. Herz accepted appointment as staff director with the same responsibilities.

In 1950 and 1951 Mr. Herz served as staff director for the Subcommittee on Reconstruction Finance Corp. of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, chaired by Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas. The Subcommittee conducted an inquiry into the lending policies and internal procedures of the RFC.

As a staff director Mr. Herz supervised the work of auditors, investigators and other staff members and helped plan and organize the Subcommittee's executive sessions and public hearings.

Mr. Herz also participated in and supervised numerous other projects for the Government or involving governmental functions. He held memberships and committee posts in professional organizations including the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the District of Columbia Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the American Accounting Association and the National Association of Accountants.

In addition, he belonged to the Financial Executives Institute, the National Security Industrial Association, the Washington Board of Trade and the Academy of Political Science.

**HISTORY AND PUBLIC POLICY**

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the distinguished Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and former White House presidential adviser, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., recently delivered a thoughtful lecture on the interpretation of history as a factor in the formulation of public policy.

Speaking at the Institute of Contemporary History in London on May 31, 1966, Mr. Schlesinger warns, with special force, of the danger of drawing false analogies between historical events. He convincingly discards the notion that the 1938 lesson of Munich is a proper justification of our present military venture in Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Schlesinger's lecture, entitled "History and Public Policy," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the lecture was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**HISTORY AND PUBLIC POLICY**

(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)

I want to talk a little this afternoon about the way statesmen use history—or are used by it. As one who is by profession an historian and has been by accident a government official, I have long been fascinated and perplexed by the interaction between history and public decision. Because I find this problem both elusive and tricky, I can hope to do no more than submit preliminary observations to you today.

It is elusive because, if one excludes charismatic politics—the politics of the prophet and the medicine man—one is bound to conclude that all thought which leads to decisions of public policy is in essence historical. Public decision in rational politics necessarily implies a guess about the future derived from the experience of the past. It implies an expectation, or at the very least a hope, that certain actions will produce tomorrow the same sort of results they produced yesterday. This guess about the future may be based on a general theory of historical change, as with the Marxists; or it may be based on specific analogies drawn from the past; or it may be based on an unstated and intuitive sense of the way things happen. But, whatever it is based on, it involves, explicitly or implicitly, an historical judgment.

And the problem is tricky because, when explicit historical judgments intervene, one immediately encounters a question which is, in the abstract, insoluble: is the history invoked really the source of policies, or is it the source of arguments designed to vindicate policies adopted for other reasons? Moreover, even when history is in some sense the source of policies, the lessons of history are generally so ambiguous that "other reasons" are often free to determine the choice between alternative historical interpretations. Thus in France between the wars Reynaud and Mandel drew one set of conclusions from the First World War, Bonnet and Laval another. Yet one cannot, on the other hand, reduce the function of history in public policy to that of mere rationalization. For historical models acquire a life of their own. Once a statesman begins to identify the present with the past, he may in time be carried further than he intends by the bewitchment of analogy.

However hard it may be to define with precision the role of history in public policy, it is evident that this role stands or falls on the utility of history as a means of prediction. This is a point, it should immediately be said, on which professional historians have few illusions among themselves. They well understand that they study history for its own sake—for the intellectual and aesthetic fulfillment they find in the disciplined attempt to construct the past—and for no other reason. And they know better than outsiders that historians are rarely wiser than anyone else about the choices of public policy.



Still, in justifying ourselves to society, we sometimes invite arguments of a statelier sort: particularly the argument that knowledge of the past can throw light on the future. In what sense is this argument true? Why and how should history help us to foretell the shape of things to come? Because presumably history repeats itself enough to make possible a range of historical generalization. Many historians, of course—perhaps most—reject the idea that generalization is the purpose of history. We all respond, in Marc Bloch's phrase, to "the thrill of learning singular things." Indeed, it is the commitment to concrete reconstruction as against abstract generalization—to life as against laws—which distinguishes history from sociology. Yet, on the other hand, as Crane Brinton once put it, "the doctrine of the absolute uniqueness of events in history seems nonsense." And even historians who are skeptical of attempts to discern a final and systematic order in history must acknowledge the existence of a variety of uniformities and recurrences. There can be no question that generalizations about the past, defective as they may be, are possible—and that they can strengthen the capacity of statesmen to deal with the future.

So historians have long since identified a life-cycle of revolution which, if properly apprehended, might have spared us misconceptions about the Russian Revolution—first, about its good will and, later, when we abandoned belief in its good will, about the fixity and permanence of its fanatical purpose—and which, if consulted today, might save us from the notion that the Chinese Revolution will be forever cast in its present mold. Historical generalizations in a number of areas—the processes of economic development, for example, or the impact of industrialization and urbanization or the effect of population growth or the influence of climate or sea power or the frontier or the circulation of political elites or entrepreneurial innovation—will enlarge the wisdom of the statesman, giving his responses to the crisis of the moment perspective, depth and a more thoughtful sense of the direction and flow of events.

I am happy, of course, that history can make these claims. But honesty constrains me to call attention to the special character of these historical generalizations. They are nearly all generalizations about massive social and intellectual movements over a considerable period of time. They make large-scale, long-term prediction possible. But they do not justify small-scale, short-term prediction. For short-run prediction is the prediction of detail; and, given the complex structure of social events, the difficulty of anticipating the intersection or collision of different events and the irreducible mystery, if not invincible freedom, of individual decision, there are simply too many variables to make precise prediction possible. History, in short, can answer questions after a fashion at long range. It cannot answer questions with confidence at short range. Alas, policy makers are rarely interested in the long run—"in the long run," as Keynes used to say, "we are all dead"—and the questions they put to history are thus most often the questions which history is least qualified to answer.

Yet every day around the planet great decisions are being made—or at least rationalized—in terms of short-run historical estimates. The whole Marxist world, of course, is sworn to a determinist view of the future, according to which fixed causes produce fixed effects and mankind is moving along a predestined path through predestined stages to a single predestined conclusion. For the Marxists, history has become a positive model: it prescribes not only for the long but for the short run, not only strategy but tactics—the immediate policies to be favored,

courses pursued, action taken. It is a tribute to the devotion of Marxists, if hardly to their intelligence, that they have remained so indefatigably loyal to their metaphysics in spite of the demonstrated limits of Marxism as a system of prediction.

For, if any thesis was central to the Marxist vision of history, it was that the process of modernization, of industrialization, of social and economic development, would infallibly and inexorably carry every nation from feudalism through capitalism to communism: that the communist society would be the inevitable culmination of the development process. Thus Marx contended that, the more developed a country was, the more prepared it was for communism, and that communism in consequence must come first to the most industrialized nations. In fact, communism has come only to nations in a relatively early stage of development, like Russia and China, and it has come to such nations precisely as a means to modernization, not as a consequence of it. Instead of being the climax of the development process, the end of the journey, communism is now revealed as a technique of social discipline which a few countries in early stages of development have adopted in the hope of speeding the pace of modernization. Instead of the ultimate destination toward which all societies are ineluctably moving, communism now appears, as W. W. Rostow has suggested, a phenomenon of the transition from stagnation to development. Modernization, as it proceeds, evidently carries nations not toward Marx but away from Marx—and this would appear true even of the Soviet Union itself.

History thus far has refuted the central proposition in Marx's system of prediction. And it has also refuted important corollary theses—notably the proposition that the free economic order could not possibly last; that it was doomed to perish of its own inner contradictions. In defiance of this basic dogma, free society in the developed world has rarely displayed more creativity and vitality than it does today. Indeed, it is casting as powerful a spell on the intellectuals and the youth of the communist world as the communist world cast on us during the depression thirty years ago.

Why did Marx go wrong here? His forecast of the inevitable disintegration of free society was plausibly based on the laissez-faire capitalism of the mid-19th century. This devil-take-the-hindmost economic order did very likely contain the seeds of its own destruction—especially in those tendencies, pronounced irreversibly by Marx, toward an ever-widening gap between rich and poor, alleged to guarantee the progressive impoverishment of the masses, and toward an ever-increasing frequency and severity of structural economic crisis, alleged to guarantee the progressive instability of the system. But the Marxist vision did not allow for two things: the extraordinary and growing success of the free economic order as a mechanism of production; and, equally important, the reform of classical capitalism through the invention of the affirmative democratic state.

Here the Marxists were undone by ideology. The state, they believed, could never be anything but the executive committee of the capitalist class: dogma told them that those who owned the economy must own the state, and the state could therefore never act against their desires or interests. Yet fifteen years before the Communist Manifesto an American President, Andrew Jackson, had already suggested that the state in a democratic society, far from being the obedient instrument of the possessors, could become the means by which those whom Jackson called the "humble members of society" might begin to redress the balance of social power against those whom Hamilton had

called the "rich and well-born." Thus the 20th century: while the economic machine drowned the revolution in consumers' goods, the affirmative state, undertaking a course of piecemeal intervention in the economy, brought about both a relative redistribution of wealth, defeating Marx's prediction of the immiseration of the poor, and a relative stabilization of the economy, defeating Marx's prediction of ever-deepening cyclical crisis.

So the Marxist prophecy of a single destiny for mankind missed in both its parts: in its prediction of the irresistible breakdown of the free economy; and in its prediction of the irresistible triumph of communism as the fulfillment of the development process. In spite of its many subsidiary insights and successes, Marxism must surely stand in our time as the spectacular failure both of history as prophecy and of the resort to history as a positive model for policy. The failure, indeed, has been so complete that today Marxists revile each other in seeking the true meaning of the most elementary doctrines, and the more fanatical stand Marx on his head, proclaiming against his whole theory of development the priority of the countryside against the cities.

Yet the democratic world is hardly in a position to take too much satisfaction from the collapse of Marxism. It is true that our intellectual heritage—empirical, pragmatic, pluralistic, competitive—has happily inoculated us against rigid, comprehensive and absolute systems of historical interpretation. But, though we may reject the view of history as metaphysically set and settled, we seem at times to cherish our own forms of historical determination—even if we invoke history less as theology than as analogy. This is only a marginal advantage. The argument by analogy can generate a certitude almost as mischievous as the argument by total determinism.

For the democratic policy-makers, history generally serves as a negative rather than a positive model: it instructs us, not in the things we must do, like Marxism, but in the things we must not do—unless we wish to repeat the folly of our ancestors. Thus we have taken very much to heart the warning that generals always fight the last war. So a great deal of the diplomacy of the Second World War was inspired, so far as the United States was concerned, by a passion to avoid the errors of the First. The American insistence on the doctrine of 'unconditional surrender' in 1943 sprang from the belief that the failure to get unconditional surrender in 1918 encouraged the stab-in-the-back myth and stimulated the revival of German nationalism. The American obsession with the United Nations came from the conviction that the failure to join the League of Nations had made the Second World War possible. The American readiness to make concessions to the Soviet Union, as Professor E. R. May has suggested, was based in part on an analogy with Clemenceau's France. The American President viewed the Soviet Union as a nation which, having lived in permanent insecurity, could be expected like France 25 years earlier, to value security above almost anything else. "Roosevelt," Professor May has perceptively written, "was determined to see Stalin's point of view as Wilson had not seen Clemenceau's. He was determined that, insofar as possible, the Soviet Union should have the guarantees it wanted and should not be forced into the sullen self-preoccupation of the France of Poincaré."

So too, in the years since the Second World War, the policy consciousness, at least in Britain and the United States, has been dominated by the Munich analogy—the generalization, drawn from the attempt to accommodate Hitler in 1938, that appeasement always assures new aggression. I trust that a graduate student some day will write a

doctoral essay on the influence of Munich analogy on the subsequent history of the 20th century. Perhaps in the end he will conclude that the multitude of errors committed in the name of Munich may almost exceed the original error of 1938. Certainly Munich was a tragic mistake, and its lesson was that the appeasement of a highly wound-up and heavily-armed totalitarian state in the context of a relatively firm and articulated continental equilibrium of power was likely to upset the balance and make further aggression inevitable. But to conclude from this that all attempts to avert war by negotiation must always be Munichs is wrong. No one understood this better than the greatest contemporary critic of Munich. An historian himself, Winston Churchill well understood the limits of historical analogy. As he defined the issue in his chapter on Munich in "The Gathering Storm":

"It may be well here to set down some principles of morals and action which may be a guide in the future. No case of this kind can be judged apart from its circumstances. . . .

"Those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp and clearcut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the majority of instances, they may be right, not only morally but from a practical standpoint. . . .

"How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands! How many misunderstandings which led to war could have been removed by temporizing! How often have countries fought cruel wars and then after a few years of peace found themselves not only friends but allies!"

Sixteen years after Munich President Eisenhower wrote Churchill, "If . . . Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists, the ultimate effect on our and your global strategy and position . . . could be disastrous. . . . We failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson?" Eisenhower was invoking the Munich analogy to persuade the British to join the Americans in backing the French in Indochina. I need not remind this audience that Churchill was unmoved by Eisenhower's argument. He saw no useful parallel between Hitler, the man on the bicycle who could not stop, a madman commanding vast military force and requiring immediate and visible success, and the ragged bands and limited goals of Ho Chi Minh. Nor could he see any useful parallel between Europe, a developed continent with well-defined national frontiers, interests and identities and a highly-organized equilibrium of power, and Southeast Asia, an underdeveloped subcontinent filled with fractious states in vague, chaotic and unpredictable revolutionary ferment. So Churchill rejected Eisenhower's analogy—which did not, of course, prevent Churchill's successor as Prime Minister two years later from seeing Nasser and the Middle East in terms of 1938 and committing his nation to the Suez adventure. This time it was Eisenhower who rejected the Munich analogy.

Today the same analogy haunts us again, echoing in the corridors of Washington, with China cast in the role of Nazi Germany. "In the forties and fifties," President Johnson has said, "we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of those threatened by aggression. Now the center of attention has shifted to another part of the world where

aggression is on the march. Our stand must be as firm as ever." The instrument of this aggression, we are told, is the war of national liberation. If this technique is permitted to succeed in Vietnam, it will be tried elsewhere. If it is defeated in Vietnam, the Chinese will know that we will not let it succeed in other countries and they will have to reconsider their policies. As Adlai Stevenson put it in a letter published after his death, "I do not think that the idea of Chinese expansionism is so fanciful that the effort to check it is irrational. . . . My hope in Vietnam is that relatively small-scale resistance now may establish the fact that changes in Asia are not to be precipitated by outside force. This was the point in the Korean War. This is the point of the conflict in Vietnam." The Secretary of State has even compared the recent manifesto by the Chinese Defense Minister, Marshal Lin Biao, to *Mein Kampf*.

This is not the place to comment on the Vietnam riddle—except to suggest that it is not to be solved by bad historical analogies. I see no evidence, for example, that we face in Southeast Asia a premeditated and coordinated plan of Chinese aggression for which the Viet Cong constitute the spearhead, nor do the Chinese appear to have the overwhelming military power or the pent-up mania for immediate expansion which would justify comparison with Hitler. As for the Lin Biao document, a careful reading shows that, far from being a Chinese blueprint for revolution around the earth, it is a message to guerrilla movements in other lands that they are on their own. But the fact that the analogy is invalid does not necessarily invalidate every aspect of the policy. I would, for example, be opposed to any precipitate American withdrawal from Vietnam. I strongly support President Johnson's objective of a negotiated settlement, and it is common sense to recognize that the other side will not negotiate so long as it thinks it can win.

My point rather is to suggest the persistence of the cast of mind which seeks to make policy through stereotype, through—historical generalization wrenched illegitimately out of the past and imposed mechanically on the future—and does so in face of Churchill's warning: "No case of this kind can be judged apart from its circumstances." I well remember President Kennedy expressing to me after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 his fear that people would conclude from his victory that all we would have to do thereafter in dealing with the Communists was to be tough and they would collapse. The missile crisis, he pointed out, had three distinctive features: it took place in an area where we enjoyed local conventional superiority, where Soviet national security was not directly engaged and where the Russians lacked a case which they could convincingly sustain before the world. Things would be different, he said, if the situation were one where the Communists had the local superiority, where their national security was directly engaged and where they could persuade themselves and others they were in the right. Kennedy, who, like Churchill, had the skeptical mind of a first-class historian, was without illusion about the infallibility of historical analogy. Or, as Mark Twain put it in *Pudd'n'head Wilson*, "We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it—and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove lid again—and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one any more."

In confronting the choices of our own time, our leaders would be well advised to emulate this skepticism. For history offers us no short cut to clairvoyance. If history teaches us anything, it is rather that the future is full of surprises and outwits all our certitudes. If 25 years ago, in May 1941, a speaker had predicted that before the end

of the decade of the forties Germany and Japan would be well on the way to becoming close friends and allies of Britain and the United States, he would have been considered mad. If 15 years ago, in May 1950, as the Russians and Chinese were signing their 30 year pact of amity and alliance, a speaker had predicted that by the end of the fifties they would be at each other's throats, he too would have been considered mad. The chastening fact is that many of the pivotal events of our age were wholly unforeseen: from the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Tito-Stalin quarrel of years ago to such events in today's newspapers as the anti-communist upsurge in Indonesia and the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana—and his resurrection in Guinea.

Occasionally I read in the press that leading political figures in Washington are shaping their actions today by calculations with regard to the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972. I am sure that these men themselves are under no delusion about the hopelessness of such an undertaking. 1972 is tonight as far away from us as 1960—and no one reflecting on the unpredictability of the last six years in the United States could sensibly suppose that the next six are going to be any more predictable. I have often thought that a soothsayer trying to forecast the next three American Presidents in early 1940 would hardly have named as the first President after Roosevelt a man who was then an obscure back-bench senator from Missouri, anticipating defeat by Governor Lloyd Stark in the Democratic primaries; as the second, an unknown lieutenant colonel in the United States Army; and, as the third, a kid still at college. Yet that sequence began to unfold in less time than between now and 1972.

The salient fact about the historical process, so far as the short run is concerned, is its inscrutability. One must bear this in mind, I believe, when asked to accept drastic decisions now on the basis of someone's speculation as to what the behavior of Communist China will be a dozen years from now. In its coarsest form, this is the argument that we must have a showdown with China before it gets the bomb. This is the old preventive-war thesis we used to hear so often in the late forties; yet I do not think anyone can rationally contend that we would be better off today had we dropped the bomb on Russia twenty years ago. Having been wrong so often in the past, how can we be so sure we have achieved such infallibility now that we would risk the future of the world on a guess?

Who can possibly predict the course the Chinese Revolution will take in the years ahead? The study of revolution has shown us that the emotional and doctrinal pitch of revolutions waxes and wanes; that, while revolutions at first may devour their children in the end the children sometimes devour the revolutions that even totalitarian revolutions fall at total mass indoctrination; that a successful revolution begins to develop a stake in the status quo; that post-revolutionary generations have their own identities and aspirations; that the possession of a major nuclear arsenal has thus far had a sobering effect on the possessor; that nations follow their historic interests much more faithfully than they do their ideologies; and that there is no greater error than to try and deduce the policy of future from the rhetoric of the present. Nor does the example of Hitler and *Mein Kampf* change this. Hitler was indeed the man on the bicycle; he had to keep moving; the Nazi revolution never got beyond the first messianic phase; its nature condemned it to *Götterdämmerung*. We must not forget that the Chinese revolutionary regime has already lasted five years longer than the whole life of the Third Reich—and we have seen in the case of the Soviet Union the permutation and erosion



time and national interest have worked on what were once thought to be final motives and permanent objectives. With an equation so overflowing with variables, how can any one forecast now the behavior of China twenty years from now?

History, in short, offers the statesman a broad and indispensable sense of the massive movements. But it does not give him a detailed forecast of particular relationships or policies. Too often it equips his decisions with good rather than real reasons, holding out a mirror in which he contentedly sees his own face. This is not an argument against the knowledge of history; it is an argument against the shallow knowledge of history. The single analogy is never enough to penetrate a process so cunningly compounded not only of necessity but of contingency, fortuity, ignorance, accident, chance and luck. And the statesman who is sure that he can divine the future invites his own retribution. "The hardest strokes of heaven," Herbert Butterfield has written, "fall in history upon those who imagine that they can control things in a sovereign manner, playing providence not only for themselves but for the far future—reaching out into the future with the wrong kind of farsightedness, and gambling on a lot of risky calculations in which there must never be a single mistake."

What, then, should be the impact of history on policy? What has history to offer the statesman? Richard Goodwin, who served Presidents Kennedy and Johnson so well as a White House Special Assistant, has suggested two cautions:

"First, at every step you have to leave as many options open as possible and decide as little as possible; because you may be wrong, you have to leave yourself with opportunities to change your mind, to make different decisions in the future.

"Secondly, since almost all important policy judgments are speculative, you must avoid risking too much on the conviction that you are right."

Of course, agnosticism about the future cannot be permitted to sever the nerve of action in the present, but present action must confront the concrete situation and the specific circumstance. The curse of international affairs is the statesman who sees himself as philosopher and moralist—we have had some such in Washington—and proposes to resolve all questions according to a higher law visible only to himself and others of the *illuminati*. Let us pledge ourselves to an economy of means, renounce self-righteousness and not try to settle questions which do not need to be settled. Your countrymen and mine find it especially hard to forsake the pleasures of preaching to lesser breeds, but it still might be worth the effort for both of us. The hard fact is that with all our superiority, we cannot intelligently base decisions on a non-existent chart of the future; so we might as well stick to what we know.

I read the other day a sagacious letter written 70 years ago by the young Winston Churchill to a New York politician of the time, Bourke Cockran. "The duty of government," Churchill said, "is to be first of all practical. I am for makeshifts and expediency. I would like to make the people who live on this world at the same time as I do better fed and happier generally. If incidentally I benefit posterity—so much the better—but I would not sacrifice my own generation to a principle however high or a truth however great."

Such an approach may seem too modest—even, perhaps, too cynical—for those ideological statesmen whose self-righteousness has adorned our age—those confident moralists prepared with the deepest conscience and commitment to sacrifice their generation on the altar of their own metaphors. But his-

tory, never wholly silent, raises questions about the infallibility of their historical models, whether positive or negative—questions about both the all-encompassing ideology and the single analogy. Far from enabling us to look piercingly into the future, history, if we read it aright, offers us an even more valuable gift: it makes us—or should make us—understand the extreme difficulty, the intellectual peril, the moral arrogance of supposing that the future will yield itself so easily to us.

Properly understood, history must lead statesmen to a profound and humbling sense of human frailty—to a recognition of the fact, so often and so tragically destructive of our most sacred certitudes, that the possibilities of history are far richer and more various than the human intellect is likely to conceive—this; and the final understanding that, despite the limitations of our knowledge and the obscurity of our situation, we are never relieved from the necessity of meeting our responsibilities. Freedom and fatality: still the essence of the human condition.

#### MORE DISSENT ON VIETNAM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the dissent from our policies in southeast Asia continues—and properly so. It is rising. It takes the form of analyses of official presentations and of recommendations for new and untried approaches to a cessation of the slaughter and to peace.

A pertinent example of the former is found in Walter Lippmann's column entitled "An Old Slogan," published in the Washington Post of July 26.

An example of the latter is the leading editorial, entitled "New Opportunity in Vietnam," published in the New York Times of July 26.

I ask unanimous consent that these items be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article and editorial were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, July 26, 1966]

TODAY AND TOMORROW: AN OLD SLOGAN  
(By Walter Lippmann)

Campaigning in the Middle West the President has used as one of his main theses the cry that the war in Vietnam is a war to end wars like the one in Vietnam. "If guerrilla warfare succeeds in Asia," he said, "it can also succeed in Africa and Latin America as well." This is precisely what we all said during the First World War. That war was "a war to end war." To hear that old slogan brought out again is, to say the least, creepy. For not only did the First World War not end war, as a matter of fact it sowed the ground for the Second World War.

Presumably the President means what he is saying. But it is hard to think that anyone can believe that the outcome in Vietnam will determine whether there are guerrilla wars "in Africa and Latin America," or even in other parts of Asia. Are we really supposed to believe that the future of guerrilla warfare, that is to say of rebellion, will be determined by what happens in Vietnam?

What is the connection between the guerrilla wars waged in Ireland, Palestine, Armenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Crete, Algeria, the Congo? Were not these uprisings separate events? How can anyone deceive himself with the notion that uprisings all over the globe have some kind of underground common instigator and that they can be suppressed and discouraged by what happens in one small corner of the world?

Fifty years ago when the cry of "a war to end war" was first heard, it was used to inspire people who, themselves remote from the fighting, needed a motive to keep on with the battle. The slogan was invented by an Englishman to arouse the insular British and the isolationist Americans who, not being under fire, saw no clear vital interests which they were defending.

Mr. Johnson has dusted off the old war slogan because it is not easy to prove to the American people that they are fighting for a vital interest of the United States. In the First World War the United States did have a vital interest, which was to prevent the conquest of Great Britain and France and to keep open the Atlantic connection with Europe. This was a difficult thing to explain in the excitement of a war, and in lieu of a true explanation of the issues of the war we fell back upon the slogan of a war to end war.

In Asia the United States does indeed have a vital interest in preventing the conquest of the Asian mainland and of the islands and archipelagoes of the western Pacific. But there is no convincing reason for thinking that the war in Vietnam as it has now developed, is vital to the American interests in the world. The American position has always been that our interest in Asia must be defended and promoted without America becoming involved in such a land war as is now raging in Vietnam.

President Johnson sustained his argument about a war to end guerrilla war with loud protestations about the firmness of our intentions to preserve and to defeat guerrilla warfare. Is he sure that what people see happening in Vietnam convinces them of this? Does the deeper and deeper involvement in Vietnam indicate that we would put equal effort into another anti-guerrilla war on some other continent? Or does the Vietnamese affair indicate that we would not be able to fight two or three such wars at the same time?

This is another reason for wanting to believe that this one disagreeable war, this one ever-expanding war, is the last and only war that will have to be fought. But to want to believe this does not make it believable.

[From the New York Times, July 26, 1966]

#### NEW OPPORTUNITY IN VIETNAM

President Ho Chi Minh's statement that there is "no trial in view" for American military prisoners in North Vietnam is a victory for the moral influence of world opinion. That victory transcends the fate of the captive airmen, for it offers hope that common sense and common humanity ultimately may prevail against the ever greater barbarism the war in Vietnam daily inflicts on both sides.

The United States has yielded to the pressure of world opinion in the past by offering peace proposals and twice suspending the bombing of North Vietnam. But this is the first time that Hanoi has shown regard for the opinion of mankind. Its decision to back away from talk of "war crimes trials" follows direct pleas from Secretary General Thant, Pope Paul VI, numerous governments and opinion leaders everywhere, including eighteen liberal American Senators. The hope now must be that reason can prevail on the broader issues of the war itself.

The conflict in Vietnam is a political struggle that, in the end, can only be resolved by political means. In politics, timing is of the essence. A number of opportunities to probe the prospects for peace have been neglected in the past. It is vital that the new atmosphere and the new opportunity opened by Hanoi's response on the prisoner issue not be missed as well.

The approach favored by American moderates and long urged by The Times has just

been summed up admirably by Prof. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. One essential element is to stop the Americanization of the war by halting the American buildup in South Vietnam; a quarter of a million American troops is more than enough. The second vital element is a civilian Government in Saigon that can open contact with the insurgent forces. Third, is the need to build an atmosphere conducive to negotiations by tapering off the bombing of North Vietnam. Finally, efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference must be linked with broad diplomatic discussions with Moscow, Paris and other interested states to find a formula for the neutralization and economic development of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Most of all, what is needed is a clear indication that the American objective is not military victory but political settlement. The American ability to escalate the war needs no further demonstration. The need now is to halt the escalation and make a vigorous new effort to achieve peace.

#### DELAWARE STARTS CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT IN SUPREME COURT

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, Wednesday, July 20, may well go down in the history books as one of the most memorable and significant dates in American history.

In an epochal action, the State of Delaware last Wednesday asked the Supreme Court of the United States to declare unconstitutional the system under which all of a State's electoral votes are cast for the presidential candidate drawing the most popular vote, thus destroying the civil rights of those voting in the minority, since their votes in opposition are actually added to the votes cast for the winner so that the entire electoral vote of a State is cast, en bloc, for the victorious candidate.

This unique suit also points out in its highly persuasive brief that the civil rights of all American citizens who should have not only an equal right to vote but who should be entitled to have that vote counted with equality with every other vote cast by every other citizen are seriously impaired and prejudiced by the prevailing method of recording electoral votes. In fact, as it now operates, the electoral system records the single vote of an individual citizen in New York State as having more than 14 times the weight and the importance of the single vote cast by an individual citizen in the State of Delaware. No other factor except the accident of geographic residence provides for the unconscionable disparity in counting and evaluating the votes cast by American citizens for the President and Vice President of their choice.

Mr. President, under the prevailing system only the voters of New York State can be considered as first-class citizens. All other citizens of all other States are relegated downward in their citizenship status with Californians being "almost first-class citizens" and with every individual voter in every other State being markedly a "lower class citizen" until we get down to the smaller States whose citizens have only one-fifth, or one-tenth, or less than one-fourteenth the status and standing of the voter in the State of New York.

In fact, it is exactly as though a citizen in New York State were permitted to vote 14 times for President while a citizen of Delaware were permitted to vote 3 times, since an individual voter in New York State moves 14 electoral votes into the Presidential voting computations while a voter in Delaware by his vote moves only 3 electoral votes into the computations of the electoral college. Similarly, voters of all other States are penalized and downgraded by the inequities and injustices of the present electoral system which the suit of the State of Delaware now seeks to correct by its appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In its memorable decision on the so-called Alabama reapportionment case of June 15, 1964, usually alluded to as Reynolds against Sims, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the prevailing opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren said:

If a State should provide that the votes of citizens of one part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or ten times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted. . . . It is inconceivable that a State law to the effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens in one part of the State would be multiplied by two, five, or ten, while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only at face value, could be constitutionally sustainable.

Mr. President, I submit that it is likewise constitutionally unsustainable to permit citizens voting for President to multiply by as much as 14 their votes cast for President.

Every State in the Union having more than a single member in the House of Representatives has been made a defendant in this suit by the State of Delaware. Already this historic suit is attracting much publicity in the press and periodicals of our Nation. I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in my remarks an article published under a three-column headline in the Minneapolis Tribune of July 21, 1966.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### DELAWARE SUES TO VOID U.S. ELECTORAL SYSTEM

(By Fred P. Graham)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The State of Delaware asked the Supreme Court Wednesday to declare unconstitutional the system under which all of a state's electoral votes are cast for the presidential candidate drawing most of the popular vote.

Invoking the court's original jurisdiction to hear disputes between states, Atty. Gen. David P. Buckson of Delaware brought suit against all the other 49 states and the District of Columbia. However, he directed his legal attack specifically at New York and other states with large blocks of electoral votes.

The suit charged that a citizen of a large state exerted more political influence than a citizen of a small state because, theoretically at least, he is capable of delivering a decisive number of electoral votes.

It asks the high court to extend its one-man, one-vote doctrine to declare unconstitutional the winner-take-all or "unit vote" system of choosing presidential electors.

All states now use the unit vote system, but neither the Constitution nor federal law requires it.

According to the suit, in the early years of the republic a majority of the states used the district system to choose electors.

This method gave an electoral vote to the candidate that carried each congressional district, with each state's two senatorial electoral votes going to the candidate who carried the state.

But a few states were able to exert additional political influence by giving all their electoral votes to the candidate who carried the states, and this forced all the other states to adopt the same system, the suit said.

The result is that at present the electoral votes of the 11 largest states, plus that of any one other state, are enough to win a presidential election. These 11 states are New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, Michigan, New Jersey, Florida, Massachusetts and Indiana.

A majority, of 270 of the 538 electoral votes, is necessary to elect a president.

The defendants were listed in this descending order, extending down to the smallest states. Thus the suit is entitled Delaware v. New York, and is in fact directed at these 11 states.

Buckson said in a news conference that other small states are expected to realign themselves on the plaintiff side of the case.

New York citizens have also benefited unduly from the unit vote system by having a great chance to become president, the suit contends.

Of the 100 men nominated for president or vice president, 24 have been New Yorkers, while no citizen of Delaware has ever been nominated for either office, and Delaware and 35 other states have never had one of their citizens elected president.

"Citizens of these states are as well qualified for national office as are New York's citizens," the suit contended, but they have been overlooked because of "the premium placed upon the strategic location of potential candidates residing in New York and other large states."

In 1960, it pointed out, John F. Kennedy received 67.5 per cent of the combined electoral college votes of Illinois and Indiana when he carried Illinois by a whisker and got its 27 electoral votes. Richard M. Nixon received 51.6 per cent of the combined electoral college votes which got only Indiana's 13 electoral votes.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, there is a fair and objective substitute for the inequitable electoral college situation of which Delaware rightfully complains. A number of us in Congress have for many years been advocating a constitutional amendment which would return this country to the so-called district system of choosing our Presidential electors which was intended by our constitutional forefathers and which, in fact, was used in this Republic during the first several presidential campaigns of this country's history. It was changed to the winner-take-all, en-bloc, method of choosing electors only because some early-day politicians with partisan ambitions had it altered by acts of their State legislatures to secure added political power for their respective States and this, of course, in self-defense compelled other States to follow the new, nonrepresentative pattern.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Senate Joint Resolution 12, which is now before Congress, be printed at this point in my remarks. It



is to be noted it has widespread, bipartisan support. It has been the subject of much testimony before the so-called Birch Bayh subcommittee studying electoral college reform. In a somewhat different version, it once was approved by a majority of the Senate, but it lacked necessary two-thirds vote at the time. However, additional support has developed for the proposal since that test vote. In my opinion, this so-called district plan, which gives every voter in America—regardless of where he lives—precisely the same "votepower" in the naming of a President solves the evils of the current electoral college system without injecting any new evils of its own. I commend it to the continued study of Congress and the country.

There being no objection, the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 12) was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**S.J. RES. 12**

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article be proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:*

**"ARTICLE —**

**"SECTION 1.** Each State shall choose a number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be chosen an elector.

"The electors to which a State is entitled by virtue of its Senators shall be elected by the people thereof, and the electors to which it is entitled by virtue of its Representatives shall be elected by the people within single-electror districts established by the legislature thereof; such districts to be composed of compact and contiguous territory, containing as nearly as practicable the number of persons which entitled the State to one Representative in the Congress; and such districts when formed shall not be altered until another census has been taken. Before being chosen elector, each candidate for the office shall officially declare the persons for whom he will vote for President and Vice President, which declaration shall be binding on any successor. In choosing electors of President and Vice President the voters in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature, except that the legislature of any State may prescribe lesser qualifications with respect to residence therein.

"The electors shall meet in their respective States, fill any vacancies in their number as directed by the State legislature, and vote by signed ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for each, excluding therefrom any votes for persons other than those named by an elector before he was chosen, unless one or both of the persons so named be deceased, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the

seat of government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors chosen; and the person having the greatest number of votes for Vice President shall be the Vice President, if such a number be a majority of the whole number of electors chosen.

"If no person voted for as President has a majority of the whole number of electors, then from the persons having the three highest numbers on the lists of persons voted for as President, the Senate and the House of Representatives, assembled and voting as individual Members of one body, shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President; a quorum for such purpose shall be three-fourths of the whole number of the Senators and Representatives, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice; if additional ballots be necessary, the choice on the fifth ballot shall be between the two persons having the highest number of votes on the fourth ballot.

"If no person voted for as Vice President has a majority of the whole number of electors, then the Vice President shall be chosen from the persons having the three highest numbers on the lists of persons voted for as Vice President in the same manner as herein provided for choosing the President. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.

"SEC. 2. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate and the House of Representatives may choose a President or a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

"SEC. 3. This article supersedes the second and fourth paragraphs of section 1, article II, of the Constitution, the twelfth article of amendment to the Constitution and section 4 of the twentieth article of amendment to the Constitution. Except as herein expressly provided, this article does not supersede the twenty-third article of amendment.

"SEC. 4. Electors appointed pursuant to the twenty-third article of amendment to this Constitution shall be elected by the people of such district in such manner as the Congress may direct. Before being chosen as such elector, each candidate shall officially declare the persons for whom he will vote for President and Vice President, which declaration shall be binding on any successor. Such electors shall meet in the district and perform the duties provided in section 1 of this article.

"SEC. 5. This article shall take effect on the 1st day of July following its ratification."

**COMMERCE AND CONSERVATION IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN**

Mr. HART. Mr. President, the Great Lakes Commission at its semiannual meeting in Milwaukee in May adopted a number of resolutions relating to commerce and conservation in the Great Lakes Basin. I ask unanimous consent that the texts of these resolutions be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolutions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**RESOLUTION REGARDING IMPOSITION OF TOLLS AND USER CHARGES ON THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY**

Whereas the Great Lakes Commission by its resolution of January 17, 1964 stated it

was opposed in principle to the imposition of tolls and user charges on the St. Lawrence Seaway, and

Whereas there is proposed by the American and Canadian entities that there be an increase in St. Lawrence Seaway tolls and imposition of lockage charges on the Welland Canal, and

Whereas such increase in tolls and lockage charges are not in the best interests of the commerce of the Great Lakes and are unfair burdens thereon: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That it is the recommendation of the Seaway, Navigation and Commerce Committee to the Great Lakes Commission that the Commission take a position in respect to commercial navigation: (1) that it is opposed to any increase in St. Lawrence Seaway tolls at this time, (2) that it is opposed to the existence of any St. Lawrence Seaway tolls of any kind and that they should be removed, (3) that it is opposed to any user charges on any inland waterway, and (4) that it is opposed to lockage charges on the Welland Canal.

Approved May 26, 1966.

GREAT LAKES COMMISSION.

**RESOLUTION OF THE POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE: RESOLUTION REGARDING ALEWIFE CONTROL IN THE GREAT LAKES**

*Be it resolved*, by the Pollution Control Committee, That the Great Lakes Commission request the Department of Interior to conduct a survey development action program for the effective control of alewife from the Great Lakes.

Approved May 26, 1966.

GREAT LAKES COMMISSION.

**RESOLUTION ON LAKE REGULATION STUDIES OF THE GREAT LAKES**

The Great Lakes Commission recognizes the historic importance of a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Report on Lake Regulation, dated December 3, 1965, in which facilities for reducing fluctuations of levels for Lakes Michigan, Huron, and Erie are deemed possible from an engineering standpoint.

The Corps report does not include total up-to-date benefits, but is indicated that the proposed project is not economically feasible under present methods for computing benefits and costs.

New methods for determination of feasibility are necessary. This position is based on recognition that:

Many benefits which are not included in present-day evaluating practices should be considered in a project of such scope as levels stabilization of the Great Lakes.

Evaluation of this project on a 50-year project life is not in the best interests of Canada and the United States. The project obviously should be evaluated on at least 100 years of project life.

Construction costs generally have risen at the rate of three or four percent per year and probably will continue to rise at this or a greater rate. Delay will result in much higher final costs. Savings that would result from early realization of the project deserve very careful study. It is reasonable to expect that benefits from stabilization will increase at an even greater rate than heretofore contemplated, and will include socio-political benefits essential to the solution of the long range North American water supply problem.

The Great Lakes Commission believes that:

Prudence and foresight dictate that fluctuations in lake levels under natural or controlled conditions must be reduced and contained within reasonable ranges of levels.

Vastly increased usage of the Great Lakes for all water resources purposes will occur over the next 100 years.

A Great Lakes level stabilization project such as that now envisioned offers unique problems which have seldom been placed in

the hands of any responsible agency for engineering and economic solution.

In addition, the Great Lakes Commission believes a number of other factors call for more intensive investigation. They concern:

Need for further regulation of Lake Superior to provide additional storage to be used more directly in control of levels of the lakes below Superior.

Inclusion of potential water supply benefits in the levels studies due to the fact that the Great Lakes will be the source of huge volumes for such purposes both in Canada and the United States.

More extensive criteria for determining feasibility that can be attained by agreement between the United States and Canada, with participation by the eight bordering states of the United States and the two bordering provinces of Canada.

Channel rectification and construction of regulatory works in such a project undoubtedly will require 10 to 20 years for completion.

Agencies are functioning now which are exceptionally capable of accomplishing such a project, based on all prospective benefits.

Therefore, be it resolved, that the Great Lakes Commission commends the splendid work accomplished to date by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and recognizes fully the value of the organizing and planning now being undertaken by the Corps and the International Joint Commission to correct the present undesirable water level fluctuations of the Great Lakes.

The Great Lakes Commission respectfully requests the International Joint Commission to expedite its work on the water levels Reference and to foster new and modern methods for attaining a feasible, comprehensive project for levels stabilization of all the Great Lakes as soon as possible.

Approved May 26, 1966.

GREAT LAKES COMMISSION.

#### RESOLUTION REGARDING S. 2720, THE FISH CONCENTRATE BILL

Whereas fish protein concentrate offers great promise in helping to meet the world's nutritional needs; and

Whereas the Great Lakes have a tremendous population of little-used fish, particularly alewife in Lakes Michigan and Huron; and

Whereas the size and availability of the alewife stock and its availability at reasonable cost have been well established by systematic explorations and biological evaluations; and

Whereas the Congress is currently considering S. 2720, the fish concentrate bill; and

Whereas section 2(a) of this bill would authorize the construction of five demonstration plants to experiment in the use of other types of fish and other extraction processes relating to the preparation of fish protein concentrate: Now, therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Great Lakes Commission endorse this legislation and respectfully urge the Congress to establish one of the demonstration plants in the Great Lakes area with the proviso that adequate waste treatment facilities would be included and constructed as an integral part of the demonstration plant; be it further

*Resolved*, That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the members of Congress representing the Great Lakes states.

Approved May 26, 1966.

GREAT LAKES COMMISSION.

#### RESOLUTION REGARDING FEDERAL EMERGENCY WETLANDS ACQUISITION PROGRAM

Whereas the Federal Emergency Wetlands Acquisition Program expires on June 30, 1968; and

Whereas less than half of the funds authorized by Congress under this program

have been expended in the acquisition of nesting habitat for waterfowl; and

Whereas there is an urgent need to preserve these wetlands so vital to the perpetuation of waterfowl on the North American continent; and

Whereas these lands are being permanently converted to other uses with a resulting decline in waterfowl production habitat; and

Whereas the lands and waters of the Great Lakes basin are a part of the waterfowl flyway with waterfowl hunting being an important segment of the recreational opportunity in the region: Now, therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Great Lakes Commission respectfully urges the Congress to extend this program; and be it further

*Resolved*, That the Emergency Wetlands Acquisition Act be amended to include a state grant-in-aid program as a means of facilitating the early acquisition of needed lands.

Approved May 26, 1966.

GREAT LAKES COMMISSION.

#### THE AIRLINES STRIKE

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, the current mechanics' strike against five domestic airlines, which normally carry 60 percent of air travelers and about 70 percent of airfreight, already has cost Hawaii millions of dollars in tourist and related income, as well as losses in agricultural exports.

The adverse effects are fast pushing out into many areas of Hawaii's economy, causing unemployment, loss of revenue to hotels, restaurants, tour bus and rent-a-car operators, retail shops, farm producers and exporters, and loss of taxes to the State of Hawaii.

Even should the strike end today, and it is not expected to end today, the harsh impact on the people of Hawaii will continue for some time.

News articles in last Sunday's Star-Bulletin and Advertiser detail the economic losses already suffered in Hawaii and the gloomy outlook for the future.

I ask unanimous consent that these articles be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin & Advertiser, July 24, 1966]

#### ISLES FEAR PINCH WILL OUTLAST STRIKE

(By Wallace Mitchell)

The airlines strike that already has cost Hawaii's economy millions of dollars may have a carry-over impact even after the jets are flying again.

Potential Mainland visitors now making vacation plans are shying away from making reservations for a Hawaiian holiday because of the uncertainty of the strike's duration, according to Robert C. Allen, executive vice president of the Hawaii Visitors Bureau.

"A number of agents on the Mainland are tearing their hair out because they're getting cancellations, although they're trying to hold their customers," Allen said.

"This we are going to feel appreciably after the strike is over because many people who would be available to visit here are making other plans at this time. They will go someplace else."

Hotels, restaurants and night spots, tour operators and resort and souvenir shops that cater to tourists already are feeling the pinch caused by the 10,000-visitors-a-week slump the strike has caused.

The effect creeps through the entire island economy as bellmen, waitresses and other service personnel in the tourist industry find themselves with less money to spend than they normally expect during this peak tourist season.

"As of tomorrow," Allen said, "the room availability on Oahu will be about 1,500 rooms."

"That will drop us down to about 85 per cent occupancy over-all at Waikiki Beach at a period when it should be 100 per cent—and of course the decline will continue well beyond that."

"On actual passenger count, as of July 20 we had lost about 10,000 visitors and we figure from here on in we'll lose 10,000 a week."

"We are almost 15 per cent behind last month and 27 per cent behind our projections for July. We've had, this month, 53,857 visitors through July 20 while last year the figure was 63,166."

"We're prepared with a program for dispersing information electronically as rapidly as we can once the strike is over on room availabilities to all the carriers and major hotel chains, which we hope will turn this tide around and get us back in business as rapidly as possible."

The rent-a-car and tour bus operators report staggering revenue losses.

"Based on our pre-book reservations from the Mainland, our business is down 50 per cent," reported Dan DiSesa, comptroller for Hertz Rent-a-Car.

"We do about half of our business at the airports, and this is business we don't think we'll ever regain. On Maui and the Big Island we're really hurting."

Duane Probst, manager of National U-Rent, also said his Neighbor Island business had been hit the hardest.

"I would say there's probably been a 35 to 40 per cent drop in business at the airports," he said. "That's just a guess, but it's at least 30 per cent."

"Our airport business just isn't doing it," said James E. Oyer, Avis manager.

"They're doing figures that look like February or March, not July."

A spokesman for Mackenzie Tours estimated business was off at least 30 per cent, and Gray Line Hawaii Ltd. figured the drop at about 10 per cent.

A spokesman for Spencecliff Corp., Ltd., operators of a string of dining and entertainment spots in Honolulu and on Maui, reported business was off about 25 per cent during the past week in their Waikiki places, a little less on Maui.

For the Sheraton chain's Royal Hawaiian, Moana-Surfrider and Princess Kaiulani Hotels, group banquets are down 9 per cent for the first 16 days of the strike and 10 per cent off over-all in anticipated food and beverage sales.

The special event nights at the hotels were reported down by 8 per cent and expected to drop to 20 per cent off pace by the end of the month.

Robert Burns, Kahala-Hilton Hotel executive manager, said food and beverage business there now is off 20 per cent "and it's going to be off more."

"We had a good first-of-the-month business, but I'm sure that the whole month will show a 20 per cent drop."

Room occupancy was about 83 per cent, against an anticipated 100 per cent, Burns said.

This tie-in between food and beverage sales and room occupancy was echoed by Raynor Kinney, executive assistant manager for food and beverage at the Hawaiian Village Hotel.

"Food and beverage revenue depends on the house occupancy—and when that drops, as it has, that revenue drops also," Kinney said.



Shop operators have been unable to get a reading on the strike's impact on their business.

"I think it's a little too early to say," commented Richard H. Wheeler, president of Andrade & Co., Ltd., that has resort shops in the Royal Hawaiian, Moana-Surfrider and Halekulani Hotels as well as one on Kalakaua Ave. and one in the Sheraton-Maui at Kaanapali.

"The only indication we have is that it has been a depressant on the other islands where we have shops.

"We operate four resort shops here on this island—and all those are showing comfortable increases, from 7 to 30 per cent. On Maui we show a decrease at our shop in the Sheraton-Maui.

"But the traffic still is good in Waikiki and the rate of occupancy in the big hotels where we operate still is pretty good."

Mitchell Cerka, vice president and treasurer of McNerny Stores, said he believed the strike is "hurting."

"A continuation of this airline strike will definitely have an adverse effect, particularly in the Waikiki area," Cerka said.

"It is a little too early to draw any firm conclusions at the retail level because we may have as many tourists as we had last year despite the strike.

"But there's no question but what it is hurting. How much, we cannot measure as yet."

A spokesman for Liberty House also said business will suffer if the airlines stay grounded much longer.

"We're such an Island store and our customers are mostly Island people and the percentage of tourists is not high in our total traffic," the spokesman said, "so I don't believe we've noticed it although I imagine we will, like everyone else, if it doesn't end soon."

[From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin & Advertiser, July 24, 1966]  
ON MAUI, THEY'RE HURTING

(By J. B. Johnson)

WAILUKU.—Fewer visitors are arriving on Maui because of the nation's airlines strike—and those who are coming are cutting their trips short to be available for stand-by space at Honolulu, when it opens.

Aloha Airlines here, which said it did not feel the effect of the strike "much" the previous weeks, said: "We are certainly feeling it now."

Hawaiian Airlines estimated a drop of about 3,000 passengers from its prestrike estimates for this past week.

In the U-Drive and tour field, Maui Island Tours said its business was down 20 per cent, while Paschoal's Grayline reported "little effect so far."

Hertz said that rental autos are being returned early so visitors can get back to Honolulu and start making sure of their airline space to the Mainland. Hertz also noted an increase in "no-shows" and a 20 per cent drop in business.

Hotels in the Kaanapali resort area also are experiencing a drop in business, with Sheraton-Maui reporting a loss of about 10 per cent occupancy. A spokesman said the strike "is affecting us quite a bit."

The Kaanapali Hotel had a similar report, while the Royal Lahaina said it still had "pretty good" occupancy.

In central Maui, not too much effect has been felt at the Maui Palms and Maui Hukilau Hotel.

In Hana, occupancy at Hotel Hana-Maui also reported about a 10 per cent decrease in occupancy.

As in the case of the U-drive and tour groups, the hotels also indicated that guests were leaving early in order to return to Honolulu and be available for standby space.

The Maui Chamber of Commerce, concerned about the detrimental effect of the

airlines strike, sent a wire to President Johnson on July 15, asking him to consider intervening. The wire, approved by the Chamber's executive committee said: "Airlines strike detrimental to tourist industry at season's peak. Your considered intervention urgently requested."

As of Friday noon, Acting Maui County Chairman Lanny Morisaki said that the County had taken no action, but he was discussing the matter unofficially with members of the Board of Supervisors.

[From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin & Advertiser, July 24, 1966]

KONA AREA HARDEST HIT ON BIG ISLE

(By Walt Southward and Bette Fay)

HILLO.—The Kona area is suffering most on the Big Isle from the airlines strike.

With the Billfish Tournament concluded, fishermen and their families start returning to Honolulu today, leaving a big void in Kailua-Kona.

William Mielke, manager of the Kona Inn, said: "We've enjoyed a high occupancy during the Billfish Tournament," but hinted that things are looking a little darker already.

Eddie Tavares, manager of the King Kamehameha Hotel, also said the hotel's occupancy rate during the Billfish Tournament was "gratifying," but he admitted he didn't like the look of things for the next few weeks.

Lee Vaughn, manager of the Leialoha Hotel, voiced almost identical sentiments.

Judy Dickie at the "Dolphin" said the hotel's high occupancy won't be affected until the 26th—but after that the strike might begin to hurt.

Among the various shopkeepers in Kona, there was the feeling that money that would normally be spent on gifts was being saved in case visitors had to extend their hotel stays while waiting for transportation.

Jack Mulhull, who owns Kona's Sandal Basket, said Kona is now feeling what Waikiki has been experiencing for some days. Even if the strike ended today, he suggested, the damage already done will affect the economic status of Kona for some time to come.

Elsewhere on the Big Isle, things weren't as good as they might be, but they seemed better than the week before.

A number of firms which reported a large number of no-shows and cancellations a week ago said that the number of house guests has increased this week, and cancellations have decreased.

Typical of the comments was that of Leslie Moore, manager of the Mauna Kea Beach Hotel.

"Our occupancy has increased," Moore said. "We've recovered a little bit. It's almost back to where it was before the strike."

"We're not running full, though. It's taken some off the top, but it's really not too bad now."

Leo Lycurgus, owner of the Hilo Hotel, said, "We still have no-shows, but our business has picked up quite a bit. We're doing much better than we were a week ago."

At the Hilo Hukilau, manager Bill Brown said, "It's not bothering us a bit. We're running about 97 per cent filled."

"Our Honolulu office is really out there selling."

"We expected to start feeling it, but we're not."

At the Naniloa Hotel, manager Bill Davis said, "We're holding out pretty well so far. We're running about 90 per cent, which is slightly below our average. If it continues, I'm sure that figure will come down, though."

[From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin & Advertiser, July 24, 1966]

"THINGS COULD GET WORSE" ON KAUAI

(By Sean O'Neil)

LIHUE.—The prolonged airlines strike is already hurting most of the tourist-connected

businesses on Kauai. And things could get worse.

Some hotels report a serious drop in hotel occupancy; though a few of the hotels aren't doing so badly, considering.

One tour company complains that business has been cut almost in half, while another reports no noticeable drop in volume as of last week.

But everyone on Kauai agrees that the island will be far more prosperous when the strike ends.

"Even when the strike does end, the industry will continue to be affected for at least two weeks," said H. S. Kawakami, Kauai director of the Hawaii Visitors Bureau.

"Things aren't so bad now, but they will worsen and last beyond a settlement. There's no question that the strike is causing a lot of mental anguish."

One certainty is that Kauai is not receiving as many arrivals as is normal for this time of year. Both airlines report that their passenger count is down from pre-strike levels.

"We're maintaining our regular schedule," said Hawaiian Airlines manager Louis T. Self. "But we're not running as many special sections as expected during the summer months."

Glenn Lovejoy, manager of the 360-room Kauai Surf, was one of the few who was bullish. "Actually, we're quite pleased. We're holding up very well," he said.

Lovejoy said the Surf has been running at 95.3 percent capacity for July, "which is even better than we did last July."

He noted that there have been some tour cancellations, but that Pan American has been doing an excellent job handling the unexpected traffic load.

"I can't explain why we're doing so well. Maybe everyone wants to stay at the Surf while they're waiting for a plane reservation."

His optimism was not shared by Bob Lloyd, head of the Prince Kuhio Hotel: "The strike hurts," Lloyd said. "We were down 25 to 30 per cent at the beginning, now we're down to 30 or 35 per cent."

"Oddly enough, tours have been our one bright spot. It appears that the more akamai tour conductors are able to get their people on the planes."

"We have a tour of over 100 in this weekend, but mid-week will look like January."

Hardest hit by the labor dispute appeared to be the ground transportation companies.

John Gilruth, manager of Achors' Gray Line, estimated that his volume is down to 60 per cent of normal.

Said Gilruth, "We've been running only 15 to 20 drivers a day, instead of 25 to 30. In other words, it's very bad."

"Every time we open the mail, we get a stack of cancellations. I've already been in contact with our Congressional representatives about the problem. This hurts the payroll."

On the other hand, Smith's Boat Service, which runs scenic trips up the Waialua River, reported: "We're still loaded; everything's sunny here. We're running a full schedule around the clock."

At the Hanalei Plantation, manager Barry Yap explained, "We dropped off for a couple of days, but we're back up to normal now. We haven't felt any major effects yet."

Then, expressing what might be on everyone else's mind, "But it's like waiting for a storm."

#### HOUSE-SENATE CONFEREES SHOULD MEET SOON ON SCHOOL MILK PROGRAM

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, it has been more than a week since the Senate passed legislation funding the Department of Agriculture's activities for fiscal 1967. At that time \$105 million

was provided for the special milk program for schoolchildren.

Now it is of the utmost importance that the House-Senate conferees meet at an early date to resolve the difference between the \$103 million the House appropriated for the program and the \$105 million appropriated by the Senate. After all, we are now well into fiscal 1967. School food service administrators have to make their plans for the fall semester. The Department of Agriculture has to know what sums they will be working with in promoting the program.

Of course, I hope that the conferees approve the \$105 million for the school milk program provided in the Senate bill. Although I fully expect that additional amounts will have to be provided in a supplemental to fully fund the program, this amount is a start.

However, the most important step the conferees can take is to meet soon so that uncertainties over the 1967 school milk program can be resolved.

### STRIP MINING IN APPALACHIA

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, last October I introduced S. 2688, a bill to regulate present and future strip mining for the conservation and reclamation of surface and strip mined areas. The proposed Mined Lands Conservation Act would provide national protection of the surface resource where strip mining is undertaken.

The act would state Congress' recognition that the mining of minerals by the surface or strip method, both past and present, first, destroys natural beauty; second, damages the terrain for an indefinite period; third, causes erosion of the soil; fourth, contributes to stream pollution; fifth, adversely affects commercial and industrial development; sixth, damages real property; seventh, destroys forests, wildlife habitat, and other natural resources; eighth, menaces the public health and safety; ninth, cannot be made subject to uniform conservation requirements because of differing conditions from area to area; and tenth, the diversity of State regulations, or lack thereof, creates competitive disadvantages for firms operating in a given market area and thereby interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of minerals in commerce.

Mr. President, pursuant to direction by Congress as part of the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, the Secretary of Interior has recently completed an interim report to the Appalachian Regional Commission. The report summarizes the Secretary's findings on the aspects of strip and surface mining in the region that most urgently need attention.

The Secretary's report deals only with the coal fields of Appalachia. His findings point to the need for greater effort in rehabilitating strip mined lands and preventing future desecration of its beauty and surface resources. The conclusions of this report apply equally to all strip mining regions in the country.

The report suggests that society as a whole must shoulder responsibility for past abuses, but the miner and consum-

er must share the future responsibility and cost of conservation and rehabilitation. I agree.

The public now recognizes the need for rehabilitation of damaged lands and resources, and is calling for legislation that will prevent such desecration in the future.

I ask unanimous consent to include in the RECORD at this point the conclusions of the Interim Report of the Study of Strip and Surface Mining in Appalachia, by the Secretary of Interior, to the Appalachian Regional Commission.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the data developed in this study, two broad goals can be defined: to prevent future devastation of the environment while fostering economic growth of the minerals industries, and to alleviate damage caused by past strip and surface mining operations.

It is first necessary to explore the causes of the present situation if one attempts to allocate responsibility for reclaiming past strip- and surface-mined land. The large tracts of unreclaimed land existing today have resulted essentially from past failure to recognize reclamation as a necessary part of the cost of mining and of the products resulting therefrom. Instead of requiring reclamation, society, through ignorance or apathy, accepted the alternatives—erosion, acid drainage, lowered water quality, and other detrimental after-effects—as costs of "progress." Current protests against despoilment of the land imply that now, however, the public is probably willing to pay for the reclamation of strip and surface mined lands. It is soberly realized that some of the past benefits of that "progress" involved deferred costs for which payments have come due. In other words, benefits have already been realized; we are now confronted with deferred social costs from which there is no cheap and easy escape.

For lands mined and left unreclaimed in the past, this former public indifference thus represents what might be considered a cost now payable by the body of our society. But, to avoid sweeping up after tomorrow's miners, it is essential that effective strip mining and reclamation regulations be established. If this is done, reclamation costs will be included in the price paid by consumers, and society will have discharged its responsibility to the future.

Although strip mining for coal has promoted the economy and security of our country, this type of mining has burdened Appalachia with a number of complex problems. Approximately 800,000 acres have been disturbed by strip coal mining in the region. The result has been acid and sediment pollution of the streams, massive slides along outcrops, destruction of forests, damage to watersheds, thousands of acres of land isolated or made hazardous by highwalls, wasted natural resources, health and safety hazards, and impaired aesthetic and economic values. Some excellent reclamation has been accomplished, but most of the damaged acreage has not been adequately reclaimed.

The study has shown a need for Federal aid in remedying the detrimental effects of past mining operations. It is concluded:

That Federal participation with States, counties, municipalities, industry, associations, and private owners will be required to implement a long-range, comprehensive program designed to deal with the adverse effects of past strip and surface mining in the Appalachian region. Two types of projects should be included in such a program.

One is the "basic reclamation" outlined in this report. This would consist of applying corrective measures to past strip-mined lands and abandoned haul roads that are contributing to detrimental off-site conditions in Appalachia. This type of project would be designed primarily to alleviate sediment and acid-pollution of streams, reduce erosion, and provide vegetative cover where the public, rather than individual landowners, would obtain the greatest benefit. For such "basic reclamation" the Federal Government will probably have to bear most of the cost.

The second type of project would include special land-use objectives, such as recreational areas, lakes, industrial and commercial sites, and others which might contribute to the economic growth of the region. Such treatment would result in the enhancement of land values; for such projects the Federal contribution may not have to be as large a percentage of the total cost of reclamation.

The study has also clearly revealed the need for controls to prevent future damage. It is concluded therefore:

That the Appalachian States should establish laws and regulations that will provide sufficient authority to regulate strip and surface mining—insure the reclamation of lands disturbed, or to prohibit such mining if reclamation is not feasible. Should the individual States fail to provide adequate controls within a reasonable period of time, the Congress can be expected to take such steps as may be necessary to protect the public interest.

To discharge the responsibilities of the Federal Government, it is concluded:

That the Federal Government should designate a central agency to administer all Federal activities related to strip and surface mining under a common set of objectives and procedural guidelines, and to correlate such activities with the total Appalachian program. Project planning, development, appraisal (including feasibility determinations), and the provision of technical assistance to Federal land-managing agencies, States, and private owners, also should be functions of the designated agency.

Several Federal agencies have competence in the various scientific disciplines related to the reclamation of strip- and surface-mined lands. Research programs, studies, and field demonstration projects are being conducted on reclamation and other related problems under Federal leadership. Certain agencies specialize in revegetation aspects of reclamation. Others are concerned with acid drainage from surface and underground mines, mine waste products, mine and refuse fires, conservation of resources, water pollution, and recreational values, all of which are interrelated. To provide a balanced program of investigation and corrective action these efforts must be correlated by one responsible agency in the interest of economy and efficiency.

Early reclamation efforts, primarily outside Appalachia, concentrated on reforestation of strip-mined lands. The knowledge and experience acquired has been successfully applied to reclamation projects located in similar environmental surroundings. Appalachia, however, presents complex and unique problems due to different physiographic, climatic, and other characteristics. Present technology does not provide complete solutions to these problems, therefore it is necessary to expand Federal programs, studies, and field demonstrations now being conducted on reclamation and other closely related problems. Specific attention should be given to mining methods and to environmental, technologic, and economic factors.

### FORT SAM HOUSTON NATIONAL CEMETERY

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in



the RECORD a copy of a resolution passed recently by the 2d (Indian Head) Division Club of San Antonio.

The president of the club, Mr. Orbra L. Longley, was courteous enough to furnish me with a copy of the resolution, which concerns the Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery.

A similar resolution was also passed, I might add, by the Retired Service Personnel Association of San Antonio.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**RESOLUTION ON FORT SAM HOUSTON NATIONAL CEMETERY, TEX.**

Whereas there remains within the fenced area of the Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery only about 65 acres of vacant land, enough for about 13,000 graves, and

Whereas the Cemetery is rapidly reaching its burial capacity, and no provision has been made to provide additional land for its expansion, and

Whereas under the existing set-up within a few years there will be no space available to provide a veteran in this area burial in a National Cemetery, and he will be deprived of burial in sacred soil to which he is rightfully entitled under the law and under the historic policy of this Country, and

Whereas there are approximately 18 acres near the golf course and 100 acres at and near toward Dodd Field that have heretofore been reserved for future expansion of the Cemetery, and these 118 acres are now vacant, connecting and adjoining the Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery, and

Whereas it appears the policy in respect to reserving this land has now been changed, and that the Department of the Army has ordered that the present Cemetery will not be expanded beyond its present size now

Therefore be it resolved that the Second (Indian Head) Division Association, San Antonio Branch, in regular meeting held on this the 22d day of May A.D. 1966, does respectfully request the Department of the Army set aside the approximate 118 acres, aforementioned, for future expansion of the Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery, and

Be it further resolved that a copy of this resolution be sent to the National President, Second (Indian Head) Division, Inc.; to the Honorable RALPH W. YARBOROUGH and the Honorable JOHN G. TOWER, United States Senators, Texas; and the Honorable H. B. GONZALEZ and the Honorable O. C. FISHER, United States Congressmen, Texas; respectfully soliciting their support and assistance in this matter.

ORBRA L. LONGLEY,  
President, Second (Indian Head)  
Division, San Antonio Branch.

Attest:

RICHARD B. HARN,  
Secretary, Second (Indian Head)  
Division, San Antonio Branch.

**MRS. KENNEDY THANKS HAWAII**

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, on her departure from Hawaii, Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy wrote a stirring tribute to the news media, the Governor, and the people of my State, for their generous efforts to make her visit a happy experience.

In recognition of these efforts by so many people of Hawaii, and as a token of my deep respect for Mrs. Kennedy, I respectfully request that her letter be entered in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JULY 23, 1966.

DEAR SIR: As I leave Hawaii after these beautiful weeks. I should like to thank you, the Editor of the *Honolulu Advertiser* and the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* for all that you have done to make this vacation such a perfect one for my children and for me.

I had forgotten, and my children have never known what it was like to discover a new place, unwatched and unnoticed.

It was your papers that made this possible for us, by deciding at the beginning not to follow our activities. It was completely against your interests to do this. As I understand the problems and pressures the press endures, I truly appreciate the extraordinary gesture you made.

But now I think I should not have been surprised. In this strange land everyone constantly goes out of his way to be kind to the other.

From Governor Burns, who so kindly watched over us and asked people to help make our visit private, to the driver of a vegetable truck who went out of his way to lead us several miles, when we merely asked for direction, everyone in Hawaii has been the same.

Now I know what the Aloha spirit means. I hope it is contagious—for it could change the world.

With my deep appreciation, and our deepest hopes for coming back again.

Sincerely,

JACQUELINE KENNEDY.

**REPUBLICANS LOOK AT THE FUTURE**

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the Senate Republican policy committee recently issued a penetrating study of the American electorate in the mid-60's, and projected its study into the 1970's to determine the issues that must be met in order to attract a majority of the votes.

This analysis places special emphasis on the issues confronting the younger generation. It points out that the growth of the 20- to 34-year-old population in the next 20 years is over 20 million; and growth of the under-20 population in that period is over 35 million. The study declares that whichever party offers the most rational solutions to the problems facing this group may well win the "respect and long-term allegiance of this new electorate."

The State of Michigan recognizes the growing responsibility and authority of the younger generation, and is placing on the November ballot a referendum to decide whether the minimum voting age should be 18 instead of 21. For my part, I strongly favor the minimum voting age at 18.

Another problem—education—is very much in the minds of our youth. The progress of education, in large measure, depends on greater training opportunities for our teachers and for all the youth of our land.

As one of several steps in this direction, I have introduced legislation to provide a tax credit for parents sending their sons and daughters to college. I have also introduced a bill granting tax deductions to teachers continuing their education.

Mr. President, an interesting article on the Republican policy committee's study was printed in the *Washington Post* under John Chamberlain's byline. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**REPUBLICANS LOOK AT THE FUTURE**

(By John Chamberlain)

The Republican Party hasn't distinguished itself recently either at the polls or as a "loyal opposition" in Congress. Nor does it seem to be making much effort to dramatize, through the activities of its National Committee, the issues that might be used to beat Democrats next November. Amid the general melancholy that this columnist feels when he contemplates Republican activities, however, it is a pleasure to report that some Republicans are doing a bit of solid thinking about the future of their party in the strange new world that will be upon us when the Vietnamese war has been finally trundled off stage.

The solid thinking turns up in a study, "Where the Votes Are," that has just been issued by the staff of Senator BOURKE HICKENLOOPER's U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee. What distinguishes this study is its almost total avoidance of the clichés of usual political discourse. Instead of gabbling about the "mainstream" or "consensus," the Hickenlooper staff has tried to map the contours of the world of the Nineteen Seventies, with an eye to determining the issues that must be met in order to attract a majority of votes.

Plunging into the thick of things after some rather lugubrious observations on falling Republican registration figures, the report observes that all the old "power centers"—labor, the farm bloc, Big Business—are losing ground to the new power group of the professional and managerial middle class. This new power group is not particularly "party minded"; it tends to vote "in terms of a reaction to problems, not an allegiance to philosophies." The new power group is accustomed to both affluence and security, and it knows little about the world of the Nineteen Thirties, which still control the politics of Lyndon Johnson's generation. In a few more years the young, with no memories of the Depression or World War II, will be taking over completely. The Hickenlooper report observes that "with citizens over age thirty-five increasing by less than 18 million, while citizens under thirty-five increase fully 61 million, certain political inevitabilities become starkly obvious."

We had a well-advertised baby boom in 1945-55. It added 25 million to the population. Ten years from now, when the babies have babies in their turn, a "hospital-busting 46 million increase will begin." So politics will become that art of accommodating to crowds, crowds, crowds.

It will be a "school-centered society," preoccupied with the problem of educating new millions. It will be increasingly worried about providing the young with adequate teachers, and "in less than 10 years we'll have more teachers voting than farmers." (Exit the farm bloc, enter the educationist bloc.)

The farms of America will be businesses, many of which will not be doing actual farming.

The Hickenlooper report argues that the "small" irritants of yesterday will become the "major, nerve shattering issues of today and tomorrow." Pollution will be our biggest headache. The politician will be judged on his responses to the problem of getting sewage and industrial wastes out of Lake

Erie or the Connecticut River, and smoke and grime and sulfur out of the metropolitan air. The Hickenlooper group doesn't want to see Washington becoming the "senior partner" in the politics of meeting the problems of the new world. It notes that an "eight-state Ohio River Compact Commission" is even now using its authority to compel industries in the Ohio Basin to "return to the river water as pure or purer than that withdrawn." With reference to the growth of the Negro population, the report observes that "Republicans could sponsor a wide variety of training programs, even financial assistance programs, to enable the nonwhite to learn business and commercial operations, to become managers or owners of the many, many service-type establishments needed in urban areas."

This is constructive Republicanism, something for every Republican to go to work on, whether his name be Rockefeller, or Reagan, or Romney, or just plain Joe Doakes.

#### PROPOSED TRIALS OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS AS WAR CRIMINALS BY NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, the recent North Vietnamese threat to try captured American soldiers as war criminals is fraught with great peril, for if such trials were to be conducted, and if our airmen were to be executed, the United States would have no other choice but to take devastating retaliatory action. In my opinion, an infuriated American public would demand such retaliation.

In view of the reaction to his threat, not only in America but throughout most of the world as well, Ho Chi Minh appears to be backing down some. He is wise to do so.

Moreover, the Hanoi government would be wise also to call a halt to the brutal murder of wounded American fighting men such as that reported in eyewitness accounts yesterday. We cannot and will not tolerate such atrocities; and, if they are repeated, the wrath of the American people is certain to be felt in North Vietnam as never before, and as it should be.

Mr. President, the Macon, Ga., Telegraph of July 20 and the Augusta, Ga., Herald of July 19 published excellent editorials concerning the Communist threat to try captured U.S. servicemen. I invite the attention of the Senate to them and ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Macon (Ga.) Telegraph, July 20, 1966]

#### EXECUTION OF PRISONERS WOULD INVITE REPRISAL

The ground rules of war require prisoners to be protected against violence, intimidation, insult, and public curiosity. The North Vietnamese already have violated the rules by marching captured American airmen through the streets of Hanoi under armed escort.

A real rupture of the rules will occur if, as suggested in wire dispatches from other Communist capitals, the airmen are put on trial as "war criminals."

The 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War which forbids such treatment, "to

all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict." North Viet Nam signed the accord in 1957.

What is atrocity and what is playing the game by the rules in the agonizing illogic of modern war is a dilemma usually reserved for civilians. At least one GI prisoner of war has been murdered by the Viet Cong in reprisal for the execution in Saigon of VC terrorists. On the other hand, there have been reports published of atrocities by the South Vietnamese. What happens in the heat of battle is perhaps understandable, if not excusable.

Should Hanoi try and execute the captured American pilots, this nation's anger is certain to be great. Such action by the North Vietnamese would invite retaliation in one form or another.

James Reston of the New York Times has written: "Nobody who knows anything about Lyndon Johnson can have much doubt about the severity of his reaction if the fliers he sent into North Viet Nam are executed against the standards of international law for carrying out his orders."

The United States never ratified the 1925 Geneva Convention against chemical-biological warfare. But in 1948 President Roosevelt pledged that the U.S. would not use gas-germ weapons except in retaliation.

Executing or even cruelly punishing or humiliating our airmen is bound to arouse the American public and in the long run hurt the North Vietnamese. We hope Hanoi has the good sense to realize that.

[From the Augusta (Ga.) Herald, July 19, 1966]

#### WARNINGS TO HANOI

It is very difficult to imagine any North Vietnamese action which would redound more to their own disadvantage than the threatened war criminal trial by Hanoi of captured members of the U.S. armed forces.

On every hand there is reflected the intense outrage and purpose to all-out retaliation which the projected "trials" seems uniformly to arouse. From President to pundit to public the sentiment appears uniform; such trials, certainly any executions resulting therefrom, would unquestionably loose unrestrained fury upon the perpetrators.

The UN's U Thant and Britain's Harold Wilson, both of whom look with disfavor upon U.S. activity in Viet Nam, have urged the captors of the Americans to abandon any thought of trials.

Escalation of the war would be immeasurably intensified, most likely with firm public support and demand. No one as attuned to public sentiment as President Johnson usually is can be unaware that the Administration has lagged behind apparent public opinion in the tempo of the war. Approval of the stepped-up offensive is general.

Of course most of us, despising the war in the deepest recesses of our being, do not wish to unleash U.S. fury without restraint. Such warfare must inevitably destroy multitudes of bystanding Vietnamese civilians. Like as not, as the might of our war machine rolled over the small nation, destroying and killing, the few leaders really guilty would troop off into Red China, whole of limb and skin, leaving the hapless civilians to suffer for the misdeeds of the leadership.

Let the clearest words, such as those delivered by Secretary of State Rusk yesterday, inform Hanoi of U.S. feeling and determination. No possible doubt should be permitted about the sureness of swift retaliation. The blistering destruction which would fall upon the North Vietnamese would bring no glory to the U.S., but any action short of the most extreme would be unacceptable to the American public.

There is some possibility that, despite the blustering and attempted menace in Sun-

day's statements by the northern president, Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi has gotten the message. For there had been speculation that the announcement would include information relating to the captive U.S. service men, and likely also to the matter of trials. No mention was made, however, of the prisoners and their fate.

#### THE HEROIC WORK OF FRANK MRKVA

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, it is the strong and sincere desire of all of us that true patriotism shall always remain alive and vibrant in this free country of ours, and I believe we should give public recognition to outstanding examples of it when they occur.

Today, Mr. President, I ask this honorable body to join me in saying thanks to a young man who risked his life for 4½ years in silent devotion to duty and love for this country. Because of his contribution, 180 million Americans are a little bit safer in their homes today.

The name of this young man is Frank Mrkva, and he is the General Services officer in the Passport Office at the Department of State. He has been a Government employee for about 11 years and has risen from the grade of G-3 to G-11 through dedication of his time and talents to his job. Four and a half years ago he began doing double duty for single pay for his country with the knowledge only of his immediate superiors and high officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

A Communist diplomat from Czechoslovakia befriended Mr. Mrkva in the course of official business and began trying to get certain information and documents from him. Mr. Mrkva reported the developments to Mr. Robert Johnson, his immediate superior, the Chief Counsel and Chief Security Officer of the Passport Office. With the additional knowledge only of Mr. Johnson's administrative aid, Mrs. Constance Lumardi, and Miss Frances G. Knight, Director of the Passport Office, the matter was reported to the FBI and Mr. Mrkva began his harrowing double life. Miss Knight and these other two people in the Passport Office are entitled to great credit also. They told no one, not even the high officials in the State Department.

Mr. Mrkva's initial meeting was with Zdenek Pisk, then Third Secretary and later Second Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Embassy. At Pisk's invitation, Mr. Mrkva attended social functions at the Embassy, to which he had been accustomed to delivering and waiting for passports in his job as visa courier in the Passport Division.

The first overt act by Pisk to enlist Mr. Mrkva into the Czechoslovakian espionage network was on November 30, 1961, when he invited Mr. Mrkva to dinner at a metropolitan restaurant and asked him numerous questions about his family, background, relatives in Czechoslovakia and State Department duties. There followed, from November 1961 to July 1966, a total of 48 meetings by Mr. Mrkva with Czechoslovakian officials—11 with Pisk and later 37 with a second agent,



Jiri Opatrny, an attache of the Czechoslovakian Embassy who took over the spy operations from Pisk in May 1963.

The two Czech agents paid Mr. Mrkva a total of \$3,440 which the American Government employee turned over to the FBI as the payments were made for him to perform certain functions requested by the Czechs.

Most of the meetings were held in the Maryland suburbs of Washington and on the park benches in Northwest Washington. One was held in front of a theater in Northeast Washington, one in Southeast Washington, and another in a Virginia suburban shopping center.

During the entire period of his contact with the Czech espionage agents, Mr. Mrkva acted with full knowledge and guidance of the FBI and his superiors in the Passport Office. At the beginning, he supplied such inconsequential items as a State Department telephone book to the Czech agents. Later he transmitted press releases and certain administrative reports which had been cleared by the FBI. As his relationship with the Czechoslovakian agents progressed, the Communists' interests became more specific. They wanted to obtain a blank U.S. passport of a new series. They wanted information concerning rooms and locations of high officials in the State Department dealing with Czechoslovakian affairs. Finally, they asked Mr. Mrkva to place a listening device—a "bugging" mechanism, if you please—in the office of Mr. Raymond Lisle, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

Mr. Mrkva, again with FBI clearance, provided Czech Agent Opatrny with a General Services Administration catalog of Government furniture to aid in designing the listening device so that it could be placed unobtrusively in Mr. Lisle's office. This was in December 1965.

After several more meetings, Opatrny delivered an electronic "bugging" device to Mr. Mrkva on May 29, 1966. The device could be activated and deactivated by remote control and was to be placed in the base of a bookcase in Mr. Lisle's office. Opatrny promised to pay Mr. Mrkva \$1,000 for making the installation. Mr. Mrkva turned the device over to FBI agents in the State Department Building.

On July 9, 1966, Opatrny contacted Mr. Mrkva to tell him the device was not working and he could not understand the reason, since the mechanism had operated correctly for 20 minutes after Mr. Mrkva had left it in the State Department. Mr. Mrkva replied that he had dropped the device and that it apparently had broken. The Communist agent asked Mr. Mrkva for the return of the mechanism so that it could be sent to Prague for inspection and repair. At their last meeting on July 6, 1966, Opatrny told Mr. Mrkva it was important for them to work closely together because there were other offices, such as that of Under Secretary of State George Ball, which the Communists wanted to "bug."

Shortly before the story was made public, the State Department was informed of the years of hazardous work of Mr. Mrkva and the Department then summoned the Second Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Embassy Miloslav Chrobok and notified him that Opatrny was engaged in activities unacceptable to the United States, and demanded that he leave the country within 3 days. The other Czech agent involved, Zdenek Pisk, was transferred out of the United States in 1963 and only last May returned to this country on reassignment to the Czechoslovakian mission at the United Nations. The State Department has notified the Secretary General of the United Nations concerning Pisk's previous activities in the United States. This whole story, Mr. President, points up the importance of loyal, hard-working employees to a Government agency and especially to one as sensitive as the Department of State.

There were times, as I understand it, when the Communist agents played upon Mr. Mrkva's sympathy and particularly his humble childhood in an attempt to convert him to their philosophy calling for the overthrow of our great Republic. Besides their financial efforts, including a suggestion that they might pick up the mortgage payments on his home and finance an operation needed by his daughter, they made attempts to interest him in Communist ideology. They tried to exploit the fact that his father and mother immigrated to this country from Czechoslovakia, and that his father at times during his childhood held down two jobs to feed, clothe, and shelter the family. Mr. Mrkva's father and mother can be proud today of the son they reared who, in the best traditions of service to the U.S. Government, demonstrated the strong character that has made this country free and great.

Our thanks also should go to Mr. Mrkva's wife and children, who certainly lived in some fear and who with Mr. Mrkva today share some concern about possible future threats to their well-being because of the service he performed to the United States.

Mr. President, I am sure that I speak for the entire Senate and all patriotic Americans everywhere in commending and congratulating Mr. Mrkva for his great contribution to the Nation. I am also submitting copies of two letters of commendation for insertion in the Record at this point, one from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the other from Frances G. Knight, Director of the Passport Office, praising Mr. Mrkva for his work. I would also like to include in my remarks the State Department's release making the story public.

The work of this Government employee, besides reflecting true loyalty and patriotism of the highest form, is one of the greatest counterespionage performances in the history of the United States. He has brought credit to those sturdy patriotic people—the Americans of Czech descent.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
Washington, D.C., July 18, 1966.

MR. FRANK JOHN MRKVA,  
Administrative Division, Passport Office,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MRKVA: I should like to take this opportunity to extend my personal thanks and congratulations to you for your splendid cooperation with this Bureau in the matter involving Czech intelligence efforts to plant a listening device in the Department of State.

I realize that your contribution has involved many personal sacrifices and much inconvenience to you and your family. However, it is through such cooperation of patriotic citizens that the FBI can fulfill its responsibilities in the internal security field.

My heartfelt thanks are extended to you and your family.

Sincerely yours,

J. EDGAR HOOVER.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, July 20, 1966.

MR. FRANK J. MRKVA,  
Westgate Woods,  
Lanham, Md.

DEAR FRANK: I want you to know how very proud your colleagues and I are to be associated with you. It is not often that one gets the opportunity to render service to one's country "beyond the call of duty." But this opportunity did come to you and you filled it in every way.

All of us can hold our heads high in the knowledge that within the Passport Office family we have such dedication to country and devotion to duty.

On behalf of the staff, I extend to you our congratulations and heartfelt thanks for a job well done.

Sincerely,

FRANCES G. KNIGHT,  
Director, Passport Office.

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIAN ESPIONAGE EXPOSED

An effort by Communist agents to plant an electronic listening device in the State Department building has been balked by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the cooperation of a State Department employee who acted as a double agent for more than four years.

Two members of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington were directly implicated in this espionage operation. The first, Zdenek Pisk served here as Third Secretary and later as Second Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Embassy. Pisk departed the United States on May 8, 1963, but recently returned and now occupies the post of First Secretary at the Czechoslovakian United Nations Mission in New York City. The second agent, Jiri Opatrny, presently an Attache of the Czechoslovakian Embassy here, took over the spy operation from Pisk upon his departure in May 1963.

In 1961, Pisk became acquainted with Frank John Mrkva, an employee of the State Department, whose official duties included messenger runs to the Czechoslovakian Embassy. At Pisk's invitation, Mr. Mrkva attended social functions at the Czechoslovakian Embassy. The first overt act on the part of Pisk to enlist Mr. Mrkva into the Czechoslovakian espionage activities was on November 30, 1961. Pisk invited Mr. Mrkva to dinner at a metropolitan restaurant, where he asked him numerous questions about his

family, background, relatives in Czechoslovakia, and his duties at the State Department.

There followed, over the period from November 1961 up to the present month of July, 1966, a series of 48 meetings—eleven with Pisk and later 37 with Opatrny—during which the two Czech spies paid Mr. Mrkva a total of \$3,440. Most of these meetings were held in the Maryland suburbs, on park benches in Northwest Washington, one in front of a theater in Northeast Washington, one in Southeast Washington and another in a Virginia suburban shopping center.

From time to time Mr. Mrkva supplied the Czech spies with unclassified papers such as a State Department telephone book, press releases and administrative reports which had been cleared for transmittal.

During the entire period of his contact with the Czech espionage agents, Mr. Mrkva acted with the full knowledge and guidance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and appropriate officials of the Department of State.

As the relationship between Mr. Mrkva and the Czech agents matured, the latter's interests became more specific. Could Mr. Mrkva obtain a blank U.S. passport of the new series? Could he provide information concerning the rooms and locations of the officers of the Department dealing with Czech affairs—particularly concerning the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs and the conference room and for his staff meetings?

In May of 1965, Opatrny revealed his interest in placing listening devices in various offices in the State Department. Mr. Mrkva subsequently provided Opatrny with a General Services Administration catalog of government furniture in December of 1965. This was to be used in designing the listening device in such a fashion that it could unobtrusively be introduced into an office in the State Department.

After many more supposedly clandestine meetings, on May 29, 1966, Opatrny delivered to Mr. Mrkva an electronic listening device which could be activated and deactivated by remote control to be placed in the base of the bookcase in the office of Mr. Raymond Lisle, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs. Opatrny promised Mr. Mrkva \$1,000 for the installation. The device was immediately turned over to FBI agents in the State Department Building by Mr. Mrkva.

On June 9, 1966 Opatrny intercepted Mr. Mrkva to tell him the device was not working, and he could not understand the reason, as it had operated successfully for 20 minutes after Mr. Mrkva had left it in the State Department. When told by Mr. Mrkva that he had dropped the device presumably making it inoperable, Opatrny then instructed Mr. Mrkva to return the device so that it could be sent to Prague for inspection and repair. Disputes over bad faith on the part of Opatrny in connection with payments due for past services was justification on the part of Mr. Mrkva to stall in carrying out the instruction to return the device.

At their last meeting on July 8, 1966, Opatrny told Mr. Mrkva that they should work closely together. There are other offices like that of Under Secretary of State Ball's in which they would want to place a device. "We want to bring the first device to a conclusion. Everyone wants to know what is wrong with it," Opatrny said.

In the absence of the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Second Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, Miloslav Chrobok was called into the State Department earlier this afternoon by Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

He was informed that Mr. Opatrny has engaged in activities incompatible with the

accepted norms of official conduct. We find his continued presence in the U.S. no longer agreeable to the Government of the U.S. and have requested therefore, that he depart from the U.S. as soon as possible and in any case within three days.

As indicated previously the other Czech agent concerned, Mr. Pisk, was transferred outside the U.S. in 1963. He was reassigned by the Czech Government to their mission at the United Nations in New York last May. The Secretary General is being informed of his previous activities.

For his outstanding contribution to his government, Mr. Mrkva is receiving a spot promotion. He is also being recommended for an Honor Award which will be presented at the Department's Annual Awards Ceremony.

#### FRANK JOHN MRKVA: A MAN INVOLVED

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, several days ago, the Federal Bureau of Investigation disclosed that a General Services officer of the Passport Office, Department of State, had acted as a double agent for 4 years to thwart an attempt by two Czechoslovak diplomats to spy on the State Department office.

Since then, much has been written about Frank John Mrkva. It is a privilege to record my gratitude and extend my congratulations to this loyal citizen.

Frank Mrkva has been a member of the Passport Office staff since May 1955, and performed his assigned duties in an outstanding manner.

In 1961, he was approached by a Czechoslovakian Embassy official. This was the first overt act of a scheme to enlist him into espionage activities. Frank Mrkva immediately contacted Mr. Robert Johnson, Chief Counsel of the Passport Office. Mr. Johnson advised the Office's able Director, Miss Frances G. Knight, and they contacted the FBI.

For 4, long years, the FBI directed and coordinated the project. During this time, Frank Mrkva was unable to reveal his participation to friend or family.

He met with these foreign spies about 50 times. He was obviously deeply involved. And, apart from everything else that can be learned from the Mrkva story, I would like to emphasize his involvement.

I have talked with him about his experiences. He is an unassuming man. He struck me as a man who will do just what he feels is right. He is a committed individual—to his family, to his job, and to his country.

Allow me to draw a contrast. In the early part of 1964, the country was shocked at the report from New York City that for more than half an hour 38 respectable, law-abiding citizens watched a killer stalk and stab 28-year-old Catherine Genovese as she was returning home from work. Heard most often in subsequent discussions with these witnesses was the plaint: "I just did not want to become involved."

There are numerous examples of similar instances occurring both before and after the great publicity surrounding Catherine Genovese's death. I have used her case simply as illustrative of an attitude still prevalent today.

Crime costs us \$27 billion per year. Is this the type of statistic which is needed

to eliminate citizen apathy? Cries for help apparently are sometimes inadequate.

It may be that crime will continue as long as mentally and emotionally deranged individuals are loose in society. But what about the morally weak and the mentally defective? As long as the mental climate is tolerant of crime, these elements are encouraged.

As long as the citizen refrains from becoming personally involved, crime will continue to flourish. Every seemingly innocent bet placed with a cigar store bookmaker fans this flame.

Around the country, more and more civic organizations are joining in the campaign against crime. They are conducting effective campaigns for higher police pay, better equipment, stronger law enforcement.

The drive is making headway, but it has a long way to go. And it needs a broader base. It needs more individual commitment.

Thus, it is especially satisfying to study the example of Frank Mrkva. This man has lived through a period of intense individual involvement which stands as a lesson to us all. I know he has the deep and lasting appreciation of his fellow citizens.

As Miss Knight pointed out in a letter to her staff:

All of us do not get the opportunity to render such outstanding service to our country as did Frank Mrkva but we can serve by being constantly alert to such dangers.

#### DIFFICULTIES OF NEGRO MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OBTAINING OFF-BASE HOUSING

Mr. HART. Mr. President, recently I received a copy of a letter which the American Veterans Committee addressed to the Honorable Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.

This letter cites examples of the difficulties Negro military personnel are having across our land in their efforts to obtain off-base housing. I suggest these examples and the many contained in the Department of Defense report which I included in my statement before the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee underline the critical need for enactment of title IV of the civil rights bill now before the Congress.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE, INC.,

Washington, D.C., July 18, 1966.

HON. THOMAS D. MORRIS,  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,  
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: The American Veterans Committee is seriously concerned with the effects of off-base housing discrimination of Negro military personnel. Not only is it a blight on our society, but it constitutes a threat to our national security. It has been stated and documented over and over again that the morale of servicemen is lowered when they encounter discrimination. The chief hardship that Negro servicemen encounter off-base is discrimination in housing.



As veterans of two world wars and the Korean conflict and the current Vietnam war, we are shocked at the pervasiveness and extent of the ignominious treatment and hardships suffered by Negro servicemen and their families when they seek to obtain decent housing off-base.

Early this year, in January, representatives of the American Veterans Committee and the Metropolitan Housing Program of the American Friends Service Committee met with Mr. Jack Moskowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights and Industrial Relations and members of his staff, to discuss the problems of Negro servicemen in obtaining adequate housing. During that meeting, the hardships to Negro families in this area in their fruitless attempts to get adequate off-base housing, were cited with full documentation of a number of cases.

During that meeting, Mr. Moskowitz told us that he was going to request briefings from the commanders of the military installations in the Washington area as to how they were meeting the housing needs of their Negro personnel. He suggested that Washington, as the Nation's Capital, might serve as a pilot area for insuring Negro families equal opportunity in obtaining off-base housing as soon as the various installations had been surveyed. Mr. Moskowitz indicated he would inform us of his findings. (See copy of letter to Mr. Moskowitz.)

We were told in early April that only 2 briefings were held, that 2 more were scheduled and that by the end of the month, we would be called. To date, we have not heard any report of the findings of the briefings nor have we had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Moskowitz concerning the findings of the briefings.

One of the objectives of the briefings as we understood them was to find out whether military commanders, in order to carry out the spirit and letter of the Department of Defense Directive 5120.36, dated July 26, 1963, "Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces," needed stronger guidance and direction from the Secretary of its Department.

Last month, in response to a request from Senator PHILIP HART of Michigan, the Department of Defense prepared a report at his request, "Racial Discrimination Against Negro and Other Minority Group Servicemen and Their Dependents in Off-Base Housing." The report again highlights the seriousness of the problem of off-base housing for Negro servicemen. "Adequate, decent off-base housing for Negro Personnel in the Armed Forces is the most stubborn and pervasive form of segregation and discrimination affecting Negroes in the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps) and the Air Force."

The report came to the following conclusion:

"While there has been some substantial progress made in the reduction of this form of segregation and discrimination, it still remains the most pervasive and stubborn, morale impairing social evil confronting the Negro servicemen off-base."

With this situation so described by the Department of Defense, we question whether it isn't time to revise the directives covering this aspect of off-base discrimination. Three years ago, when the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces released its Initial Report, "Equality of Treatment and Opportunity for Negro Military Personnel Stationed Within the United States," the Committee called for more explicit and detailed guidelines for base commanders.

"1. The Defense Department and the Services Must Redefine Responsibilities, Establish Goals and Provide Detailed Instructions.

"While any worthwhile efforts to eliminate off-base discrimination must center on the functions of the base commander, a redefinition of responsibilities at all levels of command in this field is an essential preliminary.

It should be the policy of the Department of Defense and part of the mission of the chain of command from the Secretaries of the Services to the local base commander, not only to remove discrimination within the Armed Forces, but also to make every effort to eliminate discriminatory practices as they affect members of the Armed Forces and their dependents within the neighboring civilian communities.

"As a part of this process of redefinition, a different concept of the base commander's functions in the racial field must be evolved. Interviews with base commanders have led the Committee to conclude that commanders desire more explicit instructions and clarification of their responsibilities in this regard. These commanders, concerned with morale factors, increasingly feel the need to act. Before they act, they need to have their responsibilities defined. They need more explicit orders and more detailed directives. These should be provided."

The current Section 13 of Army Regulation No. 600-21, dated Washington, D.C. 2 July 1964, states:

"Commanders will not use the off-limits sanctions in discrimination cases without the prior approval of the Secretary of the Army and then only after all reasonable alternatives have failed to achieve the desired effect."

A similar section is to be found in Air Force Regulation No. 35-78, 19 August 1964.

We cannot understand the theory behind the wording of this section. By limiting the discretion of commanders not to act without prior approval of the Secretary (Army or Air Force), this directive discourages commanders from even trying to take strong steps to prevent discriminatory practices in off-base housing against Negro personnel.

It is our conviction that military commanders would be able to play a positive role in ending the housing hardships suffered by Negro military servicemen if they would order all discriminatory off-based housing "off-limits" to all military personnel. We think no better statement of the need for a firm policy from the DoD in this area than in the statement of 12 commissioned officers quoted in Case No. 30 appended to the June 2, 1966 DoD report:

"We would all readily agree that this housing has been our greatest problem area. All of us are married, most have children, and we were all subjected to overt racial discrimination as we sought to find decent public housing for our families. . . . We simply want to be able to find decent housing just as easily (or with as much difficulty) as anyone else. When a door is slammed in our faces because we are Black, we feel that the full stature and determination of (the Military Departments) should back us up. . . . We suggest that the full economic and diplomatic weight of the government be brought to bear in areas where this problem is proven to be prevalent. (That would include most of the country.) This has been suggested and in fact ordered in the past but the situation remains basically unchanged. We feel that if certain accommodations are not open to all military personnel, no military personnel should be allowed to acquire those accommodations. With regards to housing we are desperately in need of assistance and support."

The situation with regard to Negro servicemen's housing needs, if anything, has deteriorated. It was our thesis then, and it remains our thesis, that if all housing which discriminated against Negro servicemen were declared off-limits and no military commander would permit any military personnel to lease, rent or buy apartments or houses where discrimination took place, that in itself would constitute both sufficient pressure and incentive for real estate interests to change their discriminatory practices.

We call upon the Department of Defense to:

1) Expedite the briefings of installations in the Washington area and schedule a meeting with the interested parties to discuss the findings.

2) Take steps to achieve the stated policy of the Department of Defense regarding equal opportunity and treatment of military personnel. See Army Regulations (No. 600-21, July 2, 1964) and Air Force Regulation (No. 35-78, August 19, 1964).

3) Expedite the issuance of a firm directive to base commanders to use "off-limits sanctions" for discriminatory housing (as referred to in your letter of 6/11/66 to James Harvey), with appropriate guidance.

Your earliest attention would be appreciated.

Sincerely,

JOHN S. STILMAN,  
National Chairman, American Veterans Committee.

CHESTER SHORE,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Discrimination in Housing of Negro Servicemen.

## ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY PROBLEMS GETTING THE ATTENTION THEY DESERVE

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, a recent article in the Washington Star demonstrated that the St. Lawrence Seaway, which has been for many years one of the most underutilized waterways in the Nation is, at long last, getting the type of congressional support that is essential if the seaway is to be a real success.

The article points out that House legislation sponsored by Representative REUSS, joined by 21 of his House colleagues, would remove the present requirement that construction costs be paid off in 50 years. In addition, the 12 members of the Great Lakes Conference of Senators, which I founded in 1963, went on record as supporting the upgrading of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation as a part of the proposed Department of Transportation. Finally, six Midwest Governors met with their congressional delegations to call for a moratorium on increasing seaway tolls.

Mr. President, this is good news to all those who have seen a great future for the St. Lawrence Seaway. I for one will continue to fight for this future. I ask unanimous consent that the Star article be printed at this point in the RECORD:

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### LEGISLATION ASKED TO EASE DEBTS OF STRUGGLING SEAWAY

(By William Reddig)

The 2,400-mile St. Lawrence Seaway, its debts rising about as fast as its traffic, drew increased legislative attention this week to lift the debt load from its back and give it a more important role in United States transportation policy.

The attention came from three quarters:

1. Representative HENRY S. REUSS, Democrat, of Wisconsin, introduced legislation, and was joined by 21 co-sponsors from Great Lakes states, to change the financing of the United States portion of the U.S.-Canadian waterway, removing the present requirement that construction costs be paid off in 50 years.

2. Senator PHILIP A. HART, Democrat, of Michigan, was joined by 11 Great Lakes sena-

tors in urging that the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, recently downgraded in the Department of Commerce hierarchy, become a part of the proposed new Department of Transportation.

3. Six Midwest governors, representing the 13-state Midwest Governors Conference, met here with President Johnson and the conference's congressional delegations to call for a moratorium on increasing seaway tolls.

Hearings were held in Chicago last month on a proposal to increase tolls by 10 percent so that the debt could be paid off on time, but the Department of Commerce is yet to make known its recommendations. By law, the decision, put off two years, must be made this year.

The \$470 million seaway, opened in 1959, was financed by bonds, with Canada bearing 70 percent of the cost. The U.S. is currently about \$10 million behind in its debt interest payments on the construction and Canada is some \$60 million in arrears.

REUSS, calling the financial burden on the seaway "onerous and grossly inequitable," would convert the present revenue bonds to capital stock. The 50-year payback requirement would be eliminated and the stock would be expected to pay a cumulative dividend of 3.45 percent.

The Wisconsin congressman noted that the St. Lawrence Seaway "is virtually the only transportation system which is by law required not only to cover its own operating and maintenance costs but also to pay interest at the going rate and to amortize the capital investment over a relatively short period."

Some observers noted that the Reuss proposal may involve jumping to a solution of the debt problem before negotiations with the Canadian government on the question.

The Canadians are also pondering a 10 percent increase in tolls but a final answer is not expected until discussions between the two governments are completed.

Great Lakes and inland interests want to hold down tolls, or even eliminate some of them, in order to encourage a higher traffic volume. East coast and Gulf port and railroad interests want to boost the tolls because of seaway competition.

The Reuss bill has been referred to the House Public Works Committee chaired by Representative GEORGE H. FALLON, Democrat, of Maryland. He is chairman of the National Committee for a non-Subsidized Seaway, which urged an increase in tolls at the Chicago hearings.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF A BANK FOR RURAL COOPERATIVES

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, Mr. O. W. Davis, general manager of the Guadalupe Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc., of Gonzales, Tex., was kind enough to send me a copy of a resolution passed by the members of the cooperative recently at one of their annual meetings. The resolution concerns S. 3337.

I ask unanimous consent to have the resolution printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The following resolution was adopted at the Annual Meeting of the Guadalupe Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. on June 24, 1966 at Gonzales, Tex.

"Whereas the rural electric cooperatives have served the rural areas of the nation for many years and have continued to provide adequate and dependable electric service, and,

"Whereas the demand for electricity by rural residents continues to increase, re-

quiring larger amounts of capital to build new extensions and replace existing lines with ones of greater capacity, and,

"Whereas the Rural Electric Administration has been providing capital for such construction through loans which are repaid with interest, but this source of loans has not been sufficient to meet demands in recent years and will be even less able to meet the demands of the future, and,

"Whereas legislation providing supplemental financing for rural electric cooperatives has been introduced in the National Congress whereby the current REA program of 2% loans will be continued for systems requiring such capital and a supplemental financing program through a Bank for Rural Electric Systems at higher rates of interest, with eventual control of the bank to be in the hands of the cooperatives, moving them toward eventual financial self-sufficiency, now, therefore be it

"Resolved, That the members assembled at this 27th Annual Meeting of the Guadalupe Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. hereby endorse the legislation introduced by Congressman BOB POAGE of Texas which provides for the establishment of a Bank for rural electric cooperatives, and, be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be forwarded to the Texas Senators and to members of the House, representing this area."

#### PROPOSED EXTENSION OF WEST FRONT OF THE CAPITOL

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, the Senate Committee on Appropriations yesterday took action which I feel will have a far-ranging effect on our efforts to preserve the Capitol from architectural ruin. The efforts of the present Capitol Architect to renovate the west wing of the building have attracted national attention and dismay from individuals interested in preserving the building from further alterations.

I have long supported proposals that Capitol restoration be supervised by a commission of competent architects and individuals experienced in the preservation of our national heritage. I feel that the Committee on Appropriations be commended for its constructive action in seeking to avoid the destruction of the Capitol. Now perhaps we can proceed with a coordinated plan for renovating the Capitol according to principles which will allow it to continue as a great national shrine of the American people.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD articles which were published in the Columbus Sunday Dispatch of July 17, the Washington Post of July 24, and the Washington Post of July 26.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, July 17, 1966]

ARCHITECT'S PLAN TO EXTEND CAPITOL DRAWS FIRE BUT GENERAL PUBLIC SEEMINGLY IS UNINTERESTED IN \$34 MILLION PROJECT

(By William McGaffin)

"Oh, architect spare our capitol,  
Touch not a single stone.  
In youth, it sheltered our republic.  
Oh, please let it alone."

WASHINGTON.—"Oh, architect spare our capitol."

This is how Senator PAUL H. DOUGLAS, Democrat, of Illinois, summed up his feel-

ings in the Senate recently about what he describes as "the arrogant plan" of J. George Stewart, the architect of the Capitol, to extend the west front of the Capitol Building.

DOUGLAS told his constituents in his latest newsletter that Stewart's proposal not only would be "outlandishly costly"—an estimated \$34,000,000—"but it would deface one of the great architectural achievements of this nation."

DOUGLAS' outcry, however, has only produced six letters on the subject.

A similar public apathy is reflected in the mail of house speaker JOHN W. MCCORMACK, Democrat, of Massachusetts. He told reporters this week that his mail is "running about even" for and against the extension. Then, with a grin, he disclosed that he had received "two letters for it and two against it."

It generally is agreed that the west front of the Capitol has cracked and crumbled and reached such a dilapidated state that something must be done about it. A controversy has flared in Congress, however, because of Stewart's proposal.

Instead of merely repairing and strengthening the front, or replacing the old sandstone with marble, Stewart's plan calls for moving the whole front out. The central section, completed in the 1920's, would be extended 44 feet. The House and Senate wings, built about 1817, would be extended 8 1/2 feet.

Architect Stewart who, incidentally, is not an architect, bases his argument on a safety factor. An engineering firm that he engaged to inspect the building backs his assertion that the extra building on the west front is essential to shore up the whole Capitol and prevent it from a possible collapse.

Stewart's critics, who are numerous, declare that this is simply another example of his passion for wasting the taxpayers' funds on buildings that are not only unnecessary but are done in execrable taste. Stewart has been blamed for the Rayburn Building, the new Senate Office Building, and the extension of the east front of the Capitol.

In many cases, however, he has been a lightning rod, absorbing criticism that should be directed at Congress. For Stewart could not move without the authorization and financing provided by a willing Congress.

Congress created a bipartisan group 11 years ago known as the commission for extension of the U.S. Capitol. Its members today include MCCORMACK, DIRKSEN, Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, House Republican Leader GERALD FORD of Michigan, and Stewart.

About four weeks ago, three members of this commission—DIRKSEN, MCCORMACK and Stewart—met and approved Stewart's \$34,000,000 proposal for extending the west front. Now, all that remains to be done, according to DIRKSEN, is for Congress to appropriate the necessary money to get the project started.

The critics charge that the commission members were stretching the law that created their little group when they took this action without holding hearings, or going to the whole Congress for approval. But DIRKSEN denies this. He also excuses the action taken with only three members of the commission present on the ground that this constituted a quorum.

But unless the public gets more excited than it has to date, the project obviously is going to sail through Congress exactly as approved by the three members of the commission.

[From the Washington Post, July 24, 1966]  
A FURTHER OUTLOOK: LESSER MINDS FIDDLE  
WITH WHAT FATHERS FUSSED OVER  
(By Wolf Von Eckardt)

Although busy enough making independence and self-government work, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson worried



and fussed a great deal about the National Capitol.

The original building—the last remaining portions of which lesser minds would now entomb in a new, vastly extended marble front—is as much their work as that of architects William Thornton, Benjamin Latrobe and Charles Bulfinch.

As Washington and Jefferson saw it, the Nation's first building was to be the symbol for generations of the dignity and permanence of the new republic.

Two generations later, President Millard Fillmore decided against tampering with the original building when Congress demanded more space. Instead, in 1851, he appointed architect Thomas U. Walter to add new wings to either side of the old building. They are connected with it by narrow corridors. To give harmony to this ensemble, Walter capped it with his magnificent dome.

To Abraham Lincoln, too, the Capitol was a symbol of the permanency of the Union. Despite the demands which the Civil War made on manpower and finance, he ordered the work rushed to completion. His judgment of the country's sentiment was soon proven correct:

"How is the Capitol? Is it finished?" were among the first questions the representative of the Confederacy asked the representative of the Union when South and North first met to negotiate the end of hostilities on Feb. 3, 1865, aboard a ship in Hampton Roads.

It was essentially finished. Two years earlier—not long after Gettysburg—the bronze statue of Freedom was, precisely at noon on Dec. 2, 1863, slowly hoisted atop the great cast iron dome. A flag was unfurled and a salute of 35 guns was fired from Capitol Hill.

All that remained to be done now was Frederick Law Olmstead's magnificent west terrace and landscaping and, obviously, continuing interior improvements of plumbing, lighting, heating and cooling. But for this the building and the symbol were complete, or should be considered so. Who would dream of extending St. Peter's in Rome, Monticello, Mount Vernon or even the Houses of Parliament in London?

#### BICKERING GOES ON

But the unending bickering—a curious mixture of political and architectural ambition, of genius and pettiness, parsimony and extravagance, respect for history and disrespectful vainglory—that had accompanied the work from the very beginning has persisted to this day. In a way this bickering helped create our Capitol. Now it threatens it.

President Fillmore had ended the long debate in Congress about enlarging and changing the original Capitol because he would not "mar the harmony and beauty of the present building which, as a specimen of architecture, is so universally admired." Yet only ten years later scheme after hideous extension scheme was proposed.

For nearly a hundred years, Congress, supported by the vast majority of the country's architects, has resisted all of them. Rather than change and disfigure its glorious home, Congress decided to accommodate the ever-growing need for additional space and facilities by constructing new buildings on Capitol Hill. The results are the Library of Congress, the Supreme Court Building, the old and new Senate Office Buildings, three huge House Office Buildings and now the proposed Madison Memorial Library which will serve as a third building for the Library of Congress.

The old, vainglorious and long rejected enlargement proposals of the 1870's and 1880's have, however, intrigued the present Architect of the Capitol, J. George Stewart, who is not an architect but a builder and former Republican Congressman from Delaware.

With the emphatic backing of the late House Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.), he

puffed out the east facade of the original, central portion of the building by 32½ feet with a new, slick marble replica. The work was completed in 1961.

#### ON THE WESTERN FRONT

Last month Stewart and his powerful Commission for the Extension of the Capitol suddenly announced that they had decided to similarly extend the west front, but this time by up to 88 feet, and not with a replica but a somewhat changed design. The members of this Commission, in addition to Stewart, are Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, House Speaker JOHN W. MCCORMACK, Democrat, of Massachusetts, Senate Minority Leader EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, Republican, of Illinois, and House Minority Leader GERALD R. FORD, Republican, of Michigan.

This second extension would, of course, spell the final obliteration of the splendid building that Fillmore saved and Washington and Jefferson worried so much about.

Of all the politicians who fussed with the work of the Capitol's architects, Washington and Jefferson were surely the most qualified. An informed appreciation of architecture was, in their day, considered an essential part of the education of a Virginia gentleman.

True, Washington thought it best to let the design of buildings "be governed by the rules which are laid down by the professors of the art." But his active part in the enlargement of his home at Mount Vernon belies this modesty.

And for Jefferson, of course, architecture was a passionate avocation. He had, he confessed, in uncharacteristic ecstasy, "stood for whole hours gazing at the Maison Carré like a lover at his mistress." It was not that this exceptionally well preserved Roman temple at Nîmes, in southern France, seemed more perfect to him than other buildings he had seen.

It was because, in the words of one scholar, this temple's almost austere simplicity—in contrast to the still predominant Georgian style which accompanied British colonization—"was the speaking symbol of all that America could and should stand for, proclaiming the strength of republican virtue, the beauty of discipline, the wisdom of rule by laws rather than men, in a language he wanted all the United States to learn."

In quest of such architecture, Washington and Jefferson called a competition for the design of the Capitol. Its disappointing results may justify the slight hanky-panky which helped Thornton to win it. The fact that he had been introduced to President Washington by the famous painter John Trumbull may also have helped.

At any rate, Thornton was given permission to enter three months after the competition was officially closed and after the French architect Stephen Hallet had been given reason to believe that he had won. But surely Hallet's drawing of what looked like the fairy tale palace of a minor Renaissance prince was hardly the simple, classic building both Washington and Jefferson had in mind.

William Thornton was born in 1759 at Tortola in the Virgin Islands. He studied medicine in Edinburgh, traveled extensively in Europe and in Parisian society, settled for a while in Philadelphia where he knew Benjamin Franklin, gave up the practice of medicine and married a 15-year-old girl. He eventually became a Commissioner for the District of Columbia and later head of the United States Patent Office which he saved from destruction by the British in 1814 by stepping in front of their cannon and cussing them out.

At Philadelphia he had learned of a competition for the design of a public library. "When I traveled," he wrote, "I never thought of architecture, but I got some books and worked a few days, then gave a plan in the ancient Ionic order, which carried the day."

He carried the day again in the Capitol competition, his second architectural effort.

"Grandeur, simplicity and convenience appear so well combined in this plan of Dr. Thornton's," wrote George Washington on Jan. 31, 1793, to the District Commissioners who were officially in charge, that he was certain of their instant approval.

And Jefferson let it be known that Thornton's design "had captivated the eyes and judgment of all. It is simple, noble, beautiful, excellently arranged and moderate in size. . . . Among its admirers none is more decided than he whose decision is most important."

But Hallet's eyes and judgment, understandably perhaps, were captivated not at all. He, after all, was a professional architect and Thornton was not. And the District Commissioners, it turned out, made a bad mistake when, to appease the cantankerous Frenchman, they awarded him the same prize as Thornton (\$500 and a building lot in Washington), invited him to examine Thornton's plans (which he promptly ripped to pieces in a lengthy report), and gave him the \$400-a-year job of supervising the construction of the building (which he proceeded to change in accordance with his own ideas).

When it was discovered that Hallet had laid foundations for a square court, instead of the Rotunda Thornton had planned, President Washington, according to the long harassed Thornton, "expressed his disapproval in a style of such warmth as his dignity seldom permitted."

Hallet was fired. But since he refused to surrender the original plans, it is difficult to judge precisely how much influence he had on the design. Some historians have accepted Hallet's assertion that Thornton stole it from him in the first place. Glenn Brown, in his two heavy volumes on the history of the Capitol, defends Thornton's originality and competence with passionate eloquence.

The truth is probably as Latrobe has written, that Thornton's design was one of the most brilliant and modern of his time, but that the amateur lacked the practical skill to properly execute and articulate it. His, regardless of details, is no doubt the chaste, classic simplicity of the building that pleased Jefferson so well and that Walter's House and Senate wings lack. As any discerning art historian knows, it is impossible to recreate this spirit, the "Zeitgeist," as Germans call it, of a work of art. And although George Stewart's East Front now appears as an exact replica, future generations will, no doubt, instantly recognize it for what it is—a mid-20th century imitation.

Even Latrobe, aside from his jealous ambition, rebelled against Jefferson's and Thornton's pure classicism, though in the end he, like Bulfinch, faithfully executed Thornton's design. Besides he created the marvelous interiors of the original building.

Another difficulty was lack of skilled craftsmen. It proved hard to recruit carpenters and stone cutters who could build anything higher than thresholds.

Money, furthermore, was short. Washington's public buildings were to be financed from the sale of lots. But in the trackless wasteland where few streets were even marked, the real estate business was slow. The Government had to borrow money.

Under the circumstances, President Washington would not hear doing the building in marble as Thornton urged. There was none about at the time and it would have had to be imported at tremendous expense. Instead the original Capitol was built of sandstone from the nearby Acquia quarry and painted white.

#### CORRODED AND PAINT-CAKED

Sandstone is porous and has, as the incumbent Architect of the Capitol keeps pointing out with much alarm, corroded in

spots and is caked with the innumerable coats of paint. But Washington's sandstone is part of our history, too. And although it must, of course, be repaired, and although marble is unquestionably the most suitable building material, it should no more be changed for the sake of prettiness than we should put up plastic cherry trees around the Tidal Basin.

On Nov. 22, 1800, President John Adams welcomed Congress in the completed north wing of the building, congratulating the gentlemen "on the prospect of a residence not to be changed." Seven years later, built under the direction of Latrobe, the identical south wing was completed. The two were joined by a wooden arcade where the Rotunda now stands.

Latrobe was appointed by Jefferson in 1803. He was a most accomplished architect and engineer but just as arrogant and troublesome as Hallet had been—at least for poor Thornton. The two kept harpooning each other with bitter accusations and acid sarcasm.

Latrobe was born in England and trained partly in Germany. On a visit to Philadelphia, in 1798, he met the president of the Bank of Pennsylvania and in the course of a casual conversation made a sketch of what a bank ought to look like. Nine months later, to his great surprise, he had the commission.

Latrobe was almost unique among the architects of his time in believing in function as well as form. This led him to his many quibbles, not only with Thornton but with Jefferson as well, who would not have his conceptions of classic design altered for the sake of a more workable building.

Latrobe and Jefferson, for instance, disagreed violently over roofing the House of Representatives. Latrobe, for functional reasons, wanted a hemispheric dome lighted by a lantern with vertical glass panes that could be easily waterproofed. Jefferson wanted something like the dome over the new Halle aux Bles he had seen in Paris with long ribs springing from a drum and horizontal glass strips between them. It seemed to him more like the Pantheon in Rome.

The President had his way. Latrobe was sarcastic. "Presidents and Vice Presidents are the only architects and poets," he wrote his assistant. "... Therefore let us fall down and worship them..." The leaks Latrobe had predicted were fixed with some extra putty.

But Jefferson, like everyone else to this day, much admired Latrobe's handsome "cornucopia" capitals on the ornamental columns in the original Senate wing. It was a patriotic deed of much daring to replace the 2000-year-old acanthus leaf of antiquity with a motive as lowly—and American!—as carved ears of Indian corn.

#### BRITISH SET FIRES

"The Cossacks spared Paris," as one English newspaper remarked, but the British did not spare Washington and the fire damage they did to the Capitol in 1814 was extensive. The District Commissioners promised Congress, which had retreated to Sam Blodgett's nearby hotel, to have the building restored by 1816. It took 14 years longer.

Latrobe now did over much of the formerly wooden interiors in marble and metal, but was out of town a lot on other business and an increasing irritant to the growing bureaucracy. In 1817 he stiffly informed President James Monroe that he had "no choice between resignation and the sacrifice of all self-respect." He was spared the sacrifice. Bulfinch took over and to him goes the credit for completing the Capitol much as Thornton had envisioned it.

That job completed in 1830, there seemed no more need for an architect of the Capitol

and the position was abolished for many years.

In 1850 the country's population exceeded 23 million and even distant California had become a state. The 62 Senators and 232 Representatives who assembled that year felt crowded.

Again, following precedent, a competition was called. Again the munificent sum of \$500 was offered as first prize. And again the entries proved most unsatisfactory.

Robert Mills, the official government architect and engineer at the time, was asked to combine the various ideas the competition had brought out into a new scheme. Mills had designed the Washington Monument, the Treasury and the Patent Office (now the National Portrait Gallery), among other handsome buildings, but failed to please Congress on this job. After much hassle, President Fillmore appointed Thomas U. Walter to build the Capitol as we know it today.

Walter's design reflects a different America than Thornton's. The age of elegance and almost aristocratic refinement had yielded to a new sense of power—in fact, to a certain arrogance, and to the esthetic confusion of the beginning industrial revolution. Walter's idea of "classic" architecture was different from that of Thornton and Jefferson. He would, he once lectured, have architects think as the Greeks thought, not do as they did. And what he thought the Greeks thought was really what most Americans thought of—the manifest destiny of a new industrial empire.

Walter's nine million pound, cast-iron dome reflects this spirit. Besides, it was a great engineering feat. People often wonder how Walter got the 16-foot figure of Freedom way up there. It's quite simple. He merely built scaffolding straight up the middle of the rotunda, through the eye of the dome. From there he swung a derrick by means of which the ironwork could be hoisted up on the outside.

He left the interior of the original rotunda unchanged up to the top of the cornice. From there a new and higher inner dome was constructed.

The last constructive and truly handsome work on Capitol Hill was performed by Frederick Law Olmsted, America's greatest landscape architect, who, beginning with Central Park in New York, gave us fine city parks all over the country. Olmsted, in 1874, spruced up the Capitol grounds. He created the handsome plaza on the east of the building which has now been turned into a dismal parking lot. And he designed the marble terraces and grand stairs on the west which Stewart's extension scheme would also destroy, along with the architecture. They were, according to Olmsted, "to support, sustain and augment."

By the time all this was finished, Ulysses S. Grant was President, the flag had 38 stars and Congress again felt crowded.

Though long retired as Architect of the Capitol, Walter offered two remedies. His plans showed the Capitol enlarged like a blown-up balloon. Then the busy architectural firm of Smythmeyer & Pelz came along with a real lulu. Extending the Capitol east and west, they wanted to adorn it with towers and turrets in all directions. It was filed away.

In 1903, however, these ideas were again resurrected and a Joint Commission of Congress appointed architects Carrere & Hastings to study the possibility of extending the east front.

They recommended an extension of no more than 12½ feet to give Walter's dome better visual support. They called this Scheme A. In addition, they complied with the request of the Commission for more space but recommended against it. This

plan, called Scheme B, was to extend the east front by 32½ feet. With some slight amendments, the Commission approved Scheme B, despite the architects' recommendation to the contrary. But the Congress as a whole voted it down in 1905 and built the first House and Senate Office Buildings instead. Nothing was ever said about the west front.

Scheme B was brought up and voted down three times more—in 1935, 1937 and 1949. In 1955, a year after J. George Stewart was appointed Architect of the Capitol, legislation to extend the east front in substantial accordance with Scheme B was passed as a rider to the Legislative Appropriations Act. There were no public hearings or public debate. But the measure had the emphatic backing of Speaker Sam Rayburn. Many Congressmen apparently took any criticism of the scheme as a criticism of this popular leader. The deed was done.

#### A PROMISE BY RAYBURN

Again, nothing was ever said about the west front. On the contrary, Rayburn assured the Congress in 1958 that "we are not going to do anything with the west end."

Yet the present Commission for the Extension of the Capitol says that it derives its authority from the 1955 Scheme B legislation.

It proposes to bring out Thornton's portico by 44 feet and change its design by adding a pediment, widening it and adding more columns. Thornton's wings are to be brought out 88 feet. And Walter's corridors that connect the original building with his wings is to be extended by 65 feet. Olmsted's terrace and stairs are to be redesigned.

The yield: 4½ acres of space—a 25 per cent increase in the size of the present Capitol—to be used for two visitors' auditoriums, two cafeterias, four dining rooms, several conference rooms and 109 "hideaway" offices for Members of Congress.

The cost: an estimated \$34 million and the certain loss of a building that for a century—and-a-half has in Thomas Jefferson's words "captivated the eyes and judgment of all."

[From the Washington Post, July 26, 1966]

#### SAVING THE CAPITOL

The Senate Appropriations Committee yesterday took action that may save the West front of the Capitol from destruction. It attached to the legislative appropriations bill a provision that will defer expenditures on the extension of the West front until estimates on the cost of restoring the structure have been obtained.

It is to be hoped that the Senate will approve this proposal and that the House will concur. If this happens, it may well mean the end of the West front extension. Once the Congress has the full facts and knows that the West wall can be rebuilt and repaired where it stands, the plans of the Capitol Architect will face new troubles. The Committee is to be congratulated on a proposal that is such good sense that it is hard to figure out why this information wasn't demanded in the first place.

It is a good beginning in the fight to save the last remnant of the exterior of America's most historic building. When the West wall has been surveyed, Congress ought to proceed to enact further guaranties against destruction of the Capitol building. The West front, shamefully neglected for years, ought to be repaired and rebuilt where necessary. In addition, the great work of America's foremost landscape architect, Mr. Olmsted, on the stairways, terraces and approaches to the building must be safeguarded. These elaborate and richly ornamented architectural gems are basically as sound as on the day of construction, but they are destined for destruction, along with the main wall of the



West front, if the plans of Architect Stewart are carried out.

#### THE PUBLIC TRANSIT COMPACT BETWEEN MISSOURI AND KANSAS

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, Senate approval of S. 3051 yesterday indicates once again the concern of this body for the problems of metropolitan areas. This bill grants congressional consent of the bistate compact entered into by the State of Missouri and the State of Kansas to help solve the public transit problem of the Kansas City metropolitan area.

The compact creates the Kansas City Area Transportation District which includes parts of seven counties in the two States, and the Kansas City Area Transportation Authority, a public body to own and operate a transit system within the district.

The compact was approved by the legislatures and Governors of the two States last year at the request of leaders of various communities within the district. It was executed on December 28, 1965.

Public transit within the district at this time is completely uncoordinated and inadequate. A 10-month transit planning survey is now underway and the report is due this fall. The Missouri Legislature, recognizing the importance of getting the authority started, has appropriated \$50,000 for organization and initial operating expenses. Similar funds are also expected from local communities. This compact is vital to the growth and development of Kansas City.

Section 1 of the bill sets out the compact as agreed to by the two States. Section 2(a) specifies that obligations issued by the authority including income therefrom shall be subject to Federal tax laws. Section 2(b) spells out that the compact does not affect, impair, or diminish any rights, power, or jurisdiction of the United States except it specifically exempts the authority from ICC regulations as to its local transit operation within the district. The Interstate Commerce Act exempts local transit operations in commercial zones from ICC regulation. In this case, however, the district extends beyond the Kansas City commercial zone; thus, it seems fair and wise to provide this exemption. The ICC in its report to the committee has no objection to the exemption.

Section 2(c) provides that the authority shall exercise no additional powers other than those now prescribed without authorization by both States and the consent of Congress.

Section 2(d) expressly reserves to Congress the right to alter, amend, or repeal its consent.

I appreciate the swift action taken by the Senate.

#### THE TROUBLED TIMES IN WHICH WE LIVE

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, yesterday the Dow-Jones industrial average of the New York Stock Exchange fell 16.32 points, or 1.88 percent, to a new 1966 low of 852.83. This was the worst market

setback since November 22, 1963, the day President Kennedy was assassinated.

What caused this sharp loss of millions of dollars in the paper value of the shares traded on the exchange? Was it news of a national disaster? Did the foreign or domestic policies of the United States take a drastic change for the worse? No; it was none of these. It was simply the stock market and the people who deal in the stock market expressing their uncertainty of what the future holds for our country.

This uncertainty in the world's greatest marketplace is both domestic and international in scope.

Internationally, our close friends the British have embarked upon a program of austerity to save the value of the pound. The Labor government of Prime Minister Wilson has once again nationalized the British steel industry against strong opposition from the Conservatives.

In the field of international negotiations, the Kennedy round negotiations in Geneva remain at a standstill while the members of the EEC concentrate on mending the fences of the Common Market. Efforts to bring about international monetary reform have ground to a halt while the members of the Group of 10 bicker among themselves. In the meantime, the world's supply of monetary reserves continues to dwindle while we rapidly approach an international monetary crisis.

Here at home, we face uncertainty in every aspect of our economic, political, and social life.

What are we going to do about Vietnam? What are we going to do about inflation? Will we have higher taxes? These are all questions we ask ourselves every day.

Added to this are the riots in Chicago, New York, and Cleveland. The airline strike. The growing weak spots in our economy in the sectors dealing with home construction and automobile production. The tight money and high interest rate situation. And the slowdown in the growth rate of the economy.

All of these things add to our uncertainty, and nowhere are they more graphically portrayed than in the traditional barometer of national opinion, the stock market.

It is time we brought an end to all of this uncertainty. It is time we began to act positively instead of negatively in our foreign and domestic affairs.

This administration could easily do away with all of the uncertainty. Tell the American people the truth about Vietnam. Tell them how long it expects the war will last and how much it estimates it will cost.

Tell the American people the truth about the state of the economy. Tell them if it is believed that higher taxes are necessary to halt the spread of inflation.

Have the United States take the lead in the Kennedy round negotiations and in the negotiations on international monetary reform. Why should the richest industrial country in the world be dictated to by the Europeans in these

meetings? We should be leaders, not followers.

We are living in troubled and uncertain times, and they will continue to become more troubled and uncertain if we continue to permit this shroud of secrecy to surround the facts.

I have strong faith in the American people. They have been through good times and bad. They love their country. To them, no sacrifice is too great for her.

They are willing to stand by her in her darkest hour, but they cannot be expected to do this until they are told the facts. Therefore, I ask that this shroud of secrecy be removed. I ask that the facts be presented. I ask that this uncertainty which plagues our country today be removed from the minds of her citizens, and be replaced with the facts.

#### THE LIGHT OF HOPE SHINES THROUGH

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, out of the dark hours of the past 2 weeks, while the fate of American war prisoners has hung in the balance, comes the first ray of hope from Hanoi.

The weight of world opinion calling for humanitarian treatment of all war prisoners—including the "plea for sanity" issued on July 15, in which I was joined by 18 of my Senate colleagues who have opposed the escalation of the Vietnamese war—has apparently registered in Hanoi. North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh now indicates there is no trial in view for American military prisoners.

Let us hope this decision, as the New York Times expresses it in this morning's lead editorial, may offer hope that commonsense and common humanity ultimately may prevail against the ever greater barbarism the war in Vietnam daily inflicts on both sides.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this editorial, entitled "New Opportunity in Vietnam" may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### NEW OPPORTUNITY IN VIETNAM

President Ho Chi Minh's statement that there is "no trial in view" for American military prisoners in North Vietnam is a victory for the moral influence of world opinion. That victory transcends the fate of the captive airmen, for it offers hope that common sense and common humanity ultimately may prevail against the ever greater barbarism the war in Vietnam daily inflicts on both sides.

The United States has yielded to the pressure of world opinion in the past by offering peace proposals and twice suspending the bombing of North Vietnam. But this is the first time that Hanoi has shown regard for the opinion of mankind. Its decision to back away from talk of "war crimes trials" follows direct pleas from Secretary General Thant, Pope Paul VI, numerous governments and opinion leaders everywhere, including eighteen liberal American Senators. The hope now must be that reason can prevail on the broader issues of the war itself.

The conflict in Vietnam is a political struggle that, in the end, can only be resolved by political means. In politics, timing is of

the essence. A number of opportunities to probe the prospects for peace have been neglected in the past. It is vital that the new atmosphere and the new opportunity opened by Hanoi's response on the prisoner issue not be missed as well.

The approach favored by American moderates and long urged by *The Times* has just been summed up admirably by Prof. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. One essential element is to stop the Americanization of the war by halting the American buildup in South Vietnam; a quarter of a million American troops is more than enough. The second vital element is a civilian Government in Saigon that can open contact with the insurgent forces. Third, is the need to build an atmosphere conducive to negotiations by tapering off the bombing of North Vietnam. Finally, efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference must be linked with broad diplomatic discussions with Moscow, Paris and other interested states to find a formula for the neutralization and economic development of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Most of all, what is needed is a clear indication that the American objective is not military victory but political settlement. The American ability to escalate the war needs no further demonstration. The need now is to halt the escalation and make a vigorous new effort to achieve peace.

#### THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BOEING CO.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, while in my home State recently, I had the privilege of participating in the celebration of the 50th anniversary of one of this Nation's great aviation pioneers—the Boeing Co., of Seattle.

The major address on that occasion was delivered by Mr. Juan Trippe, chairman of the board of Pan American World Airways. I consider his address an inspiring lesson in American aircraft history, and a clear portrayal of the opportunity and challenge of the future for this great company and the others which will shape the destiny of air transportation.

The Boeing path to success has not been without difficulty and crisis. Almost all of it is familiar to me, for I have lived with these problems.

Mr. Trippe traced the history of Boeing from the first piano wire seaplane, delivered to the Navy as a trainer 2 years before the end of World War I, to the fabulous 747, which can well revolutionize the business of air transportation. From the tiny piano wire trainer to an aircraft that will carry 490 passengers and 16½ tons of baggage, mail, and freight, is vast progress in just half a century, but the determined faith and keen vision of Boeing Co. leadership promises that the coming 50 years will be even more significant.

The American aircraft industry, as Mr. Trippe suggested, is one of the toughest areas of competition in the Nation, and to merely survive, there must be constant steps forward toward an uncertain future. The Boeing Co. has done more than survive, and its aircraft today carry more than half the air travel of the free world. I salute this tower of progress in our national industrial scene, and I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Trippe's historic message be included in the *Record* at this point.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

Any lawyer can tell you that a corporation has powers but no personality and above all no soul. Imagination, daring, persistence, patience, vision, the great qualities of the human spirit, are beyond its reach. And yet we are met here today to pay the tribute of our respect and admiration to a corporation which has survived and prospered for fifty years precisely because it possesses and has exercised imagination and daring, vision and persistence—plus, of course, outstanding business acumen.

I have no wish, and certainly no competence, to rewrite the text books of corporation law, but I propose, nevertheless, to dwell on this paradox a moment. For the fact is that the history of the Boeing Company, when one looks back at it with the perspective of half a century, is more like some Norse saga or Greek epic which we learned about in high school than it is like a corporate record. Of course, there were board meetings and legal opinions and tax problems and all the rest of the familiar paraphernalia from one end of the story to the other. What I find myself thinking of, however, when I try to pull it all together in my mind is the fabulous journey of Ulysses, King of Ithaca, from one impossible adventure to another—and always with a high heart, a shrewd eye, a bold spirit and the never defeated determination to get back to Ithaca somehow—even if he, like the Greek god Hermes, had to fly.

The story begins, of course, rather more modestly than Homer's poem. There were no Topless Towers of Ilium to be conquered. Instead you have the Duwamish Flats here in Seattle and a young man out of Yale with extensive lumber holdings who knows about the Lafayette Esquadrielle and who would rather build planes than cut timber. This young man is named Bill Boeing. Along with such men as Donald Douglas, Glenn Martin and Frederick Rentschler, he is to found a new and vital industry.

To build his planes, he has assembled a few carpenters, a supply of spruce, some linen fabric and a number of rolls of piano wire together with propeller blades and what passed at the time for motors. He has somehow or other combined these several parts—exclusive of the carpenters—into airplanes—which actually fly and which are sold eventually as Navy trainers.

From the start, the Boeing enterprise succeeded. From the start, too, there were troubles and dangers—dangers to which the Corporation was to become accustomed as time went by. Two years after the first piano wire seaplane was delivered on the Duwamish Flats, World War I ended—as World War II was to end with similar consequences—thirty years later. The Navy's need of trainers ended with it.

The result, of course, was a conference of Bill Boeing and his associates to consider a question which arose with some persistence in those days: Was there a future in the aircraft business? And the answer, obviously—and I can say obviously because I knew Bill Boeing and because I knew well the characteristics he bred into his company—was yes. Or, more precisely, yes-if. There was a future in the aircraft business if you built a few seaplanes and a little household furniture on the side.

Incidentally, as the Chairman just pointed out, Mrs. Boeing is not with us tonight. Bill Boeing's son, I am glad to say, however, is with us. I would like to ask him to rise and be recognized.

While Bill Boeing's decision was a wise one at the time, it was not one that satisfied Bill Boeing. His heart was never in seaplanes or mahogany bureaus. He wanted to build

planes. But if you built planes, whom would you build them for? And the question remained: was there a future in the aircraft manufacturing business? Would operating aircraft ever be a business? Bill Boeing decided that the answer was "yes."

Bill Boeing's next decision was to go into the air mail business. Of this chapter in the story I can speak with personal knowledge. I had helped organize and was managing Colonial Air Transport when it started operations in October of 1925 as the first airline contractor to the Post Office Department. Colonial carried passengers and mail between Boston and New York where we made connections with the experimental government air mail line being run by the Post Office Department between New York, Chicago and San Francisco.

I well remember being present on July 1, 1924, when the experimental overnight service from New York to Chicago started. The airplane was a frail, temperamental wartime DH-4 in whose box-like nose an old Liberty engine clattered away. It could carry only a hatful of mail and a couple of hours' gas. The lone pilot had no blind-flying instruments, no safety aids except his parachute. Ahead of him were no marked airways, no chain of airports, no radio beam to guide him. His only ground aids were bonfires to be lit by friendly farmers on mountain tops along his way. His weather service was an eye cocked aloft—and a prayer.

Air transportation in those days was not a business. It was scarcely a hope of one. Postal revenue from the few pounds of mail the airplane could carry hardly paid for the gasoline. You couldn't find a passenger revenue dollar with a telescope. And capital was even harder to uncover.

Late in 1926, the Post Office Department wisely decided also to transfer its experimental transcontinental service to private enterprise. Bill Boeing decided to bid on the larger portion of this trunkline route, between Chicago and San Francisco. His bid was far below that of his nearest competitor for he would use a new airplane—the 40A—which he would build, equipped with a new and more efficient engine, the Pratt and Whitney Wasp Radial.

Although his bid was successful, for Bill Boeing the outlook was dim when, a month ahead of target, only one of his 40As was in service.

Nevertheless, by July 1, 1927, the contract starting date, twenty-five of the new planes were ready to fly. They had actually been delivered to their appointed places along the two thousand miles of the new route.

It was a prophetic operation—and in more ways than one. Boeing's business gamble paid off over the next two years. Thirteen hundred tons of mail were carried. Six thousand passengers, more or less smothered under the mail bags, had entrusted themselves successfully to the Boeing airline.

Once Bill Boeing had satisfied himself that you could build transport planes to carry mail and people at a profit, things began to hum at Boeing. The Boeing 247, the first twin-engine transport, followed the 40A in 1933—carrying 10 passengers, a crew of two and—oh, great and unsung date in American history, a stewardess as well. The whole thirteen of them roared across the continent in a mere twenty hours with only seven stops!

We, in Pan American, were engaged in those years in charting and testing the great overseas routes which soon made transpacific and transatlantic service possible. We remember with gratitude today the early Sikorskis, the S-38, and S-40 and S-42, the Martin China Clippers and the great Boeing Yankee Clippers which pioneered the trade routes across the Atlantic and Pacific.

It was Boeing that built the first pressurized transport, the four-engined 307. Later came the Douglas DC4 and the Lockheed Constellation. And we all remember



the great Boeing 377s, the glamorous double-decked Stratocruisers that for many years led the way over the ocean trade routes.

Still later came the Douglas DC6 and DC7 series and the successive models of the Lockheed Constellation. One of the reasons why the aviation industry of the United States leads the world is the vigorous competition that has always characterized the industry. Boeing, in the best American business tradition, has always had to face outstanding competitors.

But there was one development of these critical years for which Boeing, and Boeing alone, must take the credit. I refer to the plane to which this Republic owes more, perhaps, than to any other in the history of aviation: the B-17. If there is one event in the rich and fabulous history of the Boeing Corporation which illustrates better than another the Company's imagination, its daring and its fundamental know-how, it was the building of the Flying Fortress.

The story begins, simply enough, with the Corporation designing and building, at its own cost and with its own resources, a prototype later identified as the B-17, a four-engined, heavily armed bomber with a range of three thousand miles and a top speed of two hundred and thirty-six miles an hour.

Now this, my friends, was the year 1934, with the Second World War five years off. A romantic historian with the historian's professional advantage of looking backward, might be excused for endowing the Boeing Company with second sight. Why? Because the B-17 played a larger part in winning the Second World War than any other weapon.

Unfortunately for romantic historians, however, no second sight was available in the government in 1934. The War Department then rejected the four-engined bomber as too advanced, not to say visionary, leaving the Boeing Company to hold the bag and also—fortunately for the nation—the B-17 as well. But Boeing itself that year was thinking of planes—as it has always thought of them—with a free-wheeling, uninhibited imagination and the intestinal fortitude to make its dream come true.

How true it came, a few statistics will suggest. When Hitler exterminated himself under the bunker in Berlin and the war in Europe ended, thirteen thousand B-17s had been built. The B-17s had dropped six hundred and forty thousand tons of bombs on Nazi installations and industries. Moreover, B-17s had shot down as many enemy aircraft over Europe as all other American planes combined. Yes, many of us here tonight can vividly recall the American bomber bases along the East Coast of Britain. We who saw them will never forget the spectacle of the departing armadas or the sight of the Flying Fortresses returning at dusk—those that did return.

The B-17, tried and tested in the war, also aired the great B-29 that became the basis for American strategy in the Pacific.

The parade of big Boeing bombers—weapons systems as we call them these days—continued on after the war with the six-engined Strato-jet, the B-47, and today the tremendous B-52, capable of carrying heavier and more effective weapons farther than any other airplane now in existence or in prospect.

As long as men remember the Second World War and the world which followed it—and men, I suspect, will remember them for a long time—Boeing's fame as armorer to the Republic will be secure.

If the military story is brilliant, the peacetime story has about it the elements of greatness, of true greatness. If the first has inventiveness, the second has vision. The peacetime story of Boeing is the story of its leadership in the development of the airplane as an instrument of human com-

munication; as a reshaper of the planet; as a modifier of the relations of human beings to each other; as a destroyer of strangeness and the fears and the prejudices which have always fed on strangeness; as the one real hope of our common brotherhood, our common fate.

The post-war story begins, as great dramas often do, with disaster or the threat of disaster. It ends with triumph. And it discovers on the way, if I may say so in his very modest presence, as authentic a hero as American industry has ever produced.

The near disaster was the post-war deflation of the aircraft industry. The triumph was the technological and industrial revolution which replaced the piston plane with the jet. And the hero was a one-time teenage cherry hawker of Lolo, Montana, named William M. Allen. William M. Allen on September 1, 1945, because President of Boeing by the improbable route of the Harvard Law School. He succeeded Phil Johnson and Clair Egvedt, both able administrators, who had directed Boeing for many years. Clair Egvedt, I am glad to say, is also here with us tonight. I would ask that he stand up and be recognized.

Bill Allen could hardly have chosen a more inauspicious date to take over. The war had just ended. An important contract for B-29s had just been cancelled. A plant in Wichita had shut down. A sweeping cut-back had followed here in Seattle itself.

Within sixty days, a billion and a half in contracts had been cancelled. Thirty-eight thousand workers had been laid off. Boeing's assets were down from a hundred million to thirty-three million.

Bill Allen told his wife the roof had fallen in. He was wrong. It hadn't—yet. On January 1, 1946, there was a strike of fourteen thousand workers. The work stoppage continued a hundred and fifty-four days. In addition, fifty-six Stratocruisers, on order by Pan Am and other airlines, were proving costly to produce. Instead of recovering momentum, Boeing lost fifteen million dollars on the transaction.

At this low point, Bill Allen and the Boeing Company showed their quality—which is to say, their courage. In 1949, after the three worst years in its history, Boeing suggested to the industry that the time had come for a major revolution in the manufacture of planes—a switch from piston-driven craft to jets which would eventually mean the rebuilding of the airfleets of the world. When the industry demurred—reluctant to get in deeper when the water was already cold—Boeing went ahead itself. In 1952, without an order in hand, it announced that it was investing sixteen millions of its own funds to build the prototype of "an entirely new, jet-powered transport." The prototype was to be derived from the tankers that Boeing was building for the U.S. Air Force.

The announcement was followed by action. On July 15, 1954, exactly twelve years ago, the prototype was flown. It was the forerunner of the world-famous 707.

If I were asked to name some of the events which have most dramatically changed the shape of things in our world during my lifetime, I should put that flight very near the top of the list. It promised a new dimension of speed, a new standard of reliability in the business of moving people and things from one point on the earth's surface to another. For millions of people, the 707 would shrink the globe by 40 per cent. Today, our world is a neighborhood. Today, government leaders, businessmen, teachers and scientists the world over meet face to face. They know each other.

But let us not forget that 70 per cent of Americans have yet to fly. Let us not forget that 98 per cent of the people of this world have yet to fly. Great as was the contribution of the 707, the contribution of the 747,

the great Boeing superjet, will be even greater.

The 747 will carry 490 passengers plus 16½ tons of baggage, mail and freight. In all-cargo configuration it will carry more than twice the cargo of today's big transports. Its cargo will be carried in automated, nose-loaded highway-standard containers. Its great Pratt and Whitney engines will have twice the thrust of any in airline service today. Its gross weight will be more than twice today's big 707s. It will operate at 45,000 feet above lower airplanes used by all jet transports now in service. It will provide faster service on world trade routes. Lower operating costs will reduce air fares and cargo rates.

Construction of the 747s will provide employment for 55,000 people over a dozen forward years—20,000 here in Seattle; 10,000 at United Aircraft in Hartford; 25,000 more by subcontractors in 43 other states. By December, 1972, the sale abroad of 747s should contribute one billion seven hundred million dollars to the U. S. balance of payments. By December 1975, the contribution will, in my opinion, reach three billion, four hundred million dollars.

The 747 is a bold and gigantic venture in the best tradition of American industry. Competitive American private enterprise in our world has always produced the best products and the best services. Private credit and private risk-taking on a scale as yet unmatched in industry have made the 747 possible. For 20 years the 747 will mean fast, low-cost mass transportation on a scale never before available for the traveling and shipping public at home and abroad.

Far more important than its effect on fares and rates, however, will be its effect on human society and human history. The new era of mass travel between nations may well prove more significant to human destiny than the atom bomb. There can be no atom bomb potentially more powerful than the air tourist, charged with curiosity, enthusiasm and good will—who can roam the four corners of the world, meeting in friendship and understanding the people of other nations and races. The tourist plane, the bomber, and now the missile, have been racing each other to a fateful finish. In my opinion, the huge 747 can help win this race with catastrophe. The 747 will be a great new weapon for peace.

Tonight, however, we are saluting the Boeing of today as well as the Boeing of tomorrow. In honoring the company, we are paying tribute not only to its great leaders, but also to its able executives, scientists, engineers, mechanics, administrators and skilled men and women who, over the years, have created the Boeing of today.

The Boeing of today has produced the world-girdling jet fleet that carries half the air travel of the whole Free World. It is the largest government contractor in the nation. In the best tradition of American private enterprise, it has become the largest aerospace company in all the world. We salute the Boeing Company for its physical accomplishments and its contributions to the nation. But we also salute, on behalf of the entire aviation industry, an adventurous and imaginative Corporation—which has written its own saga—created its own legend—in a day in which these great assertions of the human spirit, are as rare as they are greatly needed.

#### VIETNAM—STATEMENT BY GENERAL KY

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] will shortly return to the Chamber and make some comments about a column which appeared in the Washington Post this

morning by Walter Lippmann under the subject of "An Old Slogan."

The Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] will at that time ask unanimous consent to have the column printed in the RECORD.

The Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] a few moments ago obtained unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the leading editorial in this morning's New York Times entitled "New Opportunity in Vietnam."

I find myself in complete accord with this column and this editorial.

This morning's papers carry an account of an article consisting of an interview with Premier Ky of South Vietnam which appears in this week's issue of U.S. News & World Report.

I wish to comment briefly on the interrelationship between the Lippmann column, the New York Times editorial, and the interview of General Ky.

It is well known that General Ky stated publicly for a well-known British newspaper not too long ago that Adolf Hitler was his hero.

This was well before the famous Honolulu conference at which General Ky was embraced as a noble ally of the United States. General Ky now favors the American people with the suggestion that an armed confrontation with Communist China would be desirable at the present time. He concludes that Communist China is the real enemy in southeast Asia and thinks it is better to face them right now than in 5 or 10 years. Some of us will remember that there were certain Americans who felt the same way about the Soviet Union shortly after World War II. It was thought, after they got the bomb, long after we did, that we should go in and in the phrase of the day, "Clobber them before they clobber us."

Fortunately, that counsel did not prevail. It occurs to me that General Ky is a daily source of embarrassment to the administration. He states that his government is not a dictatorship, but I doubt whether we could find a reputable newspaperman in Vietnam, in Saigon, or anywhere else there, who would agree with that statement. The fact is, we are supporting a tight little dictatorship—a junta—which in terms of its ideology is no more democratic than the Vietcong against whom it is contending.

It is true that we have been promised elections in South Vietnam in September, but it will, indeed, be interesting to see whether those elections are going to be like free American elections, whether they are going to be like the Hitler elections which used to be conducted in Nazi Germany or, indeed, whether they will be like the Russian elections with which we have become familiar, where one either votes "right," with the government, or he is in serious trouble and possibly in physical danger.

I am extremely skeptical about General Ky's devotion to the cause of democracy. I think he is a great liability to the efforts of the administration to persuade the peoples of the world that we are, indeed, fighting on the side of freedom and against dictatorship.

I thoroughly concur with the statements published in the New York Times editorial, to which I referred earlier, that President Ho Chi Minh's statement that there is no trial in view for American military prisoners of war in North Vietnam is a victory for the moral influence of world opinion. It does, I believe, offer hope that commonsense and common humanity may eventually prevail against the ever greater barbarism on both sides of the war in Vietnam.

I would hope that this interview by General Ky will not again dim the hopes for a fair negotiated peace. I would hope that reason can prevail on the broad issues of the war itself before it is too late.

There is no doubt about the fact that the war is not going to be settled by military means. It is a political struggle which can be resolved only by political means. We will receive little help in settling the struggle by political means from General Ky and the other members of his junta.

I would suggest, in accord with the views expressed by my friend, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., that we take the following steps:

First, stop the Americanization of the war by halting the American military buildup in South Vietnam. A quarter of a million American fighting troops is plenty—if not too many.

Second, install a civilian government in Saigon. Get rid of the junta. At least, give some semblance of a free democratic regime in that war torn country.

Third, we need to build an atmosphere conducive to negotiations by tapering off the bombing of North Vietnam, which I categorically assert has been a catastrophic failure.

As widely predicted, all it has done has been to stiffen the will of the North Vietnamese people, without destroying any military installations essential to the continued conduct of the war.

It has embittered both sides.

This morning, I had the opportunity to talk to a young lieutenant in the Naval Reserve, a brilliant and outstanding young naval airman who has just returned from conducting missions in Vietnam. There is no doubt about the fact that the defenses of North Vietnam against our air attacks are increasing every day. American casualties are increasing as the number of strikes increase. The tragic deaths of these young Americans, in my opinion, cannot be justified on any ground whatsoever. What we should do is build an atmosphere conducive to negotiations, and not continue, with the help of General Ky, to build an atmosphere which feeds on escalation and insists on total military victory even at the cost of destroying the country we are presumably attempting to preserve.

Finally, the best hope is still to persuade the reluctant Russians to join with the British in reconvening the Geneva Conference so that we can, around the conference table, with all interested parties, including a representative of the National Liberation Front try to come up with a formula for the neutralization and economic development of southeast Asia as a whole.

In this connection, and I am sure that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] will have more to say on this subject, the article written by Walter Lippmann which the Senator from Oregon will shortly offer for the RECORD, is as good an exposition of how tired and obsolete our policy in Vietnam has become as I have ever seen.

I do not know what the administration reads these days, but I hope they read Mr. Lippmann, Mr. Reston, and the editorials in the great newspapers of the country. I would also hope that we could get away from the tired reiteration of a philosophy which, as I said a minute ago, is obsolete and unworkable, and turn our minds toward peace rather than war, before it is too late.

#### U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, there are two items on which I wish to comment briefly. I had not intended to comment on the first item until I listened to the brilliant and eloquent and unanswerable speech of the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK].

The Senator from Pennsylvania and I may have some degrees of difference, as the RECORD will show, in regard to the war in Vietnam. But we have a common objective—that is, to seek an honorable peace at the earliest possible date which will bring to an end this completely inexcusable and unjustifiable killing of American boys in South Vietnam.

The Senator from Pennsylvania has referred to the Walter Lippmann article which was published in this morning's Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### AN OLD SLOGAN

(By Walter Lippmann)

Campaigning in the Middle West the President has used as one of his main theses the cry that the war in Vietnam is a war to end wars like the one in Vietnam. "If guerrilla warfare succeeds in Asia," he said, "it can also succeed in Africa and Latin America as well." This is precisely what we all said during the First World War. That was a "war to end war." To hear that old slogan brought out again is, to say the least, creepy. For not only did the First World War not end war, as a matter of fact it sowed the ground for the Second World War.

Presumably the President means what he is saying. But it is hard to think that anyone can believe that the outcome in Vietnam will determine whether there are guerrilla wars "in Africa and Latin America," or even in other parts of Asia. Are we really supposed to believe that the future of guerrilla warfare, that is to say of rebellion, will be determined by what happens in Vietnam?

What is the connection between the guerrilla wars waged in Ireland, Palestine, Armenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Crete, Algeria, the Congo? Were not these uprisings separate events? How can anyone deceive himself with the notion that uprisings all over the globe have some kind of underground common instigator and that they can be suppressed and discouraged by what happens in one small corner of the world?

Fifty years ago when the cry of "a war to end war" was first heard, it was used to inspire people who, themselves remote from the fighting, needed a motive to keep on



with the battle. The slogan was invented by an Englishman to arouse the insular British and the isolationist Americans who, not being under fire, saw no clear vital interests which they were defending.

Mr. Johnson has dusted off the old war slogan because it is not easy to prove to the American people that they are fighting for a vital interest of the United States. In the First World War the United States did have a vital interest, which was to prevent the conquest of Great Britain and France and to keep open the Atlantic connection with Europe. This was a difficult thing to explain in the excitement of a war, and in lieu of a true explanation of the issues of the war we fell back upon the slogan of a war to end war.

In Asia the United States does indeed have a vital interest in preventing the conquest of the Asian mainland and of the islands and archipelagoes of the western Pacific. But there is no convincing reason for thinking that the war in Vietnam as it has now developed, is vital to the American interests in the world. The American position has always been that our interest in Asia must be defended and promoted without America becoming involved in such a land war as is now raging in Vietnam.

President Johnson sustained his argument about a war to end guerrilla war with loud protestations about the firmness of our intentions to persevere and to defeat guerrilla warfare. Is he sure that what people see happening in Vietnam convinces them of this? Does the deeper and deeper involvement in Vietnam indicate that we would put equal effort into another antiguerrilla war on some other continent? Or does the Vietnamese affair indicate that we would not be able to fight two or three such wars at the same time?

This is another reason for wanting to believe that this one disagreeable war, this one ever-expanding war, is the last and only war that will have to be fought. But to want to believe this does not make it believable.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, this article is, I think, another one of Mr. Lippmann's penetrating analyses of American foreign policy in Vietnam. As he has pointed out time and time again in his articles—in fact, he has written not so many but almost as many articles as I have spoken on the floor of the Senate on this subject—but in his penetrating article I think that he has pierced the administration's balloon by way of its continued fallacious rationalizations for carrying on the war.

He says, in the column:

Campaigning in the Middle West the President has used as one of his main theses the cry that the war in Vietnam is a war to end wars like the one in Vietnam. "If guerrilla warfare succeeds in Asia," he said, "it can also succeed in Africa and Latin America as well." This is precisely what we all said during the First World War. That was "a war to end war." To hear that old slogan brought out again is, to say the least, creepy. For not only did the First World War not end war, as a matter of fact it sowed the ground for the Second World War.

Later in the column he says:

In Asia the United States does indeed have a vital interest in preventing the conquest of the Asian mainland and of the islands and archipelagoes of the western Pacific. But there is no convincing reason for thinking that the war in Vietnam as it has now developed, is vital to the American interests in the world. The American position has always been that our interest in Asia must be defended and promoted without America be-

coming involved in such a land war as is now raging in Vietnam.

Not only is a land war raging in Vietnam at the present time, but my great fear—in fact, my belief—is that every sign points to an increasing escalation in Asia that will involve, not 300,000 troops, but start to involve 3 million and more American troops in a land war in Asia.

I want to say to my President again tonight, if you continue to lead this Nation down the road to a continually escalating war, you are going to have to assume the responsibility in history for sending American troops to Asia by the millions.

The moment that war involves a land war with China, we are not going to fight it with air power. I do not think the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] could be more right in his conclusion that our bombing of Vietnam has been a failure. The indications are, from information we gather from North Vietnam and from representatives of neutral countries who have access to North Vietnam, it has intensified the determination of the North Vietnamese to fight to the last person.

So would we if we were put in the same position they are.

If we want to give the benefit of doubt to the President that the shocking course of escalation he is approving will force a surrender, it will not produce peace.

Another article which appeared in today's paper, but which I do not have at my fingertips, states that it would result in having for decades to come, a guerrilla war.

Mr. President, this war cannot be won with military might. As the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] has said, the solutions over there are not military solutions, but political solutions. Therefore, we had better give some heed to what the Senator from Pennsylvania outlined tonight in the steps we should take in an attempt to bring the war to an end, for as Lippmann points out:

Asia must be defended and promoted without America becoming involved in such a land war as is now raging in Vietnam.

We had better give much thought to the interview in U.S. News & World Report referred to by the Senator from Pennsylvania involving General Ky. I quite agree with the Senator from Pennsylvania's appraisal of General Ky. It is a very sad thing that we are supporting that little tyrant and that American boys are dying to keep him in power.

The superpatriots in this country are taking to flag waving and the following of slogans rather than the following of facts. We had better take a look in retrospect. It was not so long ago that I warned on the floor of the Senate against following the advice of the little tyrant as he advocated the bombing of North Vietnam.

Oh, there was much protest in this country from administration spokesmen against the bombing of North Vietnam. But that was the trial balloon; that was the beginning of the propaganda; that was the beginning of the agitation in this country to lead us into the bombing of

North Vietnam. Not long thereafter, we began the bombing of North Vietnam, and we have been continuing to bomb and bomb. Now we are bombing within 3 miles of the heart of the city of Hanoi, and the administration continues to tell us we are not killing civilians. That is not the report we get from foreign sources. Of course, we ought to take judicial notice that it is not possible to bomb within 3 miles of the heart of Hanoi and not be killing civilians.

This is dangerous business. The story that the President told in his trip through Kentucky and Indiana over the last weekend was quite different from the promises he made to the American people in 1964. When he was seeking reelection, he was seeking it on the basis of no such war propaganda as he advocated in his speeches in Kentucky and Indiana during the last weekend. To the contrary, he was telling the American people that the war was an Asian war for Asian boys to fight, not for American boys to fight.

Millions of Americans of the Republican Party voted for him as they rejected their own party's candidate, because they were led to believe that Lyndon B. Johnson, the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, was promising them that he would not follow a foreign policy that would result in American boys fighting a war in Asia that Asian boys should fight.

I am never happy, and I shall never be happy, disagreeing with the policy of my Government in the field of foreign affairs; but I shall continue to disagree with it so long as the policy is the present policy, for that policy is unjustified and immoral. It is not possible to reconcile it on the basis of our international commitments and of our constitutional obligations.

So I quite agree with the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] that the war should be stopped; and we can stop it. That is why I say that the President ought to recognize what his military advisers recognized, and what his military advisers on occasion have briefed us—and it is public knowledge: that China cannot be defeated by bombing, nuclear or conventional. If we continue to let the little tyrant Ky egg us on into more and more military operations in North Vietnam and the sending of an American army into North Vietnam, it will not be long before that army will be involved with Chinese soldiers on the other side, because it is not possible to get that close to the China border without the Chinese recognizing that they will have to respond.

In fact, the reports appearing in the papers in the last 3 days—again from correspondents over there representing foreign newspapers—tell us that there is increasing indication that Red China recognizes that it is only a matter of time before she will have to respond to America's outlawry in Asia.

If we get ourselves involved in a land war with China, the sacrifices that we shall have to make of these precious American men whom we are sending over into a war—not a one of whom should have been sent in the first place—will

discredit, in history, any President who is responsible for it.

It is not too late for us to return to moral values. It is not too late for this great religious people to insist that their government practice our religious principles in the field of foreign policy, too. And we cannot square this war, in my judgment, with the tenets of our religions.

Well, Mr. President, what should the President do? I repeat, he should announce to the world that we are stopping our bombing. He should announce to the world that we intend to hold those positions that we can hold and completely defend, and prevent the advance of the enemy, and thereby also stop advancing our own boys into an escalated engagement or series of engagements. Because, as we send them out into these battlefields, as we sit in our living-rooms—as I did last night—and observe some of the television pictures of this war being fought, with its killing, on the television screen, we must ask ourselves, "By what right does our President send those boys to their death?"

I say he has no justifiable right. He ought to adopt the military strategy of the leader who led our forces in Korea, General Ridgway. He, in my judgment, is the man whose advice should be followed. He has made perfectly clear his opposition to the escalating of this war.

The President ought to follow the advice of General Gavin, who, when he was in uniform—and he has only lately retired—was one of the two or three top military strategists of our entire Military Establishment.

What do these leaders tell us, and the other military authorities who join them? "You ought to stop the escalating. You ought to mark out those lines of defense that we know we can hold and the enemy cannot penetrate."

That places upon the President the responsibility for taking the next step, and that is to notify the nations of the world who claim they want peace to come on in and assume their obligations under their international commitments, to enforce a peace. That group of nations includes Great Britain, whose Prime Minister is coming over here. He gives lipservice to America's policy, and tells the people of the United States he is all for our position in South Vietnam.

But no British boy is dying in South Vietnam. No British boy is being sent to battle in South Vietnam by the British Prime Minister. I wish to say, he makes no favorable impression on me, with his lipservice of supporting America's war in South Vietnam, while he himself is not willing to back up his words with military support. Why, Mr. President? Obviously because the British people recognize that they should not be involved in this war.

Mr. President, the British Prime Minister and the heads of the major countries of the world, including Russia, have a clear obligation, under the United Nations Charter, to enforce a peace in southeast Asia. Therefore, the President ought to adopt what is known as the enclave approach for the time being, and agree to support a cease-fire when-

ever these other nations are willing to declare it, backed up by their pledge that they will help enforce it.

Unless we do that, Mr. President, there will be no peace in Asia. There may be a surrender of a kind, but no peace. And this country will be bled white from the standpoint of the blood of the men who will be sacrificed, and bled white economically, as we spend the billions of dollars that it will take from the people of this country to maintain the police force that we will have to maintain in Asia after our great military power does all the devastating that can be done with nuclear and conventional bombing.

But that, as this administration's military spokesman knows, will not win a peace in Asia.

Yes, there is disunity in America, and the man more responsible for it than anyone else in the Nation is the President of the United States. Because it is the President's foreign policy that has created this disunity, and this disunity will not be made to vanish, Mr. President, by any such set of speeches as the President made in Kentucky and in Indiana over the weekend.

I would like to see unity. But, Mr. President, there are too many who recognize that a President has no justifiable right to send these boys to their slaughter without a declaration of war, under the Constitution of the United States. And why does he not call for it? He does not dare. He does not dare, not only because any proposal on his part for a declaration of war would not only deepen the disunity in the United States until a declaration is passed—if it is passed—but because it would alienate more and more of the countries in the world that we would like to have as our allies.

And so, Mr. President, I think the President has a great obligation, in the absence of a declaration of war, to proceed to announce to the world that we are going to stop the escalating.

We are not going to get out of Vietnam. I have never proposed that we get out of Vietnam. We are going to hold there in positions that we can defend in order to prevent the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese from creating a great blood bath.

Then we are going to say to the rest of the world, "You too, have a stake in peace in southeast Asia, and we are going to hold there until you have an opportunity to come in and carry out your international obligation."

I intend to continue to hold to that position until there is a declaration of war, if one comes.

On the basis of the present facts, I would vote against it, but if there is a declaration of war, it is for Congress to do and not the President. He can recommend it.

He ought to read again the war messages of great Presidents before him, and particularly the war message of Woodrow Wilson at the time of World War I, when he said to the joint session of Congress that he was without constitutional authority to make war without congressional declaration of war.

Mr. President, I think my President owes it to the American people to either

deescalate this war or to lay the issues squarely before the people and Congress with a proposed declaration of war, and let the people be the judge.

Although I disagree with my President in the field of foreign policy, I agree with him on so many matters in other fields, and particularly in the field of domestic policy, that I think it is a shame that some way, somehow, this great man—for he is a great man—does not recognize the horrendous mistake that he is making by following the foreign policy that, in my judgment, a Secretary of State, a Secretary of Defense, and some other bad advisers have apparently sold to him.

I shall never give up hope that the facts will finally get through to him and he will change our course of action.

#### THE AIRLINE STRIKE

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Breaking the Air Blockade," printed in the New York Times of this morning.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### BREAKING THE AIR BLOCKADE

Congressional action has plainly become the only realistic hope for a quick end to the paralyzing airlines strike. The Senate Labor Committee will hear from members of President Johnson's Cabinet today precisely how seriously the strike's impact has been. We hope its hearing will be followed by swift passage of legislation to get the planes back into the air and thus restore normalcy to a key segment of the nation's transportation lifeline.

We have already expressed our belief that Congress should do what it did in the 1963 rail strike threat and impose compulsory arbitration. But it is plain that, with Congressional elections only a little over three months off, the mood on Capitol Hill is not strong for legislation that would thus affront organized labor. Under these circumstances the best stop gap measure would be the revised bill proposed by Senator Morse for a new cooling-off period of 180 days. That would get everybody back on the job while a new Presidential board tried to end the wage dispute. If it got nowhere after 180 days, it would make recommendations to the President and he, in turn, would tell Congress what he thought it ought to do to assure a final settlement.

This is certainly the long way around in a controversy that has already been before a Presidential emergency board, headed by Senator Morse—a board whose recommendations the President has endorsed without reservation. The unhappy history of past disputes makes it probable that much of the Government's focus in the new truce period will be on purchasing peace through appeasement of the union by management, even though the terms the union is now rejecting exceed the Administration's anti-inflation guideposts.

It is obvious that no adequate solution to problems of this sort will be found until the White House and Congress are willing to discard politics and grapple with the intricate problems involved in any long-range recasting of the national emergency provisions of the present Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Acts. At least the 180-day truce will postpone a fresh showdown until after the elections. Perhaps then there will be enough resolution in Washington to consider answers, not expedients.



Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the first sentence reads:

Congressional action has plainly become the only realistic hope for a quick end to the paralyzing airline strike.

Mr. President, I was very much interested in an item that came over the ticker a little while ago. It reads:

AFL-CIO President George Meany urged the Senate to drop plans to intervene.

"Sen. MORSE's bill already has served as a deterrent to free collective bargaining," Meany said in a statement.

"Every minute Congress spends on this ill-advised proposal keeps the parties from honest negotiations, the only sound method for resolving this dispute," Meany said, adding:

"No danger to the Nation's health and welfare and no threat to the national defense has been demonstrated. The air traveling public has, of course, been inconvenienced, but inconvenience is a small price to pay for freedom."

And he claims to be a labor leader. Mr. President, I served with George Meany on the War Labor Board during World War II. Apparently he has suffered some lapses of memory.

George Meany apparently forgets the times that he sat on the War Labor Board and voted for seizure of American plants and industry in order to protect the public interest.

The bill that I first introduced last Friday was very similar to the policies that we followed in World War II. Wherever it was demonstrated on the facts that the paramount public interest in time of war was going to be sacrificed because of the adamancy either of a union or of an employer, the War Labor Board decided sometimes with labor, and sometimes with management to take over the plant.

The majority of the Board time and time again decided that in order to protect the paramount public interest, the American flag had to be run up over that plant, and that all of them would have to work for that flag. However, the workers would get fair wages and the employers would receive a guarantee that they would get the benefits that would come from the business under Government management. Not a managerial officer was moved from behind a manager's desk.

The so-called seizure was by token. The proposal I offered last Friday was of the same import. There would have been a receivership instead of a seizure under my resolution. Management would have stayed behind the desk. In the War Labor Board days, the so-called income from the plant would go into the Treasury of the United States, and the owners of the plant were guaranteed compensation for the operation of the plant.

Mr. President, the management made more money under that arrangement because of the benefits they received than they would have made under their own management.

I understand why there was concern about my bill of last Friday on the part of managerial forces in the country, in that they thought it might be a bad precedent for a receivership and various kinds of Government seizures.

After a weekend of consultations with the administration, I introduced a substitute for it yesterday, which is the pending proposal as far as my legislation is concerned. The Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] has offered a compulsory arbitration proposal. The Senator from Colorado [Mr. DOMINICK], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the senior Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], and the junior Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] have all offered their own particular proposals for a settlement of this dispute. However, my proposal would amend the Railway Labor Act by extending the no-strike period another 180 days, if the dispute should last that long.

Let me say for the benefit of Mr. George Meany that this legislation could well bring a settlement in less than 30 days, and probably in 10.

He knows it, too, and I am satisfied that that is probably one of the reasons why he does not want legislation, because the settlement will not be the type of settlement that is going to be coerced out of the American public if this union is permitted in time of war to continue to use its economic might against the interest of the general public.

Mr. President, they are entitled to a good settlement. My resolution provides a guarantee that whenever the settlement is reached, it shall be retroactive to January 1, 1966, excluding of course the period of time for the duration of the strike.

Mr. President, legislation is necessary, because, contrary to what Mr. George Meany says in this press release, there has not been any good faith, free collective bargaining on the basis of this union.

I was chairman of the President's Emergency Board. It conducted the hearings under the Railway Labor Act following the refusal of this union to agree to the proffer of arbitration submitted to it by the National Mediation Board. It is the requirement the National Mediation Board that functions under the Railway Labor Act has to comply with, once it comes to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable deadlock.

Before the Emergency Board, of which I am Chairman, was appointed, the National Mediation Board had come to the conclusion that collective bargaining had ended. Mr. Meany should read the history of the case. Then the National Mediation Board made the proposal for arbitration, and the union turned it down. I am satisfied that from the beginning of this dispute, the union has had no intention other than to get its demands by the use of economic force.

This is a regulated industry. This is an industry, as I have said, that works 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year. The very nature of this industry guarantees to its workers a type of job guarantee that is not available to most American workers.

The workers in this industry are blue ribbon workers. The workers in this industry receive an average income substantially above the average for all industrial workers of the country.

These are not underpaid workers. These are workers who are entitled to a

pay increase, a fair and reasonable pay increase.

The President's Emergency Board unanimously agreed upon a set of recommendations that would have provided them with a fair wage increase, good fringe benefits, including an additional holiday, and improvement in their vacation allowances as well as improvement in the other so-called fringe factors.

The union wants more. This union recognizes that the economy of this country is in danger. It occupies a position of great economic strength at this hour, and it intends to take advantage of that economic strength and force by way of a strike-out of the economic interests of the American people, an advantage to which it is not entitled.

Of course, Mr. Meany and Mr. Siemiller, the head of the union, and some of the other spokesmen for labor do not want legislation. They use the introduction of legislation—it is the duty of Members of Congress to introduce legislation—as an excuse for walking out of negotiations. If they did not have that excuse, they would have found another. In fact, before any legislation was introduced, the union leader in charge of the so-called negotiations found one excuse after another for walking out.

Mr. President, they want their demands. They are willing to use every economic power to get their demands.

For the benefit of Mr. Meany, may I say that although we are not in a declared war, as we were in World War II when he sat on the War Labor Board, we are in a war. We are in a war that has already killed 4,200 American boys. We are in a war that has wounded over three times that number. We are in a war, as I said a few moments ago, when I was discussing the war, that in my judgment engenders an ever-increasing escalation and will endanger more than the 300,000 boys we already have sent there.

These airline employees and all other employees and all businessmen, all involved in any phase of the American economy, have a clear duty of the highest order to follow an economic course of action in this country that will keep sound the greatest security weapon we possess—our economy.

These airline workers, through their union leaders, know, as Mr. Meany knows, that the demands of this union will be met in large part if the strike is permitted to go on. If the strike is permitted to go on for a considerably longer period of time, everyone knows that eventually a capitulation would have to be made to the economic might of a union that has walked out on its clear responsibility to its country in an hour of war.

Mr. President, this union is entitled to protection as to its legitimate rights; and I propose to do what I can to continue to protect these workers. Of course, at the present time, to them, I am some kind of ogre. But I do not yield to any public official in this country, for my 32-year record of settling labor disputes will show that I have always fought for the legitimate rights of the workers as

well as for the legitimate rights of management involved in a case.

But there are three parties to this case. This union seems to think there is only one; and apparently Mr. Meany thinks its workers ought to be allowed to go ahead without any checks being placed upon them, even though they are working in a regulated industry that is vested with public interest, and to use their economic might to force a settlement in this case that will blow the lid off any inflationary controls in this country—and the inflationary controls we ought to have are voluntary inflationary controls.

The alternative, I say to Mr. Meany, if this union is allowed to get by with blowing off the lid of inflationary controls, is drastic legislation to provide for price controls, wage controls, and overall economic controls. Such controls will not be needed if all parties involved in industrial relations will live up to their responsibility of industrial statesmanship.

Take a look at who are waiting to have their cases considered. If this union is allowed to get by with inflationary economic increases by way of wage benefits and other benefits, how can increasing millions of American workers be stopped from arguing that they are entitled to the same benefits? In one sense, there would be some reason for them to say it, although they would not be justified in saying it. But it is typical in an industrial situation that if one major group gets a benefit, other groups arguing for improvements in their lot will point it out. In labor mediation or in labor arbitration, that is called the principle of equal pay for workers in comparable industry.

If the machinists' union is allowed an inflationary increase, I say to my administration tonight: You will be in an impossible position if you think you can stop an increase for employees of American Airlines or the other airlines, who will soon be in the same position; or the employees of the telephone industry, who are just waiting; or the employees of General Electric or Westinghouse; or those under contracts involving the Teamsters Union; or those working under contracts with some of the major maritime companies. They will be there waiting for their adjustment.

So when Mr. Meany argues or says in this statement that there is no danger to the health and welfare of the Nation he could not be more wrong. The Nation's welfare is inseparably bound up with its economic health.

Mr. President, unchecked inflation is not in the interest of the national welfare, and if the only reason for legislation, in view of the record of this union in this case, would be to place a congressional check upon the attempt of this union to set the pace for a breakthrough in inflationary control on a voluntary basis, the legislation would be more than justified.

But there are more reasons for it than that, Mr. President. There are entire areas of this country which are virtually

isolated as a result of the strike on the five airlines.

The Pacific Northwest, as far as continental travel is concerned, is dependent upon Northwest Airlines and United. Both of them are down. We have a few of what we call local lines going up and down parts of the West Coast but they do not supply the service that the American people need and the people of the Pacific Northwest need to other parts of the country.

Hawaii and Alaska are even worse off.

This situation amounts to a form of economic holdup on the part of this union in not being willing to settle for a fair noninflationary settlement and we know what is a fair noninflationary settlement.

We handed down recommendations that economists generally—and I have talked to many of them—recognize was a very good settlement but was still noninflationary.

The carriers have offered \$76 million, and \$78 million is being called for. I am not saying that there is anything magical about \$76 million or \$78 million, but we all know that they are right on the borderline.

We have an emergency in this country if the inflationary issue were the only issue, but we have these other issues. One of them I have just mentioned: The isolating of various regions of this country as a result of the strike.

I can cite great cities in this country—New York, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco—suffering great economic losses and their people are suffering great economic losses as a result of the strike.

So-called national emergency dispute legislation was passed on the basis of congressional intent. When that kind of situation develops Congress has the duty and the Government has the duty to move in to protect the public interest.

#### ADMINISTRATION POSITION

I shall await with great interest the testimony of the spokesman for this administration tomorrow afternoon before the Labor Committee. I am satisfied, from what I know about this case, that this administration knows that a national emergency exists.

I wish to say most respectfully to my administration tonight that Congress has the duty to pass legislation to protect the public interest, and the Johnson administration has the public duty to support it.

In essence, my proposal extends the 60-day no strike period of the Railway Labor Act. The President saw fit to invoke that provision. On what basis did he invoke it that does not prevail now?

The eyes of tens of millions of American people will be on the Johnson administration tomorrow to determine whether or not the Johnson administration is willing to let this case drag on until there is an inflationary breakthrough. If there is, Congress will be passing the most stringent inflation control legislation. That should not be necessary. It will be our duty to do it if the workers involved in this union—and in other unions that are waiting to follow their course of ac-

tion—and this administration make it necessary.

But, Mr. President, I find myself in agreement with most of the things that the President stands for. In my judgment, from the cases in which I have been involved in which he has brought to bear his great industrial and political statesmanship, no one in this country has been better informed on the direct relationship between the maintenance of a sound economy in this country and the adoption of a labor-management program during this war period that will be fair to both labor and management, and who will insist that the public interest come first.

Mr. George Meany, in the statement that he made to the press, obviously, as the leader of the AFL-CIO, is not putting the public interest first in America tonight.

#### ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in accordance with the previous order, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment until 11 a.m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 16 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, July 27, 1966, at 11 o'clock a.m.

#### WITHDRAWALS

Executive nominations withdrawn from the Senate July 26 (legislative day of July 22), 1966:

#### POSTMASTERS

I withdraw the nomination sent to the Senate on May 12, 1966, of Ubaldo V. Pambianco to be postmaster at Peckville, in the State of Pennsylvania.

I withdraw the nomination sent to the Senate on June 15, 1966, of Fred E. Magee to be postmaster at New Milford, in the State of Pennsylvania.

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1966

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

*Let Thy mercy, O Lord, be upon us, according as we hope in Thee.—Psalm 33: 22.*

Eternal Father of our spirits, we pause in Thy presence with heads bowed in prayer as we begin the demanding duties of this day. Make Thy spirit real to us, for we need Thee, every hour we need Thee. Temptations lose their power when Thou art nigh.

We come disturbed by the spirit of our day, weighed down by worry, concerned by our failure to do what really needs to be done, tempted at times to give up—yet here we are. Give us the faith we need for this hour, the courage to do what is best for our country and the confidence to leave the results with Thee. In the dear Redeemer's name we pray. Amen.